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California AB 1940 expands anti‑discrimination definitions to cover menopause and reproductive decisions

The bill revises statutory definitions used to determine unlawful employment practices, changing how employers, HR teams, and regulators analyze sex‑based discrimination and accommodation duties.

The Brief

AB 1940 revises the definitional framework in California’s unfair employment practices law by updating terms that determine what counts as protected conduct or status and what remedies are available. The changes recast several core statutory definitions—what the statute means by “sex,” “reasonable accommodation,” “employer,” “age,” and related terms—so they govern how claims are pleaded, investigated, and adjudicated.

This is consequential for employers and compliance officers because statutory definitions shape threshold questions: who is covered, what conduct is unlawful, when an accommodation is required, and what court or agency relief looks like. The bill shifts the legal baseline that HR policies, leave programs, benefits design, and anti‑discrimination training must meet, and it changes the analytical map that managers and counsel will use when assessing requests linked to reproductive health or midlife changes in employees’ bodies.

At a Glance

What It Does

AB 1940 rewrites and clarifies multiple definitional provisions used to enforce California anti‑discrimination law: it explicitly treats perimenopause, menopause, and postmenopause (and related medical conditions) as encompassed by “sex”; it defines “reproductive health decisionmaking”; it enumerates what counts as affirmative (prospective) relief; and it restates baseline thresholds such as when an entity qualifies as an “employer.” The bill also updates definitions for disability, essential job functions, protective hairstyles, and the interplay with federal ADA definitions.

Who It Affects

The changes directly affect employers covered by California law (the text applies to persons who regularly employ five or more people), state and local government employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, HR and legal teams, benefits administrators, and counsel defending or prosecuting workplace claims. Employees making choices about reproductive care or experiencing perimenopause/menopause, plus workers whose appearance implicates race or national‑origin protections, are also directly affected.

Why It Matters

Because definitions determine what facts count as unlawful discrimination, these revisions will influence both early‑stage compliance decisions and outcomes in investigations or litigation. Employers will need to revisit policies on leave, scheduling, workplace adjustments, nondiscrimination statements, and training; regulators and courts will use the rewritten definitions to assess claims about midlife health changes and reproductive autonomy in the workplace.

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What This Bill Actually Does

At its core, AB 1940 is a definitions bill: it adjusts the statutory vocabulary that courts and enforcement agencies use to decide whether particular workplace actions are unlawful. By placing perimenopause, menopause, and postmenopause within the statutory definition of “sex,” the bill makes actions based on symptoms or medical conditions tied to those life stages subject to the same analysis employers apply to pregnancy, childbirth, and breastfeeding claims.

That means a denial of a schedule change, discipline, or adverse action tied to menopausal symptoms can be asserted as sex discrimination under the statute.

The bill also creates a standalone label—“reproductive health decisionmaking”—and defines it to include choices about using or accessing a particular drug, device, product, or medical service for reproductive health. Practically, this expands the class of decisions that fall under protected status, with immediate consequences for confidentiality, leave‑and‑benefit coverage decisions, and the scope of protected conduct in workplace policies.

Employers who condition benefits or discipline employees based on those choices will need to reassess whether such treatment runs afoul of the statute.AB 1940 preserves and restates many familiar compliance concepts while adding texture: it recites examples of reasonable accommodations (schedule changes, reassignment, equipment, interpreters), specifies the factors that define “undue hardship” (cost, size and resources of the employer, effect on operations), and lists evidentiary considerations for whether a job function is “essential.” The statute also makes clear that where the federal ADA provides broader protections for mental or physical disabilities, the broader federal standard controls—so employers must apply the more protective interpretation where applicable.Beyond individual protections, the bill tightens several practical mechanics that shape remedy and procedure. It explicitly catalogs the types of prospective or affirmative relief an enforcement agency or court may order—reinstatement, backpay, training, expunging records, and similar measures—so remedies for successful claims are framed in the statute rather than left entirely to adjudicative discretion.

It also clarifies that race and national‑origin protections include traits like protective hairstyles and that national‑origin protections extend to discrimination based on possession of certain driver’s licenses or ID cards, narrowing opportunities for employers to defend policies that have disparate effects on particular groups.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

The bill places perimenopause, menopause, and postmenopause—and medical conditions related to them—explicitly within the statutory definition of “sex.”, “Reproductive health decisionmaking” is defined to include a decision to use or access a particular drug, device, product, or medical service for reproductive health.

2

The statutory definition of “employer” in the part applies to any person who regularly employs five or more persons (and excludes certain religious nonprofit entities).

3

The statute incorporates the federal ADA’s broader definition of “disability” where that federal definition provides greater protection than the state text.

