Bill C-257 inserts a new Criminal Code offence, section 83.171, making it an indictable offence punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment for any person who, by communicating statements, wilfully promotes a terrorist activity, a terrorist group, or any activity of a terrorist group. The offence can be made out even if the statements do not explicitly reference a terrorist activity or group, and even if they did not actually prompt anyone to commit or join a terrorist activity.
The bill also adds the new offence to the Code’s terrorism-offence definitions and to the list of offences for which non-life sentences must be served consecutively, and it codifies four statutory defences (truth; good-faith religious opinion; public-interest statements believed true on reasonable grounds; and good-faith removal-oriented critique). Practically, the measure broadens criminal exposure for speech and online content, creates new prosecutorial options, and shifts risks and compliance costs onto platforms, publishers, and speakers while inviting judicial interpretation on key terms like "wilfully," "communicating," and the statutory defences.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill creates section 83.171, which makes it an indictable offence to wilfully promote terrorist activity or a terrorist group by communicating statements, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. It specifies that the offence can occur even if the statements do not explicitly refer to terrorism or do not actually spur anyone to participate.
Who It Affects
Federal and provincial prosecutors, police and intelligence units, online platforms and hosting services, journalists, academics, religious leaders, and organizations that moderate or publish user content. Courts and corrections services will face sentencing and case-load consequences if prosecutions increase.
Why It Matters
The offence broadens the reach of Canada’s terrorism provisions into the domain of communication and propaganda with a comparatively low statutory maximum but mandatory consecutive sentencing for non-life terms. That combination and the statutory defences will shape how prosecutors charge, how platforms moderate, and how courts balance public safety against Charter-protected expression.
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What This Bill Actually Does
Bill C-257 adds a new standalone Criminal Code offence titled "wilful promotion of terrorist activity or terrorist group" (s.83.171). The core conduct is simple on its face: anyone who, by communicating statements, wilfully promotes a terrorist activity, a terrorist group, or an activity of a terrorist group, commits an indictable offence with a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.
The drafting ties the terms "communicating" and "statements" to their definitions in s.319(7) (the hate-speech provision), which imports an established breadth for what counts as communication.
The bill deliberately casts a wide net in two ways. First, subsection (2) makes clear that the offence can be made out whether or not the communicated statements specifically or generally relate to a terrorist activity or group, and whether or not the statements actually encouraged or instigated someone to participate in terrorism.
Second, the statutory defences in subsection (3) give courts four specific routes to acquit: the accused can establish that the statements were true; that in good faith they expressed religious opinion or attempted to argue a religious belief; that the statements were relevant to a public-interest subject and the accused reasonably believed them to be true; or that, in good faith, they were pointing out problems that promote terrorism for the purpose of removing them.The bill also alters related sentencing and definitional provisions. It inserts the new offence into the Code’s terrorism-offence definition in s.2 and into the list of offences subject to consecutive sentences under s.83.26.
It further amends the "offence" definition in s.183 to list the new section, which affects how other statutory regimes reference terrorism offences. Those knock-on edits mean the new promotion offence will interact with existing terrorism provisions and sentencing rules rather than standing apart.Taken together, the provision creates a criminal prohibition squarely aimed at propaganda and promotion rather than the classic recruitment or operational conduct of terrorism.
The law uses criminalization to target communicative acts, which will force prosecutors to define and prove "wilful" promotional intent in a speech context and will require courts to apply the statutory defences. That mix makes the role of evidentiary burdens, standards of proof, and the meaning of "public benefit" and "reasonable grounds" central to future litigation and enforcement practice.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill creates section 83.171: an indictable offence for "wilfully" promoting terrorist activity, a terrorist group, or any activity of a terrorist group, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.
The offence is committed "by communicating statements," and the bill imports the meanings of "communicating" and "statements" from subsection 319(7) (the Criminal Code’s hate-speech definitions).
Subsection (2) makes prosecution possible even if the communicated statements do not explicitly reference terrorism or fail to have actually encouraged anyone to participate in terrorism.
Subsection (3) lists four statutory defences the accused must establish: truth; good-faith religious opinion; public-interest statements believed true on reasonable grounds; and good-faith, removal-oriented critique.
The bill adds the new offence into the terrorism-offence definition and makes non-life sentences for it subject to mandatory consecutive service under section 83.26.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Adds the new offence to the terrorism definition
This subsection replaces paragraph (a) of the definition "terrorism offence" in s.2 to include the new section 83.171 in the list of terrorism offences. Practically, that means convictions under s.83.171 will be treated as terrorism offences for any other statutory provision that references the terrorism-offence definition, expanding the legal consequences tied to a conviction beyond standalone sentencing.
