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Ontario’s Putting Student Achievement First Act centralizes school oversight

Expands ministerial control across education and child care — from policy-setting and property approvals to bargaining agency changes and dissolution of HEQCO, affecting boards, unions and institutions.

The Brief

The Putting Student Achievement First Act, 2026 amends multiple Ontario statutes to concentrate a range of powers in the Minister of Education. Key moves include new authority to set mandatory policies on assessment, board expense rules, educational materials and public communications; requirements for ministerial approval of land acquisitions, building works and certain estimates; the power to assign Ontario education numbers to children in early years programs; designation of the Council of Ontario Directors of Education (CODE) as the employer bargaining agency; and the winding up and transfer of the Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario (HEQCO) to the Crown.

Those changes shift operational control from local boards, certain arm’s-length bodies and post-secondary institutions to the provincial ministry, while also introducing broad liability protections for Crown actors and specified association actors. The package affects governance, property transactions, bargaining processes, accreditation of teacher education and the independence of advisory bodies — issues that school boards, labour counsel, post-secondary institutions and child-care operators will need to operationalize and manage in compliance workplans and budgets.

At a Glance

What It Does

The Act empowers the Minister to make binding policies and regulations on student assessment, board expense policies, use of (including digital) educational materials and board public communications; requires ministerial approval for acquiring or expropriating land and for certain building works and board estimates; allows the Minister to appoint or select a person to take over management of building projects and to issue directions to boards; assigns CODE as the employer bargaining agency for English-language district boards; and provides for HEQCO’s wind-up and dissolution with assets vested in the Crown.

Who It Affects

English‑language district school boards, their trustees and directors of education; child care operators and service system managers; CODE, OCSTA and OPSBA; the Ontario College of Teachers and post‑secondary institutions that offer teacher education; HEQCO staff and funders; parents and children eligible for Ontario education numbers.

Why It Matters

The Act centralizes decision‑making and regulatory control in the provincial ministry, reduces local autonomy on property, finance and communications, restructures employer-side bargaining architecture, and removes an independent post‑secondary adviser — all of which reshape compliance obligations, bargaining dynamics and institutional governance.

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What This Bill Actually Does

The Act repackages routine statutory authority into a far more interventionist framework. On policy, it gives the Minister explicit, mandatory power to set and require board compliance with policies on how student achievement is assessed, what board expense policies must include (with limits on discretionary spending, travel and hospitality), how educational materials (including digital textbooks) are selected and used, and rules that govern boards’ public communications.

The result is a provincially-defined template that boards must follow; regulators can put specific content and approval processes into regulation.

On property and capital works, the Act requires boards to obtain the Minister’s approval before acquiring or applying to expropriate land and permits the Minister to prescribe timelines for responses. It expands the scope of building‑work oversight to include additions, alterations, improvements and repairs, and authorizes the Minister to set policies about use of school sites and to require notice or prior approval for such work.

Critically, the Minister can now direct a board or appoint a person or body to take control of management of a building project where the board is non‑compliant or likely to be non‑compliant. That appointed manager may exercise board powers over contracts, budgets and communications and can alter or cancel project aspects with the Minister’s written consent; the board must cooperate and may be directed to pay the manager’s fees.The Act also reshapes governance and accountability.

It changes the role and voting status of directors of education in English‑language boards (the director is the CEO, sits on the board but cannot cast a binding vote, and must appoint a chief education officer subject to regulation), requires ministerial approval for dismissal of a director, and narrows certain board powers where the Minister exercises provisional orders. Divisions of Part IX and several sections dealing with vesting orders and ministerial exercise of board powers are reworked to allow the Minister to exercise a board’s powers directly, assume financial control, and regulate the processes that follow such interventions.On labour relations, the Act replaces OCSTA/OPSBA with CODE as the statutory employer bargaining agency for English‑language public and separate district boards and creates a committee within CODE to oversee bargaining activities.

The Minister can make regulations governing the committee and, if the Minister finds CODE unable or unwilling to act, may designate another person or body to exercise CODE’s bargaining rights. The Act provides transition rules, orders to transfer rights or information, and authority to require boards to pay fees relating to denominational observation rights during central bargaining.

