The Right to Protest Act 2025 creates a statutory right for a person to engage in peaceful protest in a public place. It defines ‘protest’ broadly to include political and disruptive actions, confines the right to peaceful conduct, and conditions any restriction on a necessity test tied to national security, public safety, public order, public health and the rights of others.
Practically, the bill declares that any Commonwealth, State or Territory law inconsistent with this statutory right is of no effect to the extent of the inconsistency, while allowing concurrent operation where possible. The Act invokes Australia’s external‑affairs power, expressly contemplates operation in Territories, Commonwealth places and certain communications, and preserves the constitutional implied freedom of political communication where applicable.
For law enforcement, event regulators and courts, the bill installs a new legal benchmark for evaluating protest restrictions and penalties.
At a Glance
What It Does
Statutorily recognises a right to engage in peaceful protest in public places, limits permissible restrictions to those 'necessary in a democratic society' for enumerated interests, and renders inconsistent laws of the Commonwealth, States or Territories inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.
Who It Affects
Police and other enforcement agencies, State and Territory public‑order and public‑health regulators, event and permits authorities, civil liberties lawyers and protest organisers, and the courts that will adjudicate necessity and proportionality challenges.
Why It Matters
It elevates protest protection from common‑law and implied constitutional doctrines into statute, sets a specific legal standard for permissible limits (including an explicit test against excessive penalties), and shifts the default in any conflict between this right and existing laws toward protecting peaceful protest.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The Act establishes a person’s statutory right to engage in peaceful protest in a public place. ‘Public place’ is drafted broadly to include places open to or used by the public (including where access is by consent or payment), while ‘protest’ expressly reaches political actions and actions that are disruptive or seek to be disruptive. The right is confined to ‘peaceful’ protest, but the definition of protest signals Parliament’s intent to encompass a wide range of political expression short of physical violence.
Any restriction on that right must meet a tightly worded necessity test: it must be intended to address an unacceptable risk of harm tied to national security, public safety, public order, public health or the rights and freedoms of others, and it must be appropriately adapted to that goal. The bill also specifies that an excessive penalty is, by definition, an unnecessary restriction — creating a standalone proportionality consideration that will influence how sanctions for protest conduct are drafted and assessed.Section 10 changes the legal map for overlapping laws: Commonwealth, State or Territory laws inconsistent with Part 2 are ‘of no effect’ to the extent of the inconsistency, though laws capable of operating concurrently remain in force.
The Act also includes explicit textual scaffolding to extend operation under the external‑affairs power, to apply in external Territories, to have the effect it would if confined to Commonwealth places, and to reach communications that fall under the Constitution’s paragraph 51(v).Finally, the Act preserves the constitutional implied freedom of political communication: it does not apply so as to infringe that doctrine. That qualification leaves open how courts will reconcile statutory protection with existing constitutional principles — including whether the statutory necessity test will dovetail with or duplicate judicial balancing under the implied freedom.
The Five Things You Need to Know
Section 8 creates a statutory right to engage in peaceful protest in a public place — the operative guarantee the rest of the Act protects.
Section 5 defines ‘protest’ to include political actions and actions that are disruptive or seek to be disruptive, while ‘public place’ covers locations open to or used by the public, including by consent or payment.
Section 9 requires any restriction to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for specific interests and says an excessive penalty is automatically an unnecessary restriction.
Section 10 makes laws of the Commonwealth, States or Territories unenforceable to the extent they are inconsistent with Part 2, but permits concurrent operation where possible.
Sections 11–12 rely on the external‑affairs power and expressly preserve operation in Territories, Commonwealth places and in communications covered by paragraph 51(v), while Section 13 saves the statute from operating so as to infringe the implied freedom of political communication.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title, commencement, objects and definitions
This part sets the Act’s purpose and mechanics: recognise the right to ‘engage in peaceful protest’ and anchor it to ICCPR Articles 19, 21 and 22. The definitions matter operationally — ‘protest’ explicitly reaches disruptive political acts and ‘public place’ is broad enough to capture venues where the public attend by consent or payment — which will affect where the statutory right applies and complicate enforcement on private land open to the public.
Statutory guarantee of peaceful protest
Section 8 is the operative clause: it gives individuals a statutory right to peaceful protest in public places. It does not create an absolute right; rather it creates a protected activity that other provisions then calibrate. Because the right is statutory (not constitutional), courts will interpret and apply it alongside other statutory schemes and the implied freedom doctrine.
