The Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 replaces multiple specific secrecy offences with a single, general criminal offence that targets people who use or communicate information obtained by reason of being Commonwealth officers, contractors or service providers. The new offence focuses on intent — to obtain a benefit or cause detriment — and on whether the use or communication would reasonably be regarded as improper; it carries a maximum prison term of two years.
The Bill also removes or repeals secrecy penalties in numerous Commonwealth laws, inserts procedural protections for journalists by requiring the Attorney‑General’s written consent before prosecutions proceed, and narrows several national‑security secrecy provisions (including revising definitions and lowering certain maximum penalties). It adds a publication requirement for the Defence Intelligence Organisation mandate and makes multiple consequential edits to existing statutes.
At a Glance
What It Does
Creates a single general secrecy offence (replacing section 122.4) that criminalises use or communication of information obtained through being a Commonwealth officer, contractor or service provider if done with the intention to gain benefit or cause detriment and the use would reasonably be considered improper; maximum penalty two years. Repeals or removes criminal penalties across many Acts, requires Attorney‑General consent for prosecutions of journalists, and narrows some national security secrecy elements and penalties.
Who It Affects
Commonwealth officers, contractors and other persons who provide paid or unpaid services to Commonwealth entities (now explicitly captured), media organisations and journalists (through a new consent rule), intelligence and defence agencies (through narrowed definitions and a transparency requirement for the DIO mandate), and agencies that previously relied on bespoke statutory secrecy offences.
Why It Matters
This is a structural rewrite: the government is converting many bespoke statutory secrecy provisions into a consolidated framework with a general offence plus prosecutorial gatekeeping for the media. That changes how disclosure risk is assessed by compliance teams, counsel and contractors and shifts discretion toward the Attorney‑General while narrowing some national security offence elements.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The Bill substitutes a new general secrecy offence into the Criminal Code that applies to people who obtained information because they were Commonwealth officers, were engaged to work for most Commonwealth entities, or provided services (paid or unpaid) to those entities. To convict, the prosecution must show the person used or communicated the information, intended to obtain a benefit or to cause detriment, and that a reasonable person could conclude the use or communication was improper.
The maximum term is two years, and the law expressly states it is unnecessary to prove an actual benefit was obtained or actual detriment occurred.
Alongside creation of the general offence, the Bill amends the Criminal Code’s drafting to make clear that a “Part 5.6 Commonwealth entity” excludes the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Special Broadcasting Service Corporation. The Bill also updates dozens of Commonwealth laws: many statutory secrecy offences or their penalties are repealed or stripped of criminal sanctions, and several Acts receive notes or edits pointing readers to the new Part 5.6 secrecy provisions.
For certain listed specific secrecy provisions the previous version of section 122.4 continues to apply in specified transitional circumstances.The Bill introduces procedural protections for media‑related prosecutions. For alleged breaches of secrecy provisions involving professional journalists or the administrative staff of news organisations, the Attorney‑General’s written consent is required before proceedings may continue; arrests, charges and remands may occur before consent but the prosecution cannot proceed further without it, and accused persons may be discharged if proceedings are not continued within a reasonable time.
Separately, the Bill amends Part 5.6’s national security secrecy machinery: it removes or narrows several definitions (for example, abandoning the “inherently harmful” label and changing what it means to “deal” with information), tightens the language about what constitutes harm to Australia’s interests, and lowers certain maximum penalties (for example reducing one offence’s maximum from five to three years).Finally, the Bill imposes a few discrete, practical changes: it requires the Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation to publish the DIO mandate; it adjusts references and cross‑references across many Acts to reflect the new Part 5.6 structure; and it makes some targeted penalty adjustments elsewhere (for example, adding a penalty in the Business Names Registration Act). The package is both a consolidation exercise and a rebalancing of secrecy risk, prosecutorial control and transparency in national security oversight.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The Bill replaces section 122.4 with a single general offence: using or communicating information obtained as a Commonwealth officer, contractor or service provider, with intent to obtain a benefit or cause detriment and where the use would reasonably be improper — maximum penalty 2 years’ imprisonment.
The term Part 5.6 Commonwealth entity is introduced and explicitly excludes the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Special Broadcasting Service Corporation.
Schedule 2 repeals or removes criminal penalties and whole secrecy provisions across numerous Commonwealth instruments (examples include repeal of s11 of the National Blood Authority Act 2003, repeal of s19H of the National Measurement Act 1960, and removal of the penalty in s79B of the Reserve Bank Act 1959).
Schedule 3 requires the Attorney‑General’s written consent before proceedings may continue against journalists or certain media staff accused under secrecy provisions, while still permitting arrest, charge and remand prior to consent.
Schedule 4 tightens and narrows Part 5.6: it revises definitions (removes the “inherently harmful” label and changes what it means to ‘deal’ with information), narrows the phrasing for what constitutes harm to Australia’s interests, reduces at least one maximum penalty (from 5 to 3 years), and substitutes a blanket rule requiring Attorney‑General consent for prosecutions under the Part.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
New general secrecy offence for officers, contractors and service providers
This provision replaces the old targeted secrecy offence with a broadly framed general offence. The practical mechanics are mens rea plus an objective impropriety test: prosecution must show use/communication, an intention (to obtain benefit or cause detriment) and that the use would reasonably be regarded as improper. The penalty is set at two years’ imprisonment and the provision clarifies that actual benefit or harm need not be proved, lowering the evidentiary burden on causation while retaining intentionality.
Who is covered and drafting changes across Part 5.6
These items insert the phrase Part 5.6 Commonwealth entity and amend multiple subsections across Part 5.6 to capture persons who provided services (paid or unpaid) as well as officers and engaged workers. Importantly, the definition explicitly excludes the ABC and SBS, narrowing the institutional reach and affecting which entities’ personnel fall under the new criminal rule. Several formatting and terminology edits align exceptions and defences (section 122.5) with the expanded coverage.