Finally, the Act winds up HEQCO, deems its board members ministerially appointed, requires the Minister to prepare a final HEQCO annual report, and transfers HEQCO’s assets and obligations to the Crown; it also strengthens ministerial regulation-making authority and creates several limits on legal proceedings against Crown actors and specified association actors in the exercise of these new powers.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

A regulation must set district school board sizes between 5 and 12 members; that range expressly excludes student trustees, the director of education and certain appointed members.

2

Boards must submit a Minister-approved request before acquiring or applying to expropriate any school site or other land; the Minister must approve or refuse within any prescribed time period set by regulation.

3

Section 195.0.1 lets the Minister appoint a person or body to take control of a building addition or repair project and authorizes that appointee to manage contracts, revenues and to alter project work subject to the Minister’s written consent; the board may be directed to pay the appointee’s fees.

4

Schedule 3 requires winding up and dissolution of HEQCO, transfers its assets, liabilities and obligations to the Crown and makes the Minister responsible for preparing the Council’s final annual report.

5

Schedule 5 designates CODE as the employer bargaining agency for all English‑language district school boards and creates a ministerially-configurable committee within CODE to oversee bargaining, with the Minister empowered to substitute another agent if CODE is unable or unwilling to act.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Schedule 2 — subsection 8(1) additions (policies and guidelines)

Minister sets mandatory policies on assessment, expenses, materials and communications

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This provision authorizes the Minister to create binding policies that boards must follow for assessing pupils, configuring board expense rules (including caps and prohibited reimbursements), selecting educational materials (explicitly including digital textbooks), and governing public communications by boards and their officers. Practically, boards will need compliance procedures and procurement rules aligned to provincial templates; procurement, curriculum and communications teams must be prepared to adjust approval workflows and public messaging to satisfy ministerial standards.

Section 195 and new sections 195.0.1–195.0.5

Ministerial approval and takeover authority for school sites and building works

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Before acquiring or applying to expropriate land, a board must submit a Minister-specified request and secure approval. The Minister can prescribe response timelines and make regulations about when notice or approval is required for additions, alterations, improvements or repairs. If non‑compliance is found or likely, the Minister can direct the board or appoint a manager to take control of the project; that manager can manage contracts, budgets and communications, alter work with Minister consent, and is entitled to fees chargeable to board accounts. The clause also requires the Minister to publish directions and allows regulations to define the manager’s additional powers.

Part IX amendments — sections 230.3, 230.5.3–230.5.5, 230.15

Expanded vesting orders and Ministerial control over boards’ finances and contracts

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The Act lowers procedural barriers for provisional orders, obliges written notice to boards of provisional orders with stated reasons, and prescribes a minimum 14‑day response window in specified circumstances. Where the Minister exercises powers of a board subject to an order, the Minister may enter, vary or cancel subsisting agreements, require issuance or sale of prescribed instruments, and take full charge of the board’s funds — including directing deposit institutions. The Minister may appoint a person to perform board functions and require the board to indemnify appointees for costs arising from the appointment.

3 more sections▾
Liability and proceedings provisions — sections 17.2, 195.0.3, 230.15.2, 8.3–8.5 (HEQCO)

Extensive limits on legal actions and transfer of vicarious liability to boards

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The Act creates broad 'no cause of action' protections for ministers, deputy ministers and Crown employees for acts done in good faith under the amended Acts, while preserving Crown vicarious liability for resulting harm. Where the Minister appoints persons to run board projects or takes over board powers, those Crown actors are deemed officers of the board and barred from personal suits; the board, however, remains vicariously liable. The provisions also extinguish many private remedies (other than judicial review and constitutional claims) against the Crown or its actors for directions, orders or related acts, and prohibit costs awards in proceedings that cannot be brought or maintained.

Schedule 3 (Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario Act, 2005)

HEQCO winding up and transfer of assets to the Crown

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The Schedule requires the Council’s board to prepare a Minister‑directed wind‑up plan, allows the Minister to issue directives during winding up, deems prior board members ministerially appointed, and provides that HEQCO’s assets, liabilities and obligations transfer to the Crown. The Minister must prepare the Council’s final annual report; the Act also repeals the HEQCO statute on proclamation, eliminating HEQCO as an independent advisory body unless restored by future legislation.

