The Public Service (Ethics, Integrity and Independence) Bill establishes a statutory architecture for ethics across government: an Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Conduct and Interests, a Commissioner for Public Appointments, a Commission on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), a reformed House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) and a strengthened Commission on Business Appointments (COBA). It requires the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office to publish and consult on a Ministerial Code, a Public Appointments Code and Business Appointment Rules, and gives the new regulators powers to audit, investigate, require information and publish reports.
The bill matters because it turns many long‑standing conventions into legal obligations and creates enforceable remedies for post‑government employment and appointment procedures. That raises operational questions—who enforces what, how independence is protected when senior appointments are made by the Prime Minister or ministers, and how criminal and civil penalties will interact—which will determine the practical impact on ministers, senior civil servants, appointing authorities and private employers recruiting former officials.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill requires the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office to publish and keep under review the Ministerial Code, the Public Appointments Code and Business Appointment Rules; creates an Independent Adviser who monitors ministerial compliance, publishes ministers’ interests and can investigate alleged breaches; and establishes statutory commissions (CSPL, HOLAC, COBA) with investigatory, audit and sanctioning powers for appointments and post‑service employment.
Who It Affects
Ministers and their households (because interests of family can be recorded), former ministers and senior civil servants (SCS3+), appointing authorities listed in the bill’s schedules, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office, and employers who hire former public servants.
Why It Matters
By placing the ministerial code and appointments rules on a statutory footing and giving regulators investigatory and sanctioning powers (including civil penalties), the bill shifts accountability from informal convention toward formal regulatory oversight—changing risks for political leaders, departments and private employers engaging ex‑officials.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The bill creates a new Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Conduct and Interests and requires the Prime Minister to publish a Ministerial Code rooted in the Principles of Public Life. The Prime Minister must publish draft versions and consult both the Independent Adviser and the appropriate Commons select committee before laying the code before Parliament.
The Independent Adviser monitors compliance, runs audits, prepares a twice‑yearly public list of ministers’ relevant interests and may require ministers to publish information about their adherence to the code.
Ministers must supply a full list of potential conflicts within 14 days of taking each new office and provide further information when reasonably required. The Adviser may review those declarations confidentially and give advice on avoiding conflicts; ministers must return a record of actions taken in response.
The Adviser may investigate suspected breaches—either when asked by the Prime Minister or at the Adviser’s discretion—and must report investigation results to the Prime Minister. The Adviser can recommend sanctions in confidence, but the Prime Minister retains ultimate authority over whether a minister remains in office.
The Adviser prepares an annual report that is published and laid before Parliament.For public appointments the bill creates a Commissioner for Public Appointments and requires a Public Appointments Code covering bodies listed in the bill’s Schedules. The Commissioner audits, investigates and can require publication of summary appointment information; the Minister for the Cabinet Office may add bodies to the regulated schedules by negative statutory instrument.
The bill also folds several existing functions into statutory commissions: a Commission on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) to oversee standards across public service, a reconstituted House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) with duties to maintain a merit list for crossbenchers and vet peerage nominees, and a Commission on Business Appointments (COBA) to regulate post‑government employment.COBA’s role is to consider applications from former ministers, senior civil servants and Crown servants at SCS3 level and above, monitor departmental implementation of the Business Appointment Rules for lower grades, provide training, and impose measures including injunctions or conditions to manage risks. The bill creates both criminal offences for knowingly breaching COBA prohibitions or conditions (applying to the individual and employer) and civil penalties administered by COBA (with a statutory cap of £7,500 that the Secretary of State may alter).
COBA can publish guidance, charge application fees intended to offset its costs and must produce an annual report including an audit of departmental compliance.
The Five Things You Need to Know
Ministers must provide the Independent Adviser a full list of interests that might create a conflict within 14 days of appointment to each new office, and the Adviser must publish a list of ministers’ relevant interests at least twice a year.
The Independent Adviser is appointed by the Prime Minister following an open, merit‑based selection process in Schedule 1 and holds office for a single five‑year non‑renewable term; removal requires an Address from the House of Commons under the Schedule’s process.
COBA gains statutory power to block appointments, impose conditions, seek injunctions and impose civil penalties (penalty notices capped at £7,500 under the Act, adjustable by regulation) while criminal offences attach to intentional breaches by individuals or their employers.
HOLAC must maintain a competition‑based list of crossbench candidates, submit names to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister must appoint at least two crossbench candidates from that list each year; the Prime Minister may also nominate up to ten former public servants to the crossbenches in any one Parliament.
The Public Appointments Code and Business Appointment Rules must be published, kept under review and laid before Parliament; the Commissioner for Public Appointments and COBA are given auditing, investigatory and reporting duties and may require appointing authorities to provide information.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Creates an Independent Adviser and makes the Ministerial Code statutory
The bill makes the Ministerial Code a published, reviewable instrument based on the Principles of Public Life and requires the Prime Minister to consult the Independent Adviser and the appropriate Commons select committee on drafts. It establishes an Independent Adviser with a statutory duty to monitor, audit and report on compliance and to maintain a public register of ministers’ relevant interests. Practically, that transforms a conventionally political document into one subject to regular external scrutiny and creates a formal flow of information between ministers and a named independent office.
