The Freedom of Expression (Religion or Belief System) Bill replaces section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986 with a provision that courts, prosecutors and other authorities “shall not read” the Public Order Act, section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, or section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 in a way that prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or other belief systems, or proselytising that urges adherents of a different religion or belief system to stop practising.
The bill does not repeal those criminal provisions; it changes how they must be interpreted. It comes into force on the day of passage and includes a drafting device tying the new subsection’s territorial extent to the provisions it amends.
For practitioners, the immediate question is how prosecutorial decisions, judicial interpretation and platform moderation will adjust when a statutory instruction tells decision‑makers not to construe existing offences as limiting a large swath of derogatory and proselytising expression.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill substitutes a new protection of expression into the Public Order Act that directs that three criminal statutes (the Public Order Act, Malicious Communications Act s.1, and Communications Act s.127) must not be read to prohibit or restrict criticism, insult, ridicule or proselytising directed at religions or other belief systems. It therefore constrains statutory interpretation rather than repealing offences.
Who It Affects
The bill primarily affects prosecutors, courts, police charging decisions, social‑media platforms and content moderators, as well as individuals who post or receive communications about religion or belief systems. It also affects legal advisers, human resources teams and equality bodies who handle harassment or discrimination complaints tied to expression about beliefs.
Why It Matters
By changing the interpretive rule, the bill can reduce the scope for criminal or regulatory action against speech that targets religion or belief. That shifts the balance between protecting open debate and protecting groups from abusive conduct, and will prompt changes in charging guidance, case law and platform policies.
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What This Bill Actually Does
At its core the bill does one thing: it rewrites the statutory instruction that governs how three criminal communications offences should be read. Instead of leaving those offences to be applied in light of human rights and public order considerations as previously interpreted, the new subsection tells courts and authorities that the relevant statutes must not be read to prohibit or restrict a specified list of expressive conduct directed at religions and belief systems.
That list is broad: it includes discussion and criticism, but also “antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse,” and explicitly protects proselytising that urges someone of a different faith or belief to cease practising.
Because the bill uses an interpretive bar—“shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts”—it does not delete or amend the substantive offences in the Public Order Act, Malicious Communications Act or Communications Act. Instead it instructs how those provisions must be construed going forward.
Practically, that shifts the first line of conflict from whether an act is prohibited to whether it falls outside the new protective language (for instance, whether it is violence, credible threats, or other conduct still liable under different criminal provisions).The bill also inserts a short territorial drafting rule and a commencement clause. It makes clear that the new subsection is to have the same territorial extent as the provisions it alters, and it brings the Act into force on the day it is passed.
That means the interpretive constraint would apply immediately and across the same parts of the UK as the amended provisions, narrowing the window for delay but raising immediate questions about devolved competencies and prosecutorial guidance.For regulators, platforms and employers the immediate operational consequence is an interpretation problem: content that previously might have been removed or reported for criminality will now be subject to an express statutory direction not to treat it as prohibited. Organisations will have to recalibrate risk, moderation and HR processes with imperfect case law and likely new prosecutorial guidance to follow.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill substitutes a new section 29J into the Public Order Act 1986 that bars reading the Public Order Act, Malicious Communications Act 1988 s.1, or Communications Act 2003 s.127 in ways that prohibit or restrict criticism, insult, ridicule, abuse or proselytising about religions or other belief systems.
The protective language expressly covers both religious beliefs and “any other belief system,” so non‑religious belief systems (e.g.
political or philosophical doctrines phrased as belief systems) fall within the clause’s scope.
The bill does not repeal the three named offences; it changes statutory interpretation rather than removing criminal liability in all cases, leaving open other offences or narrower readings that do not fall within the protected list of expressions.
Section 1(3) inserts a new territorial drafting rule into section 42: the new subsection’s territorial extent will match the extent of the provisions it amends, signalling a drafting choice about applicability across the UK’s jurisdictions.