Necessity and proportionality test for restrictions
Section 9 supplies the limiting principle: restrictions are allowed only if necessary in a democratic society for listed interests. The provision requires both intent and appropriate adaptation to address an ‘unacceptable risk of harm’ and singles out excessive penalties as inherently unnecessary. This blends elements of international human‑rights proportionality tests with a specific penalty standard that will shape legislative drafting and judicial review of protest‑related offences.
Inconsistency rule and concurrent operation
Section 10 declares inconsistent laws of the Commonwealth, States or Territories ‘of no effect’ to the extent inconsistent with Part 2, while preserving laws that can operate concurrently. That creates a direct federal check on state and local protest regulation: common state offences or permit regimes that cannot be reconciled with the statutory right may be rendered inoperative. Practical disputes over ‘capable of operating concurrently’ will likely drive litigation.
Multiple constitutional bases and special‑scope clauses
Section 12 supplements the external‑affairs foundation by saying the Act should be read as also applying if confined to Territories, Commonwealth places, or to protest using communications covered by paragraph 51(v). These alternative readings are a drafting tactic to maximise constitutional resilience and to broaden the Act’s practical reach into Commonwealth places (airports, defence sites) and into communication services.
Interaction with the implied freedom of political communication
Section 13 preserves the scope of the constitutional doctrine by excluding application of the Act where it would infringe the implied freedom. That leaves open whether the statutory necessity test will simply mirror judicial proportionality under the implied freedom or produce a distinct body of statutory standards; either outcome will shape how courts review protest restrictions.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Civil Rights across all five countries.
Explore Civil Rights in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Organised protest groups and activists — gain a clearer statutory shield for peaceful, even disruptive, political expression in public places and a legal standard to challenge restrictive permits or criminalisation.
- Civil liberties and human‑rights NGOs — receive a statutory hook to bring administrative and constitutional litigation and to use the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test in advocacy and monitoring.
- Courts and administrative tribunals — gain a defined statutory framework to assess protest‑related disputes, which can streamline reasoning about proportionality and excessive penalties compared with ad hoc common‑law analysis.
Who Bears the Cost
- State and Territory governments — face the prospect that existing public‑order, trespass and protest laws may be held inoperative to the extent they conflict with the new statutory right, requiring legislative redrafts or defence in court.
- Police and enforcement agencies — must justify restrictions under the new necessity test in real time and risk increased judicial scrutiny and litigation if their orders or dispersal tactics are challenged.
- Event organisers, local councils and permit authorities — may need to revise permit conditions and enforcement policies because an ‘excessive penalty’ standard constrains sanction regimes and could invalidate heavy fines or broad prohibitions.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is protecting robust, sometimes disruptive, political expression in public spaces while preserving the state’s ability to prevent real harms: the bill seeks to enshrine protest protections but delegates the hard line‑drawing about danger, order and proportional sanctions to courts and enforcement agencies — a trade‑off between statutory clarity of rights and practical public‑order governance.
The bill threads a statutory protection through a thicket of legal and practical questions. First, the Act’s protection applies only to ‘peaceful’ protest while the definition of ‘protest’ includes disruptive conduct; that creates scope‑of‑protection ambiguity: courts will be called on to map which disruptive acts remain ‘peaceful’ and where the line to violence or unlawful harm is crossed.
Second, the inconsistency clause (section 10) is blunt: making inconsistent laws ‘of no effect’ shifts significant regulatory power away from States and Territories and invites litigation over whether particular offences or permit conditions can ‘operate concurrently’ with the right.
Operationally, the necessity test imports international proportionality language but stops short of prescribing burdens of proof or procedural mechanisms for how authorities must demonstrate necessity before restricting protest. The provision that an excessive penalty is per se unnecessary elevates penalties as a discrete review point, but the Act does not define ‘excessive’ or prescribe review procedures, leaving thresholds to courts.
Finally, while the bill attempts constitutional self‑insurance via the external‑affairs power and alternative readings for Territories, Commonwealth places and communications, the preserved non‑application to the extent of any implied freedom infringement leaves open whether the statute will ultimately supplement, duplicate, or complicate judicial doctrines developed under the Constitution.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.