This bill amends the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 to give Parliament a formal power to change draft statutory instruments subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. It inserts a new section (6A) making clear that, for Acts passed after this amendment comes into force, either House may propose amendments to a draft SI and that any amendment must ultimately be agreed by both Houses before the instrument can be made.
The practical effect is to convert some instances of delegated-legislation review from a single yes/no decision into a potential negotiation between Houses and ministers. That increases parliamentary control over delegated acts, but also introduces new procedural steps that could lengthen timelines for regulators, require changes to drafting practices, and create points of inter-house contention that are not currently defined in statute.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill inserts section 6A into the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. For statutory instruments made under Acts passed after the amendment commences, either House may move to amend a draft SI laid for approval under the affirmative resolution procedure; amendments require agreement by both Houses before the instrument may be made.
Who It Affects
This change touches government lawyers and departmental policy teams who prepare SIs, clerks and committees in both Houses responsible for secondary legislation, and regulated sectors that depend on timely SIs (financial services, health, environment, transport, etc.). It also alters the bargaining position of backbench MPs and peers who use SIs to influence policy details.
Why It Matters
By creating a statutory route for amendment, the bill raises the political and operational stakes of affirmative procedures: ministers may need to negotiate textual changes, and businesses may face greater uncertainty about rule texts and implementation dates. It also raises constitutional questions about bicameral relations and the mechanics for resolving disagreements over secondary legislation.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill is narrowly focused: it changes the legal framework for how certain secondary legislation is dealt with by Parliament. Under current practice for instruments subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, Parliament usually votes to approve a draft laid by a minister; it does not have a statutory power to amend the instrument’s text before approval.
The new provision transforms that status for instruments created under Acts passed after the amendment takes effect.
Operationally, the new section authorises either the Commons or the Lords to amend the draft text of an SI while it is before Parliament. That amendment power is not unilateral: the bill requires both Houses to agree any change before the instrument can be made.
The statute does not spell out detailed procedures for how amendments are to be proposed, debated, or reconciled, so ordinary parliamentary practice and the standing orders of each House will determine much of the day‑to‑day implementation.Because the provision applies only to primary Acts passed after commencement, existing SIs and existing parent Acts are unaffected. Departments that draft delegated legislation will therefore face a forward-looking change in risk management: where before they could expect an up-or-down parliamentary vote in some cases, they now must anticipate the possibility of textual alteration and the need for inter‑house negotiation.
That affects timetable planning, stakeholder engagement, and the legal drafting lifecycle.The bill also creates a practical requirement for ministers and parliamentary managers to build new internal processes. If a House proposes an amendment, the minister will generally need to decide whether to accept it and re-present a revised draft, or to oppose it and risk the instrument failing to be made.
Because the statute insists on both-House agreement, a single House cannot impose changes without the other's consent—introducing potential stalemate if the Houses diverge and no fast reconciliation mechanism is provided in the text.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill inserts a new section 6A into the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, placed immediately after existing section 6.
The amendment power applies only to statutory instruments made under Acts enacted after this bill comes into force; it does not retroactively change existing parent Acts.
Either the House of Commons or the House of Lords may amend a draft instrument while it is before Parliament under the affirmative procedure.
No amendment can take effect unless both Houses agree the change; the bill does not create a unilateral override for either House.
The Act’s commencement provision sets a single deadline: it comes into force two months after the day it is passed, and its territorial extent mirrors that of the provision it amends.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Power for either House to amend affirmative instruments
This provision is the bill’s core: it creates a statutory entitlement for either House to amend a draft SI subject to affirmative resolution. Practically, that converts what has often been an up-or-down approval into a potential drafting and negotiating exercise. The clause does not define how an amendment is to be moved, whether it must be tabled in report stage or committee, or how many times an instrument may be revised—those procedural details will be handled by House standing orders and committee practices.
Bicameral agreement as a condition of making an instrument
Section 6A(2) conditions the making of an SI on both Houses agreeing any amendment. That creates a statutory requirement for bicameral concurrence: an amendment proposed and accepted in one House has no legal effect unless the other House also consents. The practical implication is that ministers cannot rely on one House alone to finalise contested text; they may need to engage in inter‑house negotiation or offer concessions to obtain the other House’s assent.
Extent, commencement and short title
This section ties the bill’s geographic reach to the provision it amends (so the same UK territorial application as the Statutory Instruments Act 1946), sets a commencement at the end of a two‑month period after enactment, and provides the short title. Because the substantive change is explicitly prospective—applying to Acts passed after commencement—its effect will appear gradually as future parent Acts adopt affirmative procedures.
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Explore Government in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Backbench MPs and peers who want more leverage over delegated details — the bill gives them a statutory pathway to secure specific textual changes rather than relying on political pressure alone.
- Parliamentary scrutiny committees and clerks, who can convert critical comments into enforceable changes and thus strengthen parliamentary oversight of delegated powers.
- Outside campaign groups and regulated industry bodies that are effective in influencing parliamentary debate; they gain an additional mechanism to secure amendments to technical rules through their parliamentary allies.
Who Bears the Cost
- Departments and government legal teams, which must build processes to handle proposed amendments, re‑draft instruments, and manage longer timetables for implementation.
- Regulated entities (for example, firms in financial services, health providers, infrastructure operators) that rely on timely secondary legislation may face delayed compliance deadlines and increased legal uncertainty while instruments are negotiated between Houses.
- Parliamentary staff and committees, which will face heavier workloads to process, reconcile and timetable amendments for SIs without any corresponding funding or statutory procedural template.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is straightforward: bolster parliamentary control over delegated legislation and thereby strengthen democratic oversight, or preserve the speed and predictability that ministers and regulated parties need to implement policy—this bill increases the former at the likely expense of the latter, and it does so without prescribing the procedural tools to manage the trade-off.
The bill improves parliamentary leverage over delegated legislation but leaves major procedural questions unanswered. It does not create a defined reconciliation route between the Houses for secondary legislation, so ’ping‑pong’ dynamics typical of primary legislation could emerge informally.
That uncertainty affects whether contested instruments will be resolved quickly or become prolonged bargaining exercises. The statutory requirement that both Houses consent prevents one House from imposing text, but it also gives the smaller House (the Lords) a stronger negotiating position in some circumstances, which may be politically sensitive.
A second tension is between scrutiny and legal certainty. Agencies and regulated parties depend on stable, timely instruments; giving Parliament a formal amendment route increases democratic scrutiny but risks delaying the entry into force of rules or producing last‑minute textual changes that complicate compliance.
The bill’s prospective application reduces immediate disruption but also means its effects will be uneven across areas of law, depending on when future parent Acts choose affirmative procedure. Finally, the bill presumes existing parliamentary machinery and standing orders can absorb the change; if they cannot, Parliament will either need new rules or risk ad hoc practices that create inconsistency across SIs.
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