This bill requires the President of the Treasury Board to produce annual, entity-level reporting on the federal public sector’s use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), including counts and dollar amounts, and to certify the accuracy of that data. It amends the Financial Administration Act and the Parliament of Canada Act to restrict the use of public money: departments, Crown corporations and certain parliamentary bodies may not use public funds to pay for settlements containing NDAs in harassment, violence or discrimination matters, nor to litigate NDAs against complainants.
The bill also forces grant and contribution agreements with entities not in the Public Accounts to include annual reporting obligations on NDAs, defines covered NDAs (expressly including non-disparagement provisions and monetary disclosure), sets an informed-consent requirement (complainants must be offered independent legal advice and make a specific written request before entering an NDA), enumerates permitted disclosures, mandates a parliamentary review every two years, and comes into force 60 days after royal assent. The measure increases transparency around silence-producing agreements while reshaping settlement and grant practices across the federal administrative sphere.
At a Glance
What It Does
Adds new sections to the Financial Administration Act and the Parliament of Canada Act that (1) require annual, anonymized reporting to the President of the Treasury Board on the number and total dollar value of NDAs; (2) prohibit using public money to fund settlements containing NDAs in harassment, violence or discrimination matters or to litigate NDAs against complainants; and (3) require complainants to be offered independent legal advice and to make a written request before agreeing to an NDA.
Who It Affects
Federal departments, departmental corporations, Crown corporations, parliamentary administrative bodies (Committee on Internal Economy, Board of Internal Economy, Parliamentary Librarian, Parliamentary Protective Service), and non-government entities that receive federal grants or contributions. It also directly affects complainants in harassment, violence or discrimination matters and the legal and compliance teams that negotiate settlements and grant agreements.
Why It Matters
The bill forces disclosure of aggregate NDA use across the federal sector and limits use of public funds to produce silence in sensitive misconduct cases, shifting the legal and financial calculus for settlements and for grant recipients. Compliance officers, grant managers and legal counsel will need to update agreements, reporting systems and intake practices to meet the new obligations.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill creates three parallel tracks: transparency, restriction, and consent. On transparency, the President of the Treasury Board must table an annual report in both Houses with anonymized counts and total dollar values of NDAs for each entity reported in the Public Accounts, plus the data that grant recipients must provide.
The President must certify the accuracy of that reporting. The bill explicitly requires that the reporting be produced even if the information would otherwise be privileged, and it mandates anonymization to reduce identification risk.
On restriction, the Financial Administration Act additions stop public money flowing toward two things: (1) settlements that address harassment, violence or discrimination when those settlements would include an NDA, and (2) using public funds to litigate NDAs against complainants. The same prohibition is extended across parliamentary administrative bodies (committees, the Board of Internal Economy, the Parliamentary Librarian and the Parliamentary Protective Service), so the rule applies to both executive and parliamentary operations.
For grants and contributions to entities not on the Public Accounts, the bill requires recipients to report annually on their NDA use—number and aggregate dollars—to the President of the Treasury Board.On consent and scope, the bill defines a covered NDA narrowly in functional terms: any post-enactment written provision that prevents a complainant from disclosing facts about alleged harassment, the process used to resolve the complaint, or the monetary value tied to the allegation; it expressly captures non-disparagement clauses that have that effect. Departments and Crown corporations may only enter such NDAs if the complainant has had an opportunity to obtain independent legal advice that includes alternatives for protecting personal information and then makes a specific, voluntary written request for an NDA before it is entered into.
The bill also lists permitted disclosures that NDAs cannot bar—statutory or legally compelled disclosures, certain artistic expression that avoids identifying the respondent or terms, and communications between the complainant and specified professionals or personal supporters.Finally, the legislation imposes a repeating governance check: Parliament must review the statute and its administration beginning two years after it comes into force and every two years thereafter. The Act comes into force 60 days after royal assent.
Taken together, these provisions aim to reduce government-facilitated silencing while balancing privacy through anonymized reporting and by requiring informed, written consent from complainants before NDAs can be used.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The President of the Treasury Board must table the annual report in both Houses no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year and must certify that the information is accurate.
The report must provide, for each entity in the Public Accounts, the number of NDAs entered into and the total dollar amount of agreements containing NDAs; grant recipients outside the Public Accounts must supply the same two data points annually to the President.
Parliamentary privilege and other privileges are explicitly waived solely to permit the information required by the reporting section to be provided to the President of the Treasury Board for the purposes of the report.
Departments, departmental corporations and Crown corporations may not enter into an NDA unless the complainant has been offered independent legal advice that includes alternatives for protecting confidentiality and then makes a specific, voluntary written request for the NDA in writing before it is signed.
The Act prohibits the use of public money to (a) pay for settlements in harassment, violence or discrimination cases if the settlement would include an NDA, and (b) litigate NDAs against complainants; similar prohibitions apply to parliamentary internal-economy bodies, the Parliamentary Librarian and the Parliamentary Protective Service.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short title
Declares the Act’s short title as the Can’t Buy Silence Act. Mostly administrative, but relevant to how the measure will be cited across government instruments and guidance.
