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AB 2573: Makes candidates’ and elected officials’ home contact details confidential on voter records

Creates a secure, opt‑in confidentiality pathway — plus automatic protections on filing — and new county/SOS duties that reshape access to the voter file.

The Brief

AB 2573 lets California elected officials and candidates keep their residence address, telephone number, and email off the public affidavit of registration. The bill requires counties (with coordination from the Secretary of State) to mark those fields confidential when an official or candidate requests it and, in many cases, to do so automatically when nominees file or qualify for the ballot.

The change alters who sees contact information in voter rosters and voter-file products, creates specific timelines and notification duties for county elections officials and the Secretary of State, and establishes a controlled disclosure path for journalists and government users. Implementation depends on updates to the statewide and county voter databases, though counties may manually apply protections until the systems are changed.

At a Glance

What It Does

The bill requires county elections officials to mark an elected official’s or candidate’s residence address, phone, and email confidential upon written request and, in many cases, automatically within five business days after nomination papers are filed or a candidate qualifies for the ballot. It also directs counties to remove confidential voters from publicly produced lists and sets rules for moving between counties, opting out, and limited disclosure for journalistic or governmental purposes.

Who It Affects

State and local elected officials and candidates across California; county elections officials who must update records and exclude confidential voters from public rosters; the Secretary of State for cross‑county notifications; journalists and media outlets seeking access to confidential records under a prescribed application process; voter‑file vendors and any users of voter rosters.

Why It Matters

AB 2573 changes the composition of publicly available voter files and shifts administrative responsibility for protecting candidate information to county offices and the Secretary of State. That has operational costs and raises tradeoffs between personal safety and the public’s access to contact information for officials and candidates.

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What This Bill Actually Does

The bill defines who qualifies as an "elected official or candidate," excluding county central committee members and treating both elected and appointed officials at the state and local level as potentially eligible for confidentiality. An immediate family member (spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child who lives in the same residence) can be included, but only if the official or candidate names them in the written confidentiality request.

Confidentiality is triggered in two ways. First, an elected official or candidate may submit a written request to their county elections official to make their residence address, telephone number, and email confidential on the affidavit of registration.

Second, the bill creates an administrative trigger: when nomination papers are filed for state or federal offices, the Secretary of State provides a list to counties identifying candidates in each county; for local offices, counties maintain those lists. Within five business days of receiving the list or a filing, the county must mark the corresponding registration fields confidential.

Counties must exclude confidential voters from any publicly produced list, roster, or index.The bill lays out handling for moves between counties: the new county is to contact the confidential voter, honor the former county’s confidential status for 60 days while the voter applies in the new county, exclude the voter from rosters during that period, and remove confidential status if the voter fails to obtain it in the new county within 60 days. It also specifies opt‑out mechanics: officials can rescind confidentiality in writing and the county must process add/remove requests within five business days and notify the Secretary of State and any relevant counties.Access to confidential data is tightly limited.

Disclosure outside elections offices is allowed only for bona fide journalistic or governmental purposes; journalists requesting state or federal confidential data must apply to the Secretary of State with a California Voter Registration File Request application, a media authorization (or press pass), and a declaration under penalty of perjury describing the intended journalistic use. The bill shields counties from liability for actions based on erroneous information from the Secretary of State and restricts negligence claims against government entities to showings of gross negligence or willfulness.

Implementation depends on database changes to the statewide voter file and county election management systems, but counties may manually provide protections to the extent feasible through December 31, 2028.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

County elections officials must make a candidate’s or elected official’s residence address, phone, and email confidential within five business days of receiving a qualifying list or nomination/qualification filing.

2

When a confidential voter moves counties, the new county must honor the prior confidential status for 60 days while the person applies for confidentiality in the new county; if they don’t obtain it within 60 days, the status is removed.

3

Journalists seeking confidential state or federal records must apply to the Secretary of State with a California Voter Registration File Request application, an outlet authorization (or press pass), and a declaration under penalty of perjury attesting to journalistic use.

4

Counties must exclude confidential voters from any roster, voter list, or index and may not include confidential information in other lists created by the elections office; they must also notify the Secretary of State and relevant counties within five business days when they add or remove confidential designations.

5

Counties may manually implement protections to the maximum degree possible until the statewide and local systems are updated, and they may continue manual efforts to December 31, 2028, while system changes are completed.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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2166.9(a)(1)-(2)

Definitions: who counts as an elected official or candidate

These paragraphs define "elected official or candidate" to include federal, state, and local elected officials and candidates who have qualified for the ballot, and they expressly exclude members of county central committees. The provision also defines "immediate family member" narrowly (spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child living at the same residence) and permits including that person only if named in the request. Practically, this limits the pool of registrants eligible for the special confidentiality treatment and constrains which household members can be covered.