Section 2 brings the Act into force on the day it is passed and provides the short title Freedom of Expression (Religion or Belief System) Act 2025, so the interpretive change would take effect immediately on enactment.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Substitute new protection into the Public Order Act
This is the bill’s operative change: it replaces the existing section 29J with a new provision that tells readers the named statutes ‘‘shall not be read or given effect’’ so as to prohibit or restrict a long list of expressive conduct about religions or belief systems. The drafting is prescriptive — it commands a particular method of interpretation rather than excising text from the offences — so the effect depends on how courts and prosecutors apply an instruction that limits statutory construction. That design preserves the text of the offences but reduces the legal foundation for prosecutions based on insulting or abusive expressions about beliefs.
Territorial drafting: matching extent to amended provisions
This short clause adds a paragraph to section 42 that ties the new subsection’s territorial extent to the extent of the provisions it modifies. Practically, this avoids having a separate territorial map for the protective clause and means the interpretive bar travels with the geographical reach of the offence provisions. It also flags that the drafter considered territorial application; practitioners should still check how the change interacts with devolved criminal law competence and prosecutorial arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Commencement, extent and short title
Section 2 confirms immediate commencement on passage, repeats that any amendment has the same extent as the provision amended, and supplies the short title. Immediate commencement magnifies the need for rapid guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service, police forces and content platforms because the statutory interpretive instruction would take effect without delay.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Journalists, commentators and academics who criticise religious doctrines — the bill reduces the risk that critical or satirical commentary will be treated as a criminal communication under the three named statutes.
- Campaigners and organisations that engage in proselytising or advocacy to change others’ beliefs — the provision expressly protects urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising, removing a statutory basis for treating such advocacy as a communicable offence under the listed provisions.
- Publishers and certain online platforms — by narrowing the interpretive basis for criminal removal or reporting, platforms gain a clearer statutory argument to retain or restore content that is critical or insulting toward belief systems, reducing removal risk in some cases.
- Free‑speech legal NGOs and lobby groups — the bill gives them a statutory lever to argue against prosecutions or takedowns based on insulting or critical speech about beliefs, and a foothold for strategic litigation and guidance submissions.
Who Bears the Cost
- Members of religious or belief minorities targeted with insulting, abusive or ridiculing speech — the bill reduces criminal law remedies for being subjected to such expression and may increase reliance on civil or regulatory routes that offer weaker or slower relief.
- Police forces and prosecutors — the interpretive bar constrains charging decisions under three commonly used communications offences and will require revised charging standards and training to identify the boundaries that remain criminally actionable.
- Social‑media platforms and content moderators — although the bill narrows criminal law risk, platforms face reputational and civil exposure if they retain abusive content; they will need new moderation policies and complaint‑handling frameworks to manage increased volume and ambiguity.
- Employers and schools handling harassment or discrimination complaints — internal disciplinary or safeguarding mechanisms may see more incidents formerly framed as potential criminal communications, forcing organisations to decide whether to act administratively or wait for updated legal guidance.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill poses a classic trade‑off: it privileges open and even abrasive public debate about religion and belief by instructing that existing communications offences should not be read to forbid a broad category of insulting and proselytising speech, but in doing so it limits criminal remedies for groups and individuals who experience that speech as harassment or abuse — leaving legislators, prosecutors and regulators to decide which harms should remain within the criminal law and which should be managed through civil, administrative or organisational remedies.
The bill resolves a legal question—whether certain insulting or proselytising expressions can be read as criminal—by instructing courts and authorities not to construe three statutes in a way that would prohibit such expression. That drafting choice shifts the battleground from statutory text to interpretation and prosecutorial discretion.
It will generate litigation over borderline cases (for example, where insult crosses into targeted harassment or where an ostensibly doctrinal critique coexists with threatening behaviour). Courts will need to define how this interpretive bar interacts with other criminal offences that still criminalise threats, incitement, or conduct-based harassment.
Another unresolved implementation issue is how the clause sits with equality and anti‑hate frameworks. The bill protects “insult” and “abuse” as categories of lawful expression in relation to beliefs, but those same expressions can underpin hostile environments in workplaces, schools or public spaces; employers and regulators will still have duties under discrimination law.
Platforms will face a three-way tension between the narrower criminal exposure, civil or regulatory responsibilities, and reputational risk. Finally, the territorial drafting choice reduces some technical complexity but does not remove practical questions about prosecutorial policy differences across the UK’s jurisdictions and the immediate need for guidance from the CPS and devolved authorities.
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