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Plebiscite (Future Migration Level) Bill 2018 — creates national plebiscite on immigration levels

Establishes a non‑binding question on whether Australia’s immigration rate is ‘too high’, run alongside the next House of Representatives election using adapted referendum rules.

The Brief

The bill authorises a national plebiscite to be held at the next general election asking electors whether “the current rate of immigration to Australia is too high.” It borrows the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 and the Electoral and Referendum Regulation 2016, with tailored modifications to make those rules apply to this advisory vote.

This matters because the measure repurposes referendum processes for a non‑constitutional, advisory poll and prescribes specific operational and media controls: the writ must be issued alongside the next House writs, scrutineer and recount procedures are adjusted, the Electoral Commissioner must certificate and return results to the Governor‑General, and broadcasters (including SBS) face balancing and blackout obligations during the plebiscite period. Those design choices shape who can influence the debate and how the result is produced and challenged.

At a Glance

What It Does

The bill enables a national plebiscite at the next general election, applies referendum machinery to run it with specified modifications, and declares the outcome by simple majority of formal votes. It fixes the plebiscite timetable to the House of Representatives writs and supplies bespoke forms and procedures for issuing the writ and counting votes.

Who It Affects

Primary obligations fall on the Australian Electoral Commission and state/territory electoral authorities; free‑to‑air and subscription broadcasters including SBS; members of Parliament (who may appoint scrutineers and can petition the High Court); and organisations that campaign on migration policy.

Why It Matters

Using referendum law for an advisory plebiscite is procedurally novel and brings strict campaign and broadcast controls into a political debate rather than a constitutional change. The bill therefore determines not only how votes are counted but who gets regulated access to air time and who may legally contest the result.

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What This Bill Actually Does

The bill creates a single yes/no national plebiscite question to be submitted to electors: it quotes population-change statistics from 2005–2016 and asks, “Do you think the current rate of immigration to Australia is too high?” The Governor‑General may cause the plebiscite to be held, and the bill ties the voting day and roll‑close day to the same days fixed for the next House of Representatives election.

Rather than inventing a new electoral framework, the bill imports the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act and the Referendum Regulation and then specifies a series of targeted changes. Practically this means the AEC runs the plebiscite using referendum processes where they fit, but with modified writ forms, a bespoke definition of the plebiscite period, and instructions that omit the usual ‘proposed law’ material (since this is not a constitutional alteration).

The plebiscite result is decided by simple majority of formal votes; informal voting is not an offence in itself.Operational adjustments matter: members of Parliament may appoint scrutineers for polling places, prepoll offices and counting centres within their State or Territory, and the Special Minister of State can limit numbers by legislative instrument. The Electoral Commissioner must certify numbers for and against and attach that certificate to the writ returned to the Governor‑General.

The bill lets the Commissioner order recounts on their own motion or at a member’s request, and restricts who may bring a legal challenge—the High Court may hear disputes, but only following a petition by a member of Parliament who must sign the petition.Broadcasting and campaign communications are governed tightly during the plebiscite period: broadcasters that air plebiscite material in favour of the proposal must give a reasonable opportunity to opponents to broadcast during the election/plebiscite period and vice versa; advertising containing plebiscite matter is prohibited from the end of the Wednesday before polling day until close of poll; and SBS must provide reciprocal opportunities but is not required to air material free of charge. The bill also allows regulations to modify other statutory instruments to make them work for the plebiscite.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

The bill requires the plebiscite question to read, verbatim, with population figures from 2005–2016 and asks: “Do you think the current rate of immigration to Australia is too high?”, The writ for the plebiscite must be issued on the same day writs are issued for the next House of Representatives general election and use forms supplied in the bill’s Schedule.

2

The plebiscite result is decided by a simple majority: more than 50% of valid (formal) votes for or against; informal ballotpapers are disregarded and casting one is not a standalone offence.

3

Members of Parliament may appoint scrutineers at polling places, prepoll offices and counting centres in their State or Territory, and the Special Minister of State may set numeric limits by legislative instrument.

4

Broadcasters (including SBS) must offer a reasonable opportunity to opposing views when broadcasting plebiscite matter during the plebiscite period, and advertisements containing plebiscite matter are banned from the end of the Wednesday before polling day until close of poll.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Part 1 — Sections 1–4

Short title, commencement and definitions

This part fixes the Act’s name, staggers commencement and provides key definitions. Most operative sections (3–33 and Schedule 1) only commence after the Consolidated Revenue Fund is appropriated to meet plebiscite costs, meaning the mechanism cannot take effect until funding is authorised. It also defines ‘plebiscite matter’, the plebiscite period and imports definitions from the Referendum Act so those terms operate consistently when the referendum machinery is engaged.

