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Manitoba Bill 2 strengthens civil remedies for non‑consensual intimate images

Creates a new tort for threatened distribution, expands privacy protections (including non‑identifiable and post‑mortem images), and lets courts order removal, de‑indexing and damages while creating a limited safe harbor for intermediaries.

The Brief

Bill 2 amends Manitoba’s Non‑Consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act to widen what counts as an “intimate image,” create a standalone tort for threatening to distribute such images, and expand the court’s toolkit to require deletion, removal from online platforms and de‑indexing from search engines. The bill also clarifies that a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in images in which they are not identifiable and that this expectation survives death.

Practically, the statute gives victims stronger civil remedies — including damages, injunctive relief and specific orders against Internet intermediaries — while simultaneously offering intermediaries a defense if they can show they took “reasonable steps” to address unlawful distribution. That mix increases the legal leverage available to plaintiffs but leaves important implementation questions about cross‑border takedown, the scope of a “reasonable steps” safe harbor, and tensions with publication and free‑expression principles.

At a Glance

What It Does

The bill broadens definitions (covers live streams, near‑nudity, and non‑identifiable persons), establishes a new tort for threats to distribute intimate images, and expands judicial remedies to include deletion, platform removal and search de‑indexing orders. It also adds a limited immunity for Internet intermediaries that have taken reasonable steps to address unlawful distribution.

Who It Affects

Directly affects survivors of non‑consensual image distribution (including images where the subject is not identifiable or deceased), defendants facing civil claims, Internet intermediaries and search engines that host or index third‑party content, and courts asked to fashion publication bans and removal orders.

Why It Matters

This is a substantive upgrade of private‑law remedies for online sexual privacy harms: it shifts more responsibility onto platforms to act and gives plaintiffs practical routes to remove content and seek damages. At the same time, the bill leaves open how courts will assess technical steps like de‑indexing and what qualifies as sufficient action by intermediaries.

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What This Bill Actually Does

The amendment package starts with definitions. The bill explicitly adds “Internet intermediary” (platforms that host or index third‑party content) and expands “visual recording” to cover live broadcasts and live streams.

The statutory definition of intimate images now includes depictions of near‑nudity and covers images where the person is not identifiable — a key change that reaches AI‑generated or heavily edited images and footage where identity is obscured.

On remedies and causes of action, the bill creates a standalone tort for threatening to distribute an intimate image. That lets a person sue before distribution occurs and seek damages, injunctions, and orders compelling the defendant to delete copies.

The existing tort for distribution remains, but courts can now award the full slate of damages (including punitive) and impose specific remedial steps aimed at removing images from circulation.Practically speaking, the courts gain express powers to order defendants to delete or destroy copies, to require intermediaries to remove content from platforms, and to order de‑indexing from search engines within timeframes the court sets. The bill also requires courts to consider the plaintiff’s views when deciding on publication bans, injecting the victim’s preference into the court’s balancing exercise.Finally, the bill balances platform obligations with a limited protection: an Internet intermediary is not liable under the act if it has taken “reasonable steps” to address unlawful distribution.

That language creates a conditional safe harbor while preserving the court’s authority to make orders against intermediaries in specific cases. The act comes into force on royal assent.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

Section 11(1.1) creates a new tort: threatening to distribute an intimate image is an actionable tort separate from actual distribution.

2

Section 12(2) makes clear a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal intimate image even when they are not identifiable; section 12(3) preserves that expectation after death.

3

Section 14 (and new section 14.1) lets courts order deletion, platform removal and de‑indexing and to award damages (including punitive) and injunctions for both distribution and threatened distribution.

4

Section 15.1 establishes a limited immunity for Internet intermediaries: they are not liable under the Act if they have taken “reasonable steps” to address unlawful distribution, but courts may still order intermediaries to act under section 14.

5

Section 13(2) narrows the public‑interest defense: only distribution for law‑enforcement investigations or court proceedings is explicitly treated as public interest; being a public figure alone is not sufficient.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Section 2 (definitions)

Expanded definitions: intermediaries, live streams, near‑nudity and non‑identifiability

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The bill inserts 'Internet intermediary' (platforms that host or index content) and expands 'visual recording' to include live broadcasts and streams. It widens 'personal intimate image' and 'fake intimate image' to cover near‑nudity and images where the subject may not be identifiable. The practical effect is to draw more online content — including AI‑generated deepfakes and streamed material — within the Act’s reach.

Section 2(2)

Tightens the transmission element

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The amendment replaces the prior phrasing after 'make the image available' with 'to another person,' clarifying that liability focuses on transferring access to a third party. That narrows ambiguities around intra‑personal possession versus distribution to others and aligns civil liability with the harm of spreading an image beyond the subject.

Section 3

False information to authorized agency

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Subsection 7(3) is amended to add liability for providing false information to an authorized agency. This punishes interference with administrative processes used to handle non‑consensual images and signals that misleading takedown or enforcement channels can carry consequences.

