AB 1932 creates the C.R.I.S.E.S. Grant Pilot Program 2.0 under the State Department of Social Services to fund community‑based alternatives to law enforcement for crisis response.
The bill restricts grant awards to community‑based organizations (CBOs), directs a stakeholder workgroup to help design and select grants, requires routine data collection and reporting, and aims to build an evidence base for broader implementation.
The statute also streamlines deployment by exempting program funds from some state contracting and rulemaking requirements and shields the state from liability for grantee activities. The pilot is time‑limited and only operates if the Legislature provides funding; its purpose is to demonstrate operational models and fiscal impacts of non‑police crisis responses for future policy decisions.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill directs DSS to run a time‑limited grant pilot that funds community‑led crisis response alternatives to police, with program design and grantee selection done in partnership with a stakeholder workgroup. Grantees must report outcomes to the department and participate in evaluation work guided by the stakeholder group.
Who It Affects
Primary targets are community‑based organizations that can operate mobile crisis teams, community paramedicine, or civilian crisis response programs; county behavioral health and local service providers who will coordinate referrals; and 911/dispatch systems that may redirect certain calls away from law enforcement. State DSS will administer the grants and oversee evaluation.
Why It Matters
This creates a pilot mechanism to shift some first‑response functions away from police toward community providers and to generate programmatic and fiscal data to inform whether California should scale alternatives statewide. The combination of expedited procurement and mandatory evaluation means programs could deploy faster than typical state initiatives, but with different oversight dynamics.
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What This Bill Actually Does
AB 1932 sets up a pilot grant program administered by the State Department of Social Services to support community‑based alternatives to law enforcement for crisis situations that don’t require fire or emergency medical first response. The department must publicly solicit partners — inviting letters of intent and holding public meetings — and work with a convened stakeholder workgroup to develop grant criteria and select grantees.
The statute bars law enforcement agencies and organizations, and organizations partnered with law enforcement, from receiving grants.
Funds are designated for activities such as mobile crisis response teams and community paramedicine; grantees must be able to respond to emergency calls, provide assessment and deescalation, coordinate with health and social services, and maintain relationships with local partners. Grantees may collaborate on planning and implementation, handle response requests, conduct crisis follow‑up and referrals, and submit data and reports to the department.
The department requires at least annual reporting on client counts and outcomes, with data elements to be recommended by the stakeholder workgroup.The bill spells out the stakeholder workgroup’s role in detail: partnering on selection criteria, advising on best practices and evaluation design, identifying implementation barriers, recommending anonymized data to collect, and supporting oversight of grantees. The membership roster must include emergency medical and public/behavioral health practitioners, people who have used community crisis services, survivors of police brutality, and family members of people harmed by police use of force; the workgroup cannot include current or former law enforcement officers or their immediate family members.Implementation is conditioned on a legislative appropriation; to speed deployment the statute exempts program funds from certain state contracting rules and from the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking requirements, and it provides immunity for the State from liability for grantee activities.
The pilot is temporary: it becomes inoperative in mid‑2031 and is repealed at the start of 2032, and the department must publish a post‑program report using quantitative and qualitative findings to inform potential full implementation and scaling.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The program only starts if the Legislature appropriates funds in the Budget Act of 2026.
Each grantee must receive a minimum award of $250,000 per year.
All grants under the chapter must be awarded no later than January 1, 2028.
Funding awarded under the chapter is exempt from personal services contracting rules, the Public Contract Code, the State Contracting Manual, and does not require Department of General Services approval.
The chapter sunsets: it becomes inoperative on June 30, 2031, is repealed January 1, 2032, and DSS must post a programmatic and fiscal report six months after the program ends.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Definitions and scope
This section defines key terms used through the chapter: 'community‑based organization,' 'department' (DSS), 'fund,' 'grantee,' 'law enforcement agency' and officer, 'program,' and 'stakeholder workgroup.' The definitions set the boundaries for eligibility (for example, allowing fiscally sponsored groups) and make explicit that federal law enforcement and state correctional entities are within the statute’s definition of law enforcement agencies. Clear definitions reduce ambiguity about who may apply and who the program seeks to displace as first responders.
Program administration, eligibility, and permitted uses
DSS administers the pilot and must work with a stakeholder workgroup to select grantees and establish eligibility criteria. The statute forbids law enforcement agencies and organizations, and organizations partnered with law enforcement, from being grantees; it also requires public outreach (notices, letters of intent, public meetings). Program funds may be used for non‑police crisis responses such as mobile crisis teams and community paramedicine; importantly, the text disallows law enforcement officers or agencies as first responders or co‑responders and authorizes funding revocation if a grantee improperly partners with law enforcement.
