This private‑member bill establishes a statutory Clare’s Law for Nova Scotia: a process for individuals who believe they are at risk from an intimate partner to request disclosure information from police, and for the Attorney General’s office to prepare and share threat assessments. The Act sets out who may apply, who may receive disclosures, and requires a Disclosure Protocol that governs safeguarding and permitted uses of information.
The bill matters because it pairs operational powers—broad authorities to collect personal and health information and to compel records or access—with strong legal protections for officials (immunity and limits on compellability). It also delegates many technical details to regulation, creating implementation choices on scope, safeguards and cross‑jurisdictional sharing that will determine how impactful the law is in practice.
At a Glance
What It Does
The Act authorizes police services to provide prescribed disclosure information to applicants and to persons identified as being ‘at risk’, and authorizes the Minister (Attorney General) to prepare and disclose threat assessments. It permits collection, use and cross‑jurisdictional sharing of personal and health information for those purposes and requires a Disclosure Protocol setting safeguarding and non‑use rules.
Who It Affects
Directly affects Nova Scotia police services, the Attorney General’s office and any provincial or federal body that may be asked to provide records (including health custodians, correctional institutions and other governments). It also targets individuals who apply as applicants and persons determined to be at risk, plus organizations that assist applicants under the regulations.
Why It Matters
The bill creates statutory authority to compile multi‑source risk profiles and share them across agencies, while insulating officials from most civil liability and making certain disclosures non‑compellable in court. Those design choices shift the balance between safety‑focused information sharing and privacy/oversight protections — and will hinge on forthcoming regulations and resourcing.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The Act sets up two linked tools: a disclosure pathway commonly called Clare’s Law, and a Minister‑led threat assessment function. Under the disclosure pathway, a person who believes they are at risk (an applicant) can seek prescribed information from a police service about an intimate partner; the police can also provide the same disclosure information proactively to a person the police determine is at risk.
The content that counts as “disclosure information” is left to regulation and must be governed by a Disclosure Protocol that prescribes safeguarding and bans onward use except with consent or where lawfully required.
Separately, the Attorney General’s office may prepare a threat assessment describing an individual’s risk of perpetrating violence and offering mitigation recommendations. The Minister can disclose completed threat assessments to a specified list of recipients (other government bodies, courts, police, correctional institutions, and other entities set out in regulations).
Importantly, if the Minister finds an imminent risk while preparing the assessment, the Minister may disclose information before the assessment is complete.To prepare threat assessments the Minister can require other provincial departments, police services, health custodians and any classes of organizations prescribed in regulation to provide or authorize access to personal and health information or records. Regulations may also give the Minister powers to access premises, electronic systems, databases, demand responses, copy and remove records, or apply for court orders to obtain material — in short, broad investigative tools to assemble information for risk analysis.The Act contains protections for privacy and process in several ways: it makes the applicant’s identity privileged (subject to a Ministerial direction to release), requires compliance with the Disclosure Protocol by all recipients, and preserves the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s powers under FOIPOP.
At the same time, the Act grants wide civil immunity to the government, police and other named participants for actions taken under the Act, limits compellability to give evidence or produce files about disclosures (with narrow exceptions), and forbids using an application or receipt of disclosure as evidence in family or child protection proceedings.Finally, the Act requires the Minister to establish a training program so police and relevant government employees can deliver disclosures and referrals in a trauma‑informed way, and it delegates most operational details to the Governor in Council or the Minister by regulation. The Act comes into force on April 1, 2027, meaning the regulatory and administrative framework must be in place before that date for full operation.
The Five Things You Need to Know
A police service may provide prescribed “disclosure information” to an applicant or to a person the police determine is at risk, even if that person did not apply (Section 7).
The Minister may prepare threat assessments and may disclose information before an assessment is complete if an imminent risk of danger is found (Section 5(4)).
The Minister can compel other provincial departments, police services, health custodians or prescribed entities to provide records or authorize ongoing access, and regulations may authorize searches of premises and electronic systems and court orders to obtain records (Sections 6 and 18(c)).
The Act grants broad immunity from civil actions for the Minister, government employees, police services and many other participating entities for acts done under the Act, and makes recipients of threat assessments subject to regulatory terms and conditions (Sections 11 and 5(3)).
The identity of an applicant is privileged by default and disclosure of that identity is only permitted if the Minister directs release; the Act also bars using the fact of an application or disclosure as evidence in family or child protection court proceedings (Sections 12 and 14).
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Purpose and core definitions
Section 2 lists three explicit purposes: enable applicant inquiries, assist risk assessment and safety planning, and connect applicants with supports. Section 3 defines key terms (applicant, disclosure information, Disclosure Protocol, person at risk, threat assessment, police service, record, health information, Minister). Those definitions frame who may act and what material the Act can reach — but the content of “disclosure information,” who may be a person at risk, and which third parties can act for applicants are all delegated to regulation.
Authorized collection, use and cross‑jurisdictional sharing of records
Section 4 authorizes police services and the Minister to collect, use and disclose personal information and records for making or deciding on disclosures, and authorizes additional collection/use for preparing threat assessments, including cross‑jurisdictional sharing under formal agreements. Practically, this provision permits pulling together police, health and other records across provincial or federal lines where agreements exist — a broad authority that relies on regulation and intergovernmental arrangements to set limits and processes.