Schedule 5 (School Boards Collective Bargaining Act, 2014) — sections 51–57

CODE as employer bargaining agency and transition framework

▾

The Schedule designates CODE as the employer bargaining agency for all English‑language district boards and requires the creation of an internal committee to oversee bargaining activities; the committee’s by‑laws may set processes that deviate from existing voting rules. The Minister can make regulations governing the committee, require boards or former associations to transfer contracts or information to the CODE, and appoint substitutes if CODE cannot act. The Schedule includes indemnities and liability limits for Crown actors and association members involved in transition activities.

Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Minister of Education and Ministry officials — gain expanded statutory authority to set binding standards, approve capital projects and intervene directly in board operations, consolidating oversight and decision‑making.
  • Parents and guardians of young children — can request assignment of an Ontario education number for a child enrolled in licensed child care or prescribed early years programs, improving administrative continuity across early learning and school records.
  • Council of Ontario Directors of Education (CODE) — acquires statutory status as the employer bargaining agency for English‑language district boards, centralizing employer-side bargaining influence and eligibility for related fees and funding streams.
  • Ontario College of Teachers and provincial regulators — receive clearer statutory authority to prescribe accreditation content and standards for professional teacher education programs that prevail over internal academic governance of post‑secondary institutions.
  • The Crown/Provincial government — receives HEQCO’s assets and functions, increasing direct control over higher‑education advisory products and eliminating an independent research body.

Who Bears the Cost

  • District school boards (English‑language) — face new approval workflows, potential project management takeovers, fees for appointed managers, constraints on capital work and estimates, and reduced autonomy over property and spending decisions.
  • School trustees and local governance actors — see a narrowing of independent authority (e.g., board estimates and acquisitions requiring ministerial approval) and must adapt to provincial policies on communications, expenses and materials.
  • OCSTA and OPSBA — lose statutory designation as the employer bargaining agency and the practical levers, revenue streams and roles that accompanied that status.
  • Post‑secondary institutions offering teacher education — may be required to meet provincial accreditation rules that explicitly prevail over academic governance, potentially altering program design, timelines and practical-experience requirements.
  • HEQCO staff, contractors and external partners — face organizational dissolution and transfer of contracts, with potential job losses, contract novation and changes in how HEQCO outputs are used or funded.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The central dilemma is between provincial uniformity and oversight versus local autonomy and independent expertise: the Act strengthens the Ministry’s ability to impose consistent standards, intervene in troubled projects and shape bargaining and accreditation, but it does so by reducing board discretion, narrowing private legal remedies, and eliminating or subordinating independent institutions — a trade‑off between control/accountability and local democratic, institutional and legal safeguards.

The Act resolves some coordination gaps by centralizing decision-making, but it creates practical and legal frictions. Operationally, boards must build capacity to navigate pre-approval processes for property and capital projects, which could slow projects or shift costs (manager fees, compliance teams).

The Minister’s power to appoint managers who can alter contracts and budgets raises procurement and contractual continuity questions: vendors, lenders or municipal partners may face unilateral changes, and although transfers are deemed not to trigger breaches, third parties will assess commercial and legal risk differently.

Legally, the statute’s broad 'no cause of action' and extinguishment clauses substantially limit private remedies and shift vicarious liability to boards; that may reduce deterrence and complicate accountability, while increasing boards’ insurance and contingent-liability exposure. The bill allows regulations to prevail in vesting‑order contexts and to be retroactive, heightening the risk of Charter challenges (language and denominational rights are touched elsewhere in the Act) and judicial scrutiny over whether statutory delegation and retroactivity breach constitutional or administrative law principles.

Finally, dissolving HEQCO and subordinating accreditation requirements to provincial regulation trade independent evidence-based advice and academic autonomy for centralized control — a trade that could erode trust in provincial data and prompts questions about who will produce independent analysis on post‑secondary quality going forward.

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