Part 2 — Sections 5–8

Plebiscite question, result rule and AEC functions

Section 5 sets the exact ballot question and empowers the Governor‑General to cause the plebiscite, while section 6 prescribes the >50% threshold for a result in favour or not in favour. Section 7 assigns relevant functions to the Electoral Commission and allows it to work with state/territory electoral authorities. Section 8 clarifies that casting an informal ballotpaper is not by itself an offence under the Referendum Act — a procedural protection that affects how informal voting is treated in practice.

Part 3 Division 1 — Sections 9–22

How the Referendum Act applies and adapted voting/counting procedures

These provisions import the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act with precise modifications: the definition of referendum period is replaced for this plebiscite; the writ form and timing are rewritten so the plebiscite runs alongside the House election; numerous subsections of the Referendum Act are omitted where they presuppose a proposed law; and practical voting rules are altered to allow MPs to appoint scrutineers and the Commissioner to direct recounts. The result certification and return are tailored so the Commissioner must attach a certificate with counts to the writ and return it to the Governor‑General. The High Court challenge route remains but is narrowed to petitions brought and signed by a member of Parliament.

3 more sections
Part 3 Division 2 — Sections 23–25

Application of the Referendum Regulation

This Division makes the Electoral and Referendum Regulation 2016 operate for the plebiscite, again with stated modifications and subject to regulations made under section 33. It ensures procedural regulations that support referendums (ballotpaper layout, postal voting, etc.) apply here unless specifically altered, and it links any necessary regulatory fixes back to the regulation‑making power in section 33.

Part 3 Division 3 — Sections 26–32

Cross‑application of electoral, privacy, criminal and broadcasting rules

The bill draws other statutes into the plebiscite framework: selected clauses of the Broadcasting Services Act and the Special Broadcasting Service Act apply to plebiscite matter (identification, records, reasonable‑opportunity rules and blackout periods), specific offences in the Criminal Code and privacy provisions are engaged, and exemptions clarify that broadcasting expenditure reporting obligations do not automatically create an annual return requirement. Notably, the bill inserts new SBS duties to offer opposing views and prohibits SBS from airing advertisements containing plebiscite matter during the blackout window.

Part 4 — Section 33 and Schedule 1

Regulations and forms

Section 33 gives the Governor‑General power to make regulations to fill gaps and modify other instruments so they operate with the plebiscite. Schedule 1 supplies the writ (Form A) and ballotpaper (Form B) to be used, which fixes the exact question wording and voter directions that the AEC must follow.

At scale

This bill is one of many.

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Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • National advocacy organisations that can mobilise resources: the plebiscite creates a single, nationwide platform and a defined plebiscite period during which broadcasters must offer opposing views, giving organised groups predictable access and a focused campaign window.
  • Electoral administrators (AEC and state/territory electoral authorities): the bill grants clear statutory authority and adapted referendum procedures to run the vote concurrently with a federal election, reducing legal ambiguity about how to administer a national advisory poll.
  • Policy researchers and public‑opinion analysts: the plebiscite produces a binary national measure on public sentiment about migration rates that can be used for research, planning and parliamentary debate.

Who Bears the Cost

  • Australian Electoral Commission and state/territory electoral authorities: running a nationwide plebiscite, even if funded by appropriation, requires additional logistics, staffing and coordination alongside a general election.
  • Broadcasters and SBS: legal obligations to provide reasonable opportunities to opposing views, compliance with identification and record‑keeping rules, and enforcement of the advertising blackout create editorial and administrative burdens and potential liability risks.
  • Members of Parliament and parties: they must resource scrutineer appointments across polling places and may be expected to defend or contest results, including by funding High Court petitions and recount requests.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The central dilemma is between seeking a broad, national expression of public opinion on migration and preserving a neutral, procedurally fair process: the bill borrows robust referendum machinery to increase administrative legitimacy, yet adapts those tools in ways that invite politicised control (MP‑appointed scrutineers, campaign‑period broadcasting rules, limited legal standing), so the instrument that grants public voice also reshapes who controls the debate and how reliably the result reflects an impartial count.

The bill balances clarity of process against several open implementation questions. It borrows referendum rules but strips away elements tied to proposed laws, producing a hybrid statutory regime whose edge cases are not fully tested — for example, how postal and absentee voting rules designed for referendums operate for this advisory question, or how spending disclosure thresholds and timing will interact with the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

The definition of plebiscite matter is broad and the reasonable‑opportunity standard for broadcasters is inherently discretionary; enforcement and resource burdens fall on regulators and broadcasters, who may face contested determinations about what constitutes adequate opportunity.

Procedural choices also carry political effects. Allowing members of Parliament to appoint scrutineers at polling, prepoll and counting centres centralises engagement by sitting MPs and parties, which can advantage organised political actors over grassroots groups.

Narrowing legal challenge standing to members of Parliament concentrates litigation power and sidelines private parties and community groups that might otherwise challenge procedural fairness. Finally, timing the plebiscite to coincide with a general election risks conflating issue campaigning with candidate contests and complicates AEC logistics during a high‑stakes electoral period.

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