2166.9(b)-(c)

How confidentiality is triggered and the five‑day action rule

The bill provides two triggers: an affirmative written request by the official/candidate to the county elections official, and an administrative trigger tied to filing/qualification. For state and federal nominees, the Secretary of State supplies county lists; for local nominees, counties maintain the lists. In either case, the county must mark the residence address, telephone number, and email confidential within five business days of receiving the list or a qualifying filing. That five‑day deadline is the core operational requirement for counties to prevent public disclosure events.

2166.9(d)

Excluding confidential voters from lists and moving between counties

Counties must exclude confidential registrants from any published list, roster, or index. The bill creates a temporary, 60‑day portability rule when a confidential voter moves: the new county must contact the registrant, honor the old confidentiality for 60 days, and exclude them from rosters during that interval, but must remove the confidential designation if the registrant does not obtain local confidentiality within 60 days. That mechanism balances continuity of protection with an administrative cut‑off for new jurisdictions.

3 more sections
2166.9(e)-(g), (j)

Opt‑in, opt‑out, duration, and notification duties

Officials and candidates opt in by written request; they may opt out in writing and the county must process such requests within five business days and notify the Secretary of State and any relevant counties. The bill contains multiple duration rules: in different places it ties confidentiality to 'until the official no longer holds the office' or to specified election canvass milestones for candidates; elsewhere it contains a separate statement that an elected official’s contact details remain confidential until two years after leaving office. Counties must notify an official at least 60 days before removing confidential status; an official who opts out consents to placement in public rosters.

2166.9(h)

Controlled disclosure for journalistic or governmental purposes

Confidential information may be disclosed only for bona fide journalistic or governmental purposes. For state and federal records, the requester must submit a California Voter Registration File Request application to the Secretary of State, provide a media authorization or press pass, and a sworn declaration describing the intended journalistic use. County procedures must mirror Secretary of State regulations for local records, and counties must retain records of requests and disclosures. The provision creates a formal gatekeeping process rather than an open public‑records release.

2166.9(i)-(j),(f),(k)

Implementation sequencing, liability limits, and interaction with other confidentiality laws

The Secretary of State and counties must implement the section once their databases support the changes; until then, counties may manually implement protections and are encouraged to do so through December 31, 2028. The statute protects counties from liability when they act on erroneous information from the Secretary of State and limits negligence claims to those showing gross negligence or willful conduct. The bill also clarifies that participation in this program does not replace court‑ordered confidentiality or other specific statutory confidentiality programs already in place.

At scale

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Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Current and prospective elected officials and qualified candidates — they gain a statutory pathway to keep home addresses, phone numbers, and emails off public voter affidavits, reducing exposure to harassment or threats.
  • Named immediate family members who live with a covered official — they can be included in the confidentiality request, providing household protections that extend beyond the officeholder.
  • Law enforcement and office security planners — fewer public contact points for high‑profile individuals can simplify threat mitigation and reduce the volume of public disclosures that might create security risks.
  • Election staff seeking consistent procedures — the bill standardizes timing and notifications, giving counties and the Secretary of State clear duties to follow when processing confidentiality claims.

Who Bears the Cost

  • County elections officials — they absorb the administrative and IT burden of identifying covered officials, making five‑day updates, honoring 60‑day portability, excluding confidential voters from products, retaining disclosure records, and coordinating with the Secretary of State.
  • Secretary of State’s office — SOS must produce county lists, process journalistic access requests for state/federal records, prescribe forms, and coordinate notifications, expanding its operational workload.
  • Voter‑file vendors and organizations relying on public rosters — removing contact fields for qualifying individuals reduces the completeness of commercial and public voter lists and may affect products that rely on full contact data.
  • Journalists and local media outlets — they gain access routes but face added paperwork and evidentiary requirements to obtain confidential information, which may slow reporting or deter smaller outlets.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The bill pits personal safety and security for public servants and their families against the public’s ability to find and contact elected officials and to hold candidates accountable; protecting contact details reduces harassment risk but narrows transparency and access in ways that are administratively costly and legally ambiguous.

AB 2573 builds a practical privacy layer into voter registration records, but it leaves several operational and normative questions unresolved. First, the bill contains overlapping and potentially conflicting duration rules: some provisions tie confidentiality to the period while an official holds office or to canvass milestones for candidates, while another provision states an elected official’s contact information remains confidential for two years after leaving office.

That creates ambiguity that counties will have to interpret and the Secretary of State will likely need to reconcile with guidance or regulation.

Second, the implementation model depends on changes to the statewide voter registration database and county election management systems. The five‑day processing rules and the requirement to strip confidential voters from all rosters assume reliable IT workflows; manual workarounds are allowed only temporarily and create risk of inconsistent protections across counties.

Third, the journalistic access standard hinges on a constitutionally informed definition of “journalistic purposes,” but the required paperwork and sworn declaration introduce a discretionary gate that could lead to uneven approvals, delays, or legal challenges. Finally, the program could be gamed: candidates could seek confidentiality to obscure residency or to limit grassroots accountability, and enforcement mechanisms are thin.

Those concerns interact with the bill’s liability protections for counties, which reduce litigation risk for officials but also lower incentives for vigorous recordkeeping.

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