Creates the offence: wilful promotion by communicating statements
The bill replaces the heading before s.83.18 and inserts s.83.171(1), which defines the core offence: wilfully promoting terrorism by communicating statements. The provision imposes an indictable maximum of five years. By tying the conduct to communication, the clause targets expressive acts (speech, writing, images, online posts) rather than overt operational assistance.
Scope, defences, and definitions; low threshold for causation
Subsection (2) clarifies that promotion can be established even if the statement does not explicitly mention a terrorist group or activity and even if it did not actually encourage anyone to act. Subsection (3) sets out four defences the accused must "establish"—truth; good-faith religious opinion; public-interest discussion believed true on reasonable grounds; and good-faith removal-oriented critique. Subsection (4) imports the Criminal Code’s s.319(7) definitions of "communicating" and "statements," which have been interpreted broadly in the hate-speech context and will be decisive in determining communications captured by the offence.
Consecutive sentencing and cross-references
Section 3 amends s.83.26 to require that any sentence for an offence under s.83.171 (other than life) be served consecutively to certain other terrorism sentences, increasing overall punishment exposure. Section 4 amends the definition of "offence" in s.183 to add s.83.171, which ensures the new promotion offence is included wherever statutory schemes reference listed offences (for example, some accessory, forfeiture, or procedural provisions that track the Code’s offence lists).
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Communities targeted by terrorist recruitment and propaganda — criminalizing promotional communications gives public safety actors another tool to disrupt recruitment channels and delegitimize extremist messaging.
- Federal and provincial prosecutors and specialized counter‑terrorism units — the bill provides a discrete statutory charge aimed at propaganda and recruitment-related speech that can complement existing terrorism and counselling offences.
- Victims and victims’ families — by expanding the catalogue of terrorism offences, the bill creates an additional legal avenue to hold accountable those who spread or normalize extremist messaging that contributes to harm.
- Intelligence and law enforcement analysts — the clarity of a named 'promotion' offence can justify investigative resources and assist in charging decisions when operational conduct is not present but propagandistic communications are.
Who Bears the Cost
- Online platforms, social-media services, and hosting providers — they face heightened legal and moderation burdens because much communication occurs online; ambiguous thresholds for 'wilful promotion' will increase takedown disputes and compliance costs.
- Journalists, academics, researchers and religious leaders — the statutory reach into communicative acts risks chilling legitimate reporting, scholarly analysis, debate, and doctrinal expression despite the listed defences, particularly where the line between explanation and praise is thin.
- Provincial and federal courts and correctional systems — mandatory consecutive sentencing for non-life terms and any increase in prosecutions will add caseload and custodial implications that require resources.
- Small publishers and independent content creators — they lack legal teams to litigate the statutory defences or to manage moderation policies, increasing exposure to charges or platform de‑platforming.
- Civil liberties organizations and defence counsel — they will likely bear litigation costs to test statutory limits, mounting Charter challenges that consume advocacy and legal resources.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill pits two legitimate objectives against one another: the need to disrupt propaganda and recruitment that facilitate terrorism, and the need to protect freedom of expression for journalism, academic inquiry, religious discourse, and public debate. The offence gives law enforcement a targeted criminal tool, but its breadth, evidentiary burdens, and reliance on contested statutory defences create a classic trade‑off between security and expressive freedoms with no easy, administrable middle ground.
The bill’s key operational ambiguity is the proof of "wilfulness" in a communicative context. Criminal law requires mens rea, but the text gives prosecutors latitude by allowing convictions where statements need not explicitly mention terrorism or actually induce action.
That gap will force courts to articulate what mental state constitutes "wilful promotion" when speech is persuasive, celebratory, or explanatory rather than operational. Prosecutors must show the accused intended to promote; defence lawyering will focus on whether the accused intended explanation, criticism, or debate rather than promotion.
The listed defences are narrow in form but leave open contested evidentiary questions. The provision says the accused must "establish" these defences—suggesting an evidentiary burden on the accused to put forward sufficient proof—yet the bill does not clarify the standard of proof for the defensive facts (whether balance of probabilities suffices for each element).
Terms like "public interest," "reasonable grounds," and "good faith" will require judicial definition; courts may construe them either narrowly (limiting acquittals) or broadly (protecting more expression). Finally, importing s.319(7)’s communication definitions broadens reach to online content, but cross-border content and anonymous speech will complicate jurisdictional enforcement and evidentiary strategies.
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