Definitions and scope
Adds statutory definitions used throughout the Act: 'complainant' (ties to Financial Administration Act usage), 'harassment and violence' (broadly defined to include actions that reasonably cause offence, humiliation or physical/psychological injury, including prescribed items), and 'non-disclosure agreement' (covers post-enactment written provisions that bar disclosure about alleged harassment, the resolution of complaints, or monetary settlement amounts and expressly includes non-disparagement clauses that have that effect). These definitions determine the universe of agreements and conduct the rest of the Act regulates.
Annual Treasury Board report on NDAs
Requires the President of the Treasury Board to table an annual, anonymized report in both Houses within 45 days after the fiscal year end. The report must list, by entity included in the Public Accounts, the number of NDAs and the total dollar value of agreements containing NDAs, include data supplied by non-government grant recipients, and include a certification of accuracy by the President. The provision also mandates anonymization and requires disclosure even where privilege might otherwise apply, explicitly limiting the use of parliamentary privilege only for the purpose of this reporting.
Mandatory parliamentary review
Requires a committee of the Senate, the House of Commons or a joint committee to review the Act and its administration starting two years after coming into force and every two years thereafter. This creates a recurring oversight mechanism to assess practical effects, compliance burdens, and whether further statutory tweaks are needed.
Restrictions on public money, grant-reporting, and consent rules
Adds a new section 25.1 that forces statutory authorities to exercise grant/contribution powers so as to prevent public money from being used to pay for settlements involving NDAs in harassment/violence/discrimination matters or to litigate NDAs against complainants. It requires grant agreements with entities outside the Public Accounts to include an annual reporting clause obliging recipients to report NDA counts and aggregate dollar amounts; that reporting must be anonymized. It also inserts a new section 40.01 that prohibits departments and Crown corporations from entering NDAs unless the complainant has been given the opportunity for independent legal advice (that includes alternatives for confidentiality) and then makes a specific, voluntary written request before the NDA is concluded. The combined effect is to limit government-funded silence, create reporting flows from grantees, and build an informed-consent gateway for NDAs inside the federal service.
Mirror restrictions for parliamentary bodies
Amends the Parliament of Canada Act to prevent the Senate Committee on Internal Economy, the House of Commons Board of Internal Economy, the Parliamentary Librarian and the Parliamentary Protective Service from permitting public money to be used to enter NDAs except under the informed-consent test, or to litigate NDAs against complainants. These clauses replicate the core prohibitions and permitted-disclosure language used in the Financial Administration Act amendments, extending the policy into the internal administration of Parliament itself.
Coming into force
Sets the Act to come into force 60 days after royal assent, with the NDA definition limited to written agreements entered into after the section comes into force (so the primary prohibitions apply prospectively).
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Complainants in harassment, violence or discrimination matters — They gain statutory protection against being compelled into NDAs by government actors, an explicit right to informed advice before consenting, and clearer pathways to speak or seek support because certain disclosures are carved out of NDAs.
- Parliamentary oversight and the public — Parliament and researchers receive anonymized, entity-level data (counts and dollar totals) about NDA use funded by public money, enabling systemic oversight of settlement practices and public-fund exposure.
- Advocacy groups and policy researchers — Aggregate reporting supports evidence-based advocacy and policy evaluation on workplace misconduct, enabling stronger empirical study of how NDAs are used in the public sector.
Who Bears the Cost
- Federal departments, departmental corporations and Crown corporations — They must change settlement practices, incorporate the informed-consent requirement into negotiation checklists, refuse to use public funds in certain settlements, and track and report NDA information; legal and HR teams will face added procedural burden and potential budgetary consequences when public funds cannot be used.
- Non-government grant and contribution recipients — Agreements must include reporting clauses and recipients must annually report NDA counts and aggregate values to the President of the Treasury Board, increasing administrative compliance costs and complicating settlement negotiations with complainants.
- Treasury Board Secretariat and parliamentary administrative offices — They will absorb the operational workload of collecting, anonymizing and certifying data, and responding to periodic parliamentary reviews, with associated resource and verification burdens not explicitly funded by the bill.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central tension is between protecting complainant autonomy and privacy versus promoting transparency and systemic accountability: the bill seeks to stop government-facilitated silence and reveal NDA use, but in doing so it risks exposing sensitive information without clear technical safeguards, shifting settlement costs and legal risk onto private parties, and creating compliance burdens whose costs may dilute the policy gains.
The bill advances transparency and constrains public-funded silencing, but it creates practical and legal friction points. First, the waiver of privilege for reporting purposes is narrow in wording but could trigger legal challenges about the scope of the waiver and downstream uses of privileged material; courts or litigants may contest how anonymization is implemented.
Second, anonymized aggregate data reduces identification risk but does not eliminate it for small entities or uniquely sized settlements; the Act requires anonymization but leaves technical standards and thresholds unspecified, creating reidentification risks and operational uncertainty for data publishers.
The informed-consent gateway—requiring offer of independent legal advice and a written request from the complainant—protects voluntariness in theory but may not fully address power imbalances, access-to-justice issues, or the time-sensitive nature of settlements. Requiring departments to refuse public funding for NDA-containing settlements could push employers or respondents to settle using private funds, restructure settlements into other confidentiality mechanisms, or increase private litigation, shifting costs and risk rather than eliminating negotiated silence.
Implementation also raises coordination questions with provincial privacy regimes, collective agreement processes, and court-ordered confidentiality; the bill applies prospectively to NDAs entered after coming into force, but does not create an enforcement regime or specify penalties for non-compliance, leaving agencies to rely on internal controls and parliamentary oversight.
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