Bill C-220 adds a single, mandatory rule to the Criminal Code: when sentencing an offender who is not a Canadian citizen, a court must not take into account any potential effect the sentence could have on the offender’s immigration status in Canada or that of a family member. The change is narrow in form — one new section inserted after s.718.201 — but it addresses a specific sentencing practice: using collateral immigration consequences (notably deportation) as an aggravating or mitigating factor.
This matters because Canadian judges regularly consider collateral consequences when tailoring punishment. Removing immigration status from that calculus shifts sentencing toward purely criminal-law factors (denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, protection of the public and parity) and away from immigration outcomes that are handled under federal immigration law.
The amendment raises practical questions for judges, counsel, and appellate courts about evidence, scope, and how to balance individualized sentencing without considering foreseeable non‑criminal consequences.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill inserts section 718.202 into the Criminal Code, which mandates that courts imposing sentence on a non‑Canadian must not consider any potential immigration consequences for the offender or their family. The prohibition is absolute in wording: courts “shall not” take immigration status or its family impacts into account.
Who It Affects
Directly affects sentencing judges, defence counsel, and Crown prosecutors in criminal proceedings involving non‑citizen accused. It also affects non‑citizen offenders and their family members whose immigration outcomes have previously been cited during sentencing submissions.
Why It Matters
By excluding immigration consequences from sentencing, the bill severs a common link between criminal sentencing and immigration enforcement, potentially changing sentence length or structure in cases where deportation or family separation would otherwise be relevant. That shift will trigger appeals court guidance and operational changes in how sentencing facts are presented and argued.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill adds a single, clear rule to Canada's sentencing law: when a person being sentenced is not a Canadian citizen, the judge must ignore any immigration consequences that could flow from the sentence for that person or for their family. The text does not create a carve‑out or exceptions; it frames the rule as a mandatory prohibition on considering immigration status as part of the sentencing analysis.
In practice this means lawyers and judges must treat immigration consequences as irrelevant to the purposes and principles of sentencing set out elsewhere in the Criminal Code. If counsel seeks to introduce evidence or argument about deportation, inadmissibility, or family separation to influence the sentence, the judge should exclude that material from the sentencing calculus.
The measure leaves immigration enforcement entirely with immigration law and agencies — it does not change removal powers, admissibility rules, or the operation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.Because the bill sets out a rule but does not prescribe procedures for enforcement, courts will need to develop doctrine on how to handle disputed facts about likely immigration outcomes, when to strike submissions that raise those facts, and how to correct a sentence on appeal if a judge considered immigration impact. Defence lawyers may change their advocacy — for instance, by emphasizing criminal‑law mitigating factors other than collateral immigration consequences — while prosecutors may adjust aggravating submissions that previously relied on immigration outcomes.Finally, the provision’s inclusion of family members’ immigration status pushes beyond the individual offender to recognize the collateral harm that sentencing can cause to dependents.
That language prevents judges from using the prospect of family separation as either a mitigating or aggravating circumstance, which adds complexity where sentencing objectives legitimately consider harm to victims and third parties.
The Five Things You Need to Know
Bill C-220 inserts new section 718.202 into the Criminal Code immediately after s.718.201.
The new section is mandatory: a sentencing court “shall not” consider any potential impact of the sentence on a non‑citizen offender’s immigration status.
The prohibition explicitly extends to potential impacts on the immigration status of a member of the offender’s family.
The amendment applies only to offenders who are not Canadian citizens; it does not change immigration law or removal powers administered under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
The text contains no procedural rules, sanctions, or guidance on how courts should handle evidence or appellate correction when immigration consequences are raised during sentencing.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Mandatory bar on considering immigration status
This is the operative clause: it tells sentencing judges they must not consider any potential immigration consequence of the sentence for a non‑citizen offender or their family. Practically, the wording (“shall not take into consideration”) imposes a substantive limitation on sentencing discretion rather than a discretionary guideline; judges cannot weigh deportation or family separation as aggravating or mitigating factors when determining the appropriate sentence.