6 more sections▾
Sections 5 and 9 (torts and threatened distribution)

New tort for threats and expanded remedies for threatened distribution

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The bill adds subsection 11(1.1), making it actionable to threaten distribution; it also creates section 14.1 to grant courts the same remedies for threatened distribution as for actual distribution. Plaintiffs can therefore sue pre‑emptively and seek damages, injunctions and orders forcing deletion — converting anticipatory harm into a conventional civil claim.

Section 6 (privacy expectations)

Privacy extends to non‑identifiable and deceased subjects

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Renumbered section 12(2) confirms that people retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in intimate images where they are not identifiable; 12(3) clarifies that privacy expectations survive death. Those changes broaden the class of protected material and allow claims when identity is obscured or when images are circulated after the subject’s death.

Section 7 (public interest carve‑outs)

Limits on the public‑interest defense

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The bill specifies that distribution is in the public interest only when done for law‑enforcement investigations or court proceedings and explicitly rejects status as a public figure as a standalone justification. That reduces scope for media or third parties to rely on 'public interest' where the primary purpose is not official or judicial.

Sections 8–11 and 14 (expanded court powers and intermediary orders)

Courts can order deletion, platform removal and de‑indexing; damages expanded

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Subsection 14(1) now authorizes courts to order defendants to delete images and to have images removed or de‑indexed from platforms and search engines; courts can order intermediaries to act within specified timeframes. Section 14.1 allows damages and injunctions for threatened distribution. Together, these changes arm courts with specific technical remedies aimed at reducing online availability of intimate images.

Section 15.1

Limited intermediary immunity plus preserved court authority

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The new section 15.1(1) says that an Internet intermediary is not liable under the Act if it has taken 'reasonable steps' to address unlawful distribution. Section 15.1(2) clarifies that this immunity does not strip courts of their power to order intermediaries to remove or de‑index content under section 14. The result is a conditional safe harbor that leaves room for case‑by‑case judicial intervention.

Section 10 (publication bans)

Court must consider plaintiff’s views on publication bans

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The bill adds a duty for courts to have 'due regard' to whether the plaintiff supports or objects to a publication ban when deciding to impose or revoke one. This creates an express procedural factor that requires the victim’s preference to be part of the court’s balancing of open‑court principles and privacy protection.

Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Survivors of non‑consensual image distribution — including cases where the person is not identifiable or has died — gain broader grounds to sue, seek injunctions, and obtain deletion and de‑indexing orders.
  • Plaintiffs seeking pre‑emptive relief: people threatened with distribution can now bring a specific tort claim and pursue damages and injunctive relief before an image is published.
  • Victims’ counsel and privacy advocates — the bill supplies clearer statutory remedies (explicit deletion/de‑indexing powers and an expanded damages regime), making civil enforcement more practicable.
  • Internet intermediaries that implement robust notice, takedown and mitigation programs may benefit from the statute’s safe harbor if they can demonstrate they took 'reasonable steps.'

Who Bears the Cost

  • Internet intermediaries and search engines — courts can order them to remove content or de‑index search results, creating compliance, monitoring and potential legal costs, especially for intermediaries with global footprints.
  • Small hosting platforms and niche intermediaries — the 'reasonable steps' standard will generate compliance burdens and possibly disproportionate costs for smaller operators without dedicated moderation resources.
  • Defendants and alleged distributors — expanded remedies (punitive damages, broadened injunctive powers and deletion orders) increase exposure and the potential for pre‑trial restraints.
  • Courts and administrative bodies — judges must assess technical remedies (timelines for removal/de‑indexing) and weigh plaintiffs’ publication preferences, adding new procedural complexity to cases.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The bill’s central dilemma balances stronger privacy and pre‑emptive remedies for victims against free‑expression and practical enforceability: it gives courts power to suppress and de‑index content to protect dignity and safety, but those powers rest on ill‑defined duties for platforms and face cross‑jurisdictional limits that may undermine consistent or proportionate enforcement.

The bill strengthens civil remedies, but it leaves several operational questions unresolved. The pivotal term 'reasonable steps' is not defined, which creates uncertainty for intermediaries about what practices (automated filters, human review, expeditious takedown policies) will suffice to trigger the immunity.

That vagueness may produce conservative over‑removal by platforms seeking to avoid litigation, or uneven outcomes where larger platforms can show compliance more easily than smaller ones.

Enforcing removal and de‑indexing orders also raises cross‑border and technical challenges. A Manitoba court can order a platform to de‑index search results, but requiring a foreign‑hosted service to delete copies globally may be impractical.

De‑indexing narrows discoverability but does not erase copies held on other sites or private backups. Finally, extending privacy to non‑identifiable images and to images after death expands protection but risks overbreadth — courts will need to distinguish protected intimate content from artistic, journalistic or historical uses that involve non‑identifiable material.

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