Declaration timelines, investigatory remit and powers to compel information
Ministers must disclose potential conflicts within 14 days of assuming a new office; the Adviser may require additional information and can give confidential advice requiring a minister to report back on remedial action. The Adviser may investigate when asked by the Prime Minister or at their own initiative and must report findings to the Prime Minister. Schedule 2 supplies statutory powers to require documents and information, creates offences for intentional non‑compliance or knowingly providing false information, and ties in civil/criminal enforcement paths that departments and ministers will need to operationalise.
Statutory public appointments code and audit powers
The Minister for the Cabinet Office must publish a Public Appointments Code governing appointments to bodies listed in Schedules 3 and 4. The Commissioner audits appointing practices, investigates complaints, can require publication of summary appointment information and reports to the Minister. The Minister may expand the schedules by negative SI, which preserves parliamentary oversight but allows administrative flexibility—an important implementation lever for the Cabinet Office.
Reformed HOLAC and a CSPL with coordinating functions
The bill reconstitutes HOLAC with defined membership and duties: it must invite candidates, keep a merit‑based list for the crossbenches, and vet all peerage nominees for probity—if HOLAC advises against an appointment, the Prime Minister may not proceed. Separately the CSPL becomes a statutory convenor and reviewer of standards across public service, tasked with a public portal explaining the relationships between ethical regulators and convening them at least quarterly. Both bodies must publish annual reports and diversity analyses, giving Parliament and the public more visibility into appointments and standards governance.
New statutory enforcement for post‑government employment
COBA becomes a statutory regulator with power to consider applications from former ministers and senior (SCS3+) civil servants, to monitor departmental implementation of the Rules for lower grades, to impose conditions, seek injunctions and, where necessary, apply criminal sanctions for knowing non‑compliance. The bill adds a civil penalty regime (not exceeding £7,500 unless changed by regulation), an appeals route to the Tribunal, provision for charging application fees and an obligation on COBA to publish guidance and an annual audit of compliance.
Appointment processes, terms of office and governance for new offices
Schedules lay down selection processes (open, merit‑based competitions with senior independent panel members), terms (most senior officeholders are five‑year appointments; political commissioners have shorter terms), delegation and assistance arrangements with the Cabinet Office, and removal mechanisms. Notably, several new officeholders are explicitly non‑political and political commissioners are nominated by the registered leaders of the three largest qualifying parties, balancing independence and political input in membership.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Government across all five countries.
Explore Government in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Parliamentary scrutiny committees and MPs — gain statutory reports, laid documents and a named independent adviser to consult, increasing factual transparency and parliamentary oversight.
- Citizens and watchdogs — receive regular, published lists of ministers' interests, annual regulator reports, and clearer grounds for assessing conflicts of interest across public service.
- Ethical regulators and oversight bodies — CSPL, HOLAC, COBA and the Commissioner for Public Appointments receive statutory powers, funding responsibilities and a formal convening role that strengthens coordination and standardisation of ethics oversight.
Who Bears the Cost
- The Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office — must resource consultation, publication, selection processes, and answer audits and investigations, increasing administrative and political costs.
- Former ministers and senior civil servants (SCS3+) and their prospective employers — face application processes, possible conditions or injunctions from COBA, criminal exposure for intentional breaches and civil penalties, plus application fees.
- Departments and appointing authorities listed in the Schedules — face audits, information demands, training obligations and potential remedial action, creating compliance costs and new HR and legal burdens.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill’s central dilemma is this: it seeks to move ethics and appointments from discretionary political management into independent, rule‑based regulation to restore public confidence, but it leaves ultimate appointment and dismissal powers in the hands of political actors; strengthening oversight therefore risks being undercut by the very mechanisms that maintain political control, and any attempt to harden independence will cut back on ministerial accountability or political discretion.
The bill tightens oversight but leaves several hard practical questions unresolved. The Independent Adviser is appointed by the Prime Minister after an ostensibly merit‑based process, yet the Prime Minister keeps final disciplinary control over ministers—so the practical independence of the Adviser depends on selection rigour, funding and political norms that the statute alone does not guarantee.
The Adviser can require publication of advice and information, but investigations and sanction recommendations are reported to the Prime Minister and may remain confidential; the statute permits publication in some cases but does not create a clear, enforceable threshold for making investigatory findings public.
COBA’s parallel criminal and civil regimes create a complex enforcement landscape. A criminal offence attaches to intentional breaches by individuals and employers, while COBA‑administered civil penalties (capped initially at £7,500) operate in overlapping territory and include limitations on proceedings where criminal action is instituted.
That raises questions about resource priorities (prosecution versus administrative penalties), proportionality for small employers, and how COBA will manage appeals and enforcement costs while funding itself partly through applicant charges. Finally, the bill opens the schedules of regulated appointing bodies to amendment by negative SI—efficient but politically sensitive—meaning the statutory perimeter of who is covered can shift administratively and provoke legal and parliamentary dispute.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.