Threat assessments: preparation and early disclosure for imminent risk
Section 5 gives the Minister power to prepare risk assessments that describe an individual’s propensity for violence and recommend mitigation. It specifies recipients who may receive assessments (government bodies, courts, police, corrections, and others prescribed in regulation) and makes recipients subject to regulatory terms. Critically, the Minister can disclose information before finalizing an assessment if an imminent danger is identified — a safety‑first override designed to expedite protective action but one that bypasses the usual finalization and review steps.
Minister’s authority to require records and access; enforcement tools
Section 6 authorizes the Minister to require other departments, police services and prescribed entities to provide information or to authorize ongoing access for threat assessments; Section 18(c) fleshes out the potential enforcement measures regulators may permit, such as accessing premises, seizing or copying records, accessing databases and electronic systems, demanding responses, ordering corrective measures and seeking court orders. Together they create a potent statutory toolset for compiling multi‑source information for risk analysis, but the exact reach depends on regulations and any limits tied to PHIA or FOIPOP.
Disclosure Protocol and who receives disclosure information
Section 7 authorizes police to provide disclosure information to applicants or people at risk and allows third parties (with consent or by regulation) to assist applications. Section 8 mandates that the Disclosure Protocol set safeguarding terms and prohibit use beyond safety purposes unless consented or legally permitted. Section 18(i–k) assigns regulation‑making authority to adopt or modify protocols, prescribe disclosure content and regulate permitted onward uses — effectively making the Disclosure Protocol the operational rulebook for when and how personal information is released.
Immunity, non‑compellability and evidentiary protections
Section 11 gives broad immunity from civil proceedings to the Minister, government, police services and many participating entities for acts done under this Act, including disclosures. Section 13 makes those actors non‑compellable to give evidence or produce documents about information obtained under the Act, except for judicial review of the Minister’s exercise of power and limited exceptions for materials from threat assessments or Sections 4(2), 5 or 6. Section 14 prevents using an applicant’s application or receipt of disclosure as evidence in family or child protection proceedings — a protective rule for applicants but one that narrows courts’ access to potentially relevant facts.
Training, exemptions, delegation and regulation powers
Section 15 requires a program to train police and government employees in trauma‑informed disclosure and referral practices. Section 16 allows exempting classes of persons or circumstances via regulation. Section 17 permits the Minister to delegate powers (except to make regulations). Section 18 is expansive, authorizing the Governor in Council to regulate nearly every technical element: threat assessment content and method, who can apply, consent processes, data types and formats, mandatory providers, terms on recipients, committees, and adopting external protocols. That heavy regulatory reliance means the Act sets the structural framework, but key operational boundaries will be set later by regulation.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on this topic across all five countries.
Explore this topic in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Applicants and persons at risk: gain a formal statutory route to obtain safety‑relevant information about intimate partners and to receive referrals and safety planning through mandated trauma‑informed supports.
- Police services and front‑line responders: receive statutory authority and a protocol framework to disclose risk information and to coordinate with government threat assessment resources, potentially improving proactive prevention and operational decision making.
- Victim‑serving and gender‑based violence organizations: receive clearer referrals pathways and mandated training expectations, which can increase timely connections to supports and safety planning resources for clients.
- Correctional and parole authorities, courts and other government agencies: can receive threat assessments to inform supervision, bail, sentencing, or family‑law safety measures when regulations permit disclosure.
Who Bears the Cost
- Attorney General’s office / Minister’s staff: must resource and operationalize a new threat‑assessment function and manage compelled data requests, IT access, and training programs — likely requiring new funding and staffing.
- Police services and municipal police departments: must implement the Disclosure Protocol, process applications, coordinate with the Minister’s office, and handle administrative and safeguarding responsibilities tied to disclosures.
- Health custodians and provincial departments (records holders): face requests or legal obligations to provide personal and health records or authorize ongoing access, creating compliance, privacy‑risk management, and potential IT integration costs.
- Small community organizations and nonprofits that assist applicants (if prescribed): may need to handle consent mechanics, data safeguarding obligations and potential liability exposure despite broad government immunity.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between empowering rapid, cross‑agency information sharing to prevent imminent domestic violence and protecting individual privacy plus institutional accountability: the Act gives broad data‑access and legal protections to encourage sharing, but those same features risk overreach, reduce opportunities for external oversight, and place heavy reliance on later regulations and funding choices to safeguard civil liberties.
The Act creates strong safety‑oriented authorities but leaves major scope and safeguard choices to regulation. That means the practical balance between safety and privacy will be set after passage: regulations will define what counts as “disclosure information,” which organizations must hand over records, how long ongoing access may last, and what terms recipients must follow.
If regulations are permissive, the Minister’s powers in Sections 6 and 18(c) would permit deep access to health, correctional and other sensitive data and to electronic systems, increasing re‑identification and mission‑creep risks.
Simultaneously, the Act grants substantial operational protections to officials — sweeping civil immunity and non‑compellability for disclosure‑related actions — which can speed information sharing but also limit accountability and judicial scrutiny. The carve‑outs (e.g., for materials created under Sections 4(2), 5 or 6 and for judicial review) are narrow and may not provide robust independent oversight if regulators do not couple the statutory powers with transparent reporting and audit mechanisms.
Resourcing and training obligations are explicit, but the Act lacks built‑in funding details beyond a general appropriation clause, so implementation quality will depend on budgetary choices.
There's more to this law than the bill.
Codify Laws traces every connection across the legislative lifecycle.