4

The bill enumerates examples of affirmative/prospective relief—reinstatement, backpay, reimbursement of expenses, training, expungement and reporting of records, among others—so such remedies are expressly authorized.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Section 12926(a)

Affirmative/prospective relief defined

This subsection lists the kinds of forward‑looking remedies an agency or court may impose to correct unlawful practices. For compliance teams this matters because it clarifies that remedies include nonmonetary corrective actions—training, policy posting, testing, and expunging records—alongside reinstatement and backpay, making remedial plans broader than simple monetary settlements.

Section 12926(d) and (c)

Who counts as an employer or employee

The bill confirms the coverage threshold used in the part: an employer is any person regularly employing five or more persons, and the employee definition retains the family‑employment exclusion except as provided elsewhere. That threshold is small by many workplace‑law standards, so small employers should confirm whether they meet the five‑employee cutoff and update their policies if they do.

Section 12926(f)

Essential functions and proof

The text lists the commonly relied on factors to determine whether a job duty is essential (employer judgment, job descriptions, time spent, consequences of not requiring performance, collective bargaining terms, and incumbents’ experience). This codifies the evidentiary checklist that employers and adjudicators will use to decide accommodation requests tied to job performance.

3 more sections
Section 12926(j), (m), and (n)

Disability definitions and ADA incorporation

The bill retains detailed state definitions for mental and physical disabilities but adds an explicit rule: if the federal ADA’s definition is broader, the broader federal protection applies. That creates a floor of state law protection while deferring to federal law for gaps, which increases complexity for employers who must apply two overlapping standards.

Section 12926(p) and (u)

Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship standards

Reasonable accommodation examples include schedule changes, reassignment, equipment modifications, and interpreters; undue hardship is defined by a five‑factor test (nature and cost of accommodation, financial resources and size of employer, effect on operations, type of operations, and facility relationships). These concrete factors provide employers with the analytical framework to evaluate accommodation requests but also leave room for disputed factual determinations.

Section 12926(r), (w), (x), (v), and (z)

Expanded protected traits and clarifying provisions

The bill broadens the definition of “sex” to enumerate pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, and perimenopause/menopause/postmenopause, explicitly includes protective hairstyles under race, extends national‑origin protection to certain identification‑card statuses under the Vehicle Code, and declares that group or class complaints alleging pattern or practice are included. These clarifications tighten protections and reduce opportunities for employers to argue that certain conduct falls outside the statute’s covered traits.

At scale

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Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Employees experiencing perimenopause, menopause, or postmenopause — they gain express statutory protection from discrimination tied to symptoms or medical conditions related to those life stages, and a clearer path to request accommodations.
  • Employees seeking reproductive medical services or products — the new “reproductive health decisionmaking” label protects a broader set of personal medical choices from workplace adverse action.
  • Workers with race‑linked appearance practices — the explicit inclusion of protective hairstyles reduces justifications for grooming or appearance policies that disproportionately affect Black employees.
  • Individual claimants and public‑interest litigants — the clarified definitions and the explicit list of affirmative remedies make it easier to seek nonmonetary corrective orders (training, policy changes, record expungement).

Who Bears the Cost

  • Employers with five or more employees — HR, operations, and benefits programs will face policy revisions, training costs, and potentially more accommodation requests and administrative burdens.
  • Small businesses just above the five‑employee threshold — they may need to adopt formal processes and documentation practices they previously avoided.
  • State and local enforcement agencies and courts — clearer definitions may increase caseload complexity and require updated guidance, investigatory practices, and training for adjudicators.
  • Health plans and benefits administrators — broader protections around reproductive decisionmaking and menopause‑related conditions could push changes in leave, coverage determinations, and accommodation funding.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The central dilemma AB 1940 creates is balancing stronger, clearer protections for people whose bodies or medical choices have been marginalized—by making those categories explicit—against the operational and legal uncertainty that comes from widening protected classes without bright‑line thresholds. The statute amplifies protections for individuals but shifts the burden of interpretation and cost onto employers, regulators, and courts to determine when those protections require accommodation or remedial action.

The bill’s strengths are also its sources of operational friction. By converting contested concepts—like menopause‑related medical conditions or reproductive choices—into enumerated protected categories, the law lowers the bar for claimants to frame an issue as sex discrimination, but it leaves significant line‑drawing to employers and adjudicators.

The statute does not define thresholds for severity, frequency, or functional impact that would uniformly trigger an accommodation duty for menopause symptoms; employers will still need to evaluate requests case‑by‑case, and those factual inquiries are ripe for dispute.

Another implementation challenge is the interaction with federal law. The provision that incorporates the ADA when it offers broader protection means employers must apply a layered analysis: state definitions plus federal disability law when applicable.

That can produce inconsistent outcomes across claims and increase litigation risk. The reproductive health decisionmaking definition is broad in text (drug, device, product, or service) but vague in scope—courts will need to decide whether an employer’s neutral policy that affects access to a particular drug or device is discriminatory in practice.

Finally, the bill strengthens remedies and clarifies relief, which helps successful claimants but raises settlement and compliance costs for employers and could increase the number of agency enforcement actions.

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