Unpicking bespoke secrecy penalties across many Acts
Schedule 2 removes standalone secrecy offences and criminal penalties from a range of laws—some by wholesale repeal of sections, others by striking specific penalty clauses. The schedule distinguishes between repeals (removing the statutory offence entirely) and substitutions that convert criminal offences into nondisclosure duties without criminal penalties. Notably, the Australian Jobs Act retains a nondisclosure duty for entrusted officials but the Bill clarifies exceptions; other statutes (for example in health, measurement and transport) have penalties removed, shifting enforcement away from criminal sanction.
Attorney‑General consent safeguard for prosecutions involving journalists
Schedule 3 adds a new prosecutorial gatekeeping rule: written consent of the Attorney‑General is required before proceedings can be commenced against persons accused of secrecy offences where the conduct would be viewed as professional journalism or media administrative work. The provision permits preliminary steps—arrest, charge and remand—before consent is obtained, but bars further prosecution steps without consent and provides for discharge if proceedings do not proceed in a reasonable time. The regulations may carve out classes of offences from this requirement.
Narrowing and modernization of national security secrecy elements; DIO transparency
This Schedule makes substantive edits to Part 5.6’s national security limb: it removes certain broad phrases from the definition of harm to Australia’s interests, repeals the ‘inherently harmful’ category, replaces the definition of deal with an enumerated list of acts (collect, possess, copy, conceal, etc.), and clarifies that communicating includes publication or making available. It also reduces the maximum penalty for one communication offence and, critically, replaces subsection 123.5 so that Attorney‑General consent is required for proceedings under the Part. Finally, it requires public publication of the Defence Intelligence Organisation mandate.
Targeted technical fixes and a few penalty changes
Schedule 5 contains small but practical edits: it inserts penalty language into the Business Names Registration Act, adjusts cross‑references and the persons authorised to receive disclosures under section 122.5, and fixes drafting oversights. These changes tidy up how exceptions and official recipients are described and set applicable commencement rules for those updates.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Justice across all five countries.
Explore Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Journalists and professional newsrooms — the Attorney‑General consent requirement builds a procedural safeguard that makes prosecutions for journalistic activity less likely to proceed without senior executive review, reducing immediate prosecutorial risk.
- Contractor and unpaid service providers to Commonwealth entities — many bespoke statutory secrecy offences and penalties are repealed or stripped, reducing the number of distinct criminal exposure points and avoiding duplication of criminal sanctions across regulatory instruments.
- Legal and compliance teams in Commonwealth agencies — the consolidation into a single offence simplifies the statutory map they must monitor and allows agencies to harmonise confidentiality policies around one framework rather than dozens of bespoke offences.
- Oversight and transparency stakeholders — the DIO mandate publication increases the written, public statement of DIO priorities and responsibilities, supporting parliamentary and public scrutiny of defence intelligence functions.
Who Bears the Cost
- Commonwealth officers, contractors and service providers — the new general offence has a broad reach (explicitly capturing paid and unpaid service providers) and an objective impropriety test that may increase prosecution risk in ambiguous cases, even where historic bespoke offences have been removed.
- Media staff and organisations — although they gain a consent safeguard, the provision still permits arrest and charging before consent is sought, which can cause reputational harm, legal costs and operational disruption.
- Commonwealth agencies that previously relied on bespoke criminal penalties — some agencies lose statutory criminal deterrents and may have to rely more on administrative, contractual or civil measures to prevent disclosures.
- Attorney‑General’s office and prosecuting authorities — centralising consent and assessing a large, consolidated set of potential secrecy matters will increase workload and require new internal procedures, guidance and potentially resources to manage consent decisions consistently.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is balancing reduced over‑criminalisation and better protections for journalism against the need for clear, enforceable limits on disclosures that genuinely harm national security or agency functions: the Bill simplifies and narrows some national‑security elements while expanding coverage to many service providers and centralising prosecutorial power in the Attorney‑General, producing a trade‑off between legal clarity, administrative efficiency and potential politicisation of high‑profile prosecutions.
The Bill trades a web of bespoke secrecy offences for a single general offence while simultaneously removing criminal penalties from many specific statutes. That consolidation simplifies the statutory landscape but replaces precise, context‑specific elements and penalties with a broad standard built on intent plus an objective impropriety assessment.
The “reasonable to conclude…improper” threshold is deliberately flexible; flexibility helps cover unexpected fact patterns but leaves significant uncertainty for advisers, contractors and courts about what conduct crosses the line.
The procedural protection for journalists centralises power in the Attorney‑General’s office. Requiring written consent before prosecutions proceed can protect legitimate journalism from being pursued lightly, but permitting arrest and charge before consent risks reputational and practical harm to accused journalists.
The replacement of subsection 123.5 to require AG consent for all Part 5.6 prosecutions further concentrates prosecutorial gatekeeping; how that discretion will be exercised (and whether it will be guided by published policy) remains unresolved. Narrowing national security language and lowering penalties reduces prosecutorial reach for some leak‑type conduct, but it may also create gaps where the new general offence does not map neatly onto the kinds of specific harms previously addressed by bespoke statutes.
Operationally, the Bill raises transition and compliance questions: agencies will need to audit which prior offences have been removed, revise internal nondisclosure regimes, and retrain staff and contractors. Prosecutors will face choices about whether to rely on the general offence or seek to retain non‑criminal administrative remedies.
The combination of broad substantive language and concentrated prosecutorial discretion creates both enforcement efficiencies and legal uncertainty that courts will have to resolve over time.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.