Reporting, evaluation, and stakeholder workgroup duties
Grantees must report at least annually on program use, client counts, and outcomes with data elements determined by DSS in consultation with the stakeholder workgroup. The workgroup’s duties are extensive: choosing grantee criteria, advising on best practices, helping design evaluation methods, recommending anonymized data sets, selecting grantees jointly with DSS, and supporting oversight. The membership mix is prescribed to include EMS and behavioral health practitioners, survivors and family members impacted by police use of force, while excluding current or former law enforcement and their immediate family.
Operational qualifications for grantees
The statute lists capacities DSS will look for in applicants — ability to respond to emergency calls, provide assessment and stabilization, deescalation, coordinate care, and maintain community partnerships. It also allows grantees to handle operational tasks: local stakeholder engagement, response request mechanisms, crisis activities, and follow‑up including tracking service delivery data. These provisions push selection toward organizations already operating in crisis response or with rapid capacity to scale.
Public reporting requirement after program ends
DSS must post a public report six months after program conclusion detailing programmatic and fiscal savings, populations served, benefits realized, and policy recommendations. The report must use both quantitative and qualitative data and is intended to inform the Legislature and Governor about feasibility and design choices for a permanent program.
Implementation conditions, procurement and liability carve‑outs, and sunset
Implementation requires an appropriation. The bill carves program funding out of standard personal services contracting rules, the Public Contract Code, and the State Contracting Manual, and exempts DSS from Department of General Services approval for these funds. The department may implement or interpret the chapter without APA rulemaking. The state is immune from liability for grantee activities. Finally, the chapter is temporary: it becomes inoperative June 30, 2031, and is repealed January 1, 2032.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Community‑based organizations with crisis response capacity — They gain a dedicated funding stream to scale mobile crisis teams, community paramedicine, and civilian crisis response programs without competing against law enforcement entities.
- People in crisis and behavioral‑health populations — The pilot aims to direct non‑criminal behavioral and mental‑health emergencies to providers trained in deescalation and care rather than to armed officers, potentially improving outcomes and reducing traumatic policing encounters.
- Local service providers and community partners — Organizations that coordinate social supports, housing, and follow‑up care can expand referral pathways and see reduced burden from law‑enforcement‑led responses.
- Policy analysts and state planners — The mandated evaluation and public report provide data on fiscal and programmatic effects to inform possible statewide rollout.
Who Bears the Cost
- State Department of Social Services — DSS must staff program administration, run the stakeholder workgroup, manage reporting and evaluation, and oversee grantee compliance, likely requiring internal resources if the appropriation isn’t fully earmarked for admin.
- Community organizations that accept grants — Recipients must meet reporting and program requirements, maintain data systems, and risk funding revocation if found to partner with law enforcement outside the statute’s allowances.
- Counties and 911 systems — Shifting call routing and integrating non‑police responders will require operational changes, coordination costs, and potentially investments in dispatch protocols and training.
- Taxpayers and the Legislature — The program requires a Budget Act appropriation and, if not executed efficiently, could create ongoing fiscal pressure to sustain successful pilots or address gaps when the pilot ends.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is whether to prioritize rapid, community‑controlled deployment of non‑police crisis response models (using procurement and rulemaking exemptions and statutory protections) or to insist on traditional oversight, contracting safeguards, and clearer accountability even if that slows rollout and preserves greater legal and fiscal safeguards.
The bill bundles an ambitious operational experiment with statutory shortcuts that raise practical and policy questions. First, banning law enforcement and partnerships with law enforcement from receiving funds aims to preserve community control, but the statute gives limited guidance on what counts as an impermissible 'partnership.' That ambiguity creates risk: programs may avoid necessary safety coordination (e.g., scene security, dispatch integration) for fear of forfeiting funding, or conversely, may inadvertently trigger revocation if a benign collaboration is misread as a disqualifying partnership.
Second, exempting program funds from state contracting rules and APA rulemaking accelerates deployment but reduces standard competitive procurement safeguards and centralized oversight by DGS. That trade‑off favors speed and bespoke local arrangements at the cost of transparency, vendor vetting, and uniform contracting terms.
Coupled with the state immunity clause for grantee activities, the statutory design shifts operational and legal risk in ways that could complicate accountability and civil remedies when things go wrong. Finally, the fixed sunset gives the evaluation a deadline but limits the time available to demonstrate durable outcomes and build long‑term systems; scaling decisions based on a short, politically time‑boxed pilot may miss long‑run costs or administrative barriers.
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