Located within sentencing principles context
By inserting the provision immediately after s.718.201, the bill situates the rule among statutory sentencing principles and statements about collateral consequences. That placement signals legislative intent that immigration consequences be treated differently from other factors judges routinely consider when exercising sentencing discretion, and it will require courts to reconcile this explicit prohibition with surrounding provisions on individualized sentences and proportionality.
Extends beyond the individual offender
The clause goes further than prohibiting consideration of the offender’s own immigration consequences: it bars consideration of impacts on family members’ immigration status. That expansion prevents courts from factoring in likely family separations or dependent status when adjusting punishment, which matters in cases where sentencing choices have foreseeable ripple effects on dependents and caregivers.
No procedural mechanism or sanction specified
The bill does not prescribe how judges should deal with contested evidence about immigration outcomes, nor does it establish remedies or sanctions for non‑compliance. Enforcement will therefore fall to ordinary appellate review and judicial doctrine: if a judge improperly considers immigration consequences, the remedy would be an appeal and possible re‑sentencing. This absence of procedural detail creates immediate questions about evidentiary rulings at sentence and about what constitutes reversible error.
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Explore this topic in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Non‑citizen offenders — The rule prevents judges from increasing or structuring sentences to achieve collateral immigration outcomes such as deportation, which can otherwise produce disproportionate punishment when removal is treated as an added penalty.
- Family members of non‑citizen offenders — By barring consideration of family members’ immigration status, the bill protects dependents from being used indirectly to justify harsher sentences or greater punishments.
- Defence counsel and duty counsel — Lawyers gain a statutory prohibition to challenge sentencing submissions that rely on immigration consequences and to argue for sentences based strictly on criminal‑law factors.
- Immigrant‑rights and civil liberties organizations — The amendment eliminates a common pathway through which immigration enforcement amplifies criminal sanctions, supporting organizations that seek to limit collateral immigration harms.
Who Bears the Cost
- Sentencing judges and courts — Judges must adjust practice to exclude immigration consequences from sentencing analysis and develop new lines of appellate authority to address contested situations.
- Crown prosecutors — Prosecutors lose a sentencing argument (the likelihood of removal or family separation) that sometimes has been used to justify tougher sentences.
- Immigration authorities — The measure separates immigration outcomes from sentencing considerations, which may increase immigration caseloads when removal becomes the sole administrative response rather than a collateral effect of criminal process.
- Legal aid and defence systems — Short‑term costs may rise as counsel litigates evidentiary limits, appeals on sentencing grounds, and seeks jurisprudential guidance on the new prohibition.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between preventing criminal punishments that rely on immigration enforcement (and the disparate harms that causes) and preserving a judge’s ability to craft individualized, proportionate sentences that reflect foreseeable, real‑world consequences for the offender and their family. Eliminating immigration considerations protects non‑citizens from being effectively punished twice, but it also removes a factual circumstance that judges have used to calibrate proportionality and public protection.
The bill draws a clear line between criminal sentencing and immigration consequences, but that simplicity masks implementation complications. First, courts will need authoritative guidance on evidentiary handling: when parties present facts about likely deportation, judges must decide whether to strike submissions, exclude evidence, or simply instruct the jury (where applicable) and the sentencing record.
The absence of procedural rules means appellate courts will quickly be asked to define reversible error and to set boundaries for trial judges.
Second, removing immigration considerations does not alter immigration law or the fact of removal: immigration authorities retain independent powers to detain or remove non‑citizens. The result is a structural separation of responsibilities that could produce practical mismatches — for example, sentences tailored without regard to deportation may produce outcomes (continued residence or community supervision) that immigration authorities then alter, creating discontinuities between criminal rehabilitation goals and immigration enforcement.
Finally, the prohibition risks uneven effects across cases. In some instances, deportation is litigated as an additional form of punishment and its exclusion may reduce sentences; in others, judges may compensate by emphasizing other aggravating factors, producing little net change.
The bill is likely to prompt a period of doctrinal development as courts decide how strictly to police sentencing arguments that touch on immigration status and how to balance individualized sentencing with the statutory ban.
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