AB 568 inserts a prescriptive rule into California groundwater governance: it identifies a group of statutorily created water and groundwater agencies and makes them the default entities to carry SGMA responsibilities inside their statutory boundaries unless they explicitly decline. The bill also requires public notice and a hearing before an agency elects to take GSA responsibilities and ties the effective date of such decisions to the statutory filing process.
The change matters because it shifts the starting point for who governs groundwater in multiple basins. By naming default entities and creating a short, formal opt‑out route, the bill reduces the procedural uncertainty that has driven competing GSA formations — but it also raises coordination, boundary, and authority questions for local agencies and the Department of Water Resources (DWR).
At a Glance
What It Does
Designates a list of statutorily created groundwater and water agencies as the default entities with authority to comply with SGMA inside their statutory boundaries, while creating a formal opt‑out process that requires notice to the state and a departmental website posting within 15 days. It also conditions an agency’s exercise of SGMA authorities on compatibility with its principal act, unless its governing board finds those authorities are necessary to sustainably manage the basin.
Who It Affects
The bill directly affects the 19 named agencies (including the Tule East Groundwater Sustainability Agency), any other local agency that overlaps those statutory boundaries, county officials in overlying counties, and DWR staff who must accept and post opt‑out notices. Water suppliers, agricultural groundwater users, and municipal managers in affected basins will see governance and decisionmaking pathways change as a result.
Why It Matters
AB 568 reduces the typical scramble over GSA formation by creating a clear default, which can streamline basin planning and reduce litigation risk. At the same time, it centralizes initial authority and creates points of friction where statutory boundaries, groundwater basin boundaries, and existing special‑district powers do not align.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill begins with a simple procedural rule for local governments: any local agency or combination of agencies sitting over a groundwater basin can choose to become that basin’s groundwater sustainability agency — but before making that choice it must publish notice and hold a public hearing in the county or counties that overlie the basin. That hearing requirement invokes the Government Code notice process, so the decision isn’t designed to be quiet or unilateral.
AB 568 then moves from a permissive regime to a prescriptive one by listing nearly two dozen agencies that were created by statute to manage groundwater and declaring they are the ‘exclusive local agencies’ within their statutory boundaries with the power to comply with SGMA. In practice, that means those named entities start with priority for GSA responsibilities in their territory unless they take affirmative steps to decline.The bill sets a short administrative opt‑out pathway.
A listed agency may notify the state department that it opts out; the department must post that notice on its website within 15 days. If a listed agency opts out, other local agencies operating within the statutory footprint can then file notice under the statutory filing process to claim GSA status for that area.
This creates a fast public record that both signals where responsibility lies and starts the clock on other agencies’ options.There’s also an alternative compliance route and a constraint on agency powers. A listed local agency can meet SGMA obligations by following the alternative standard in Section 10733.6 instead of formally adopting GSA status under this section.
And where a local agency’s principal enabling statute limits or forbids certain SGMA powers, the bill says the agency cannot exercise those SGMA authorities unless its governing board first finds it cannot sustainably manage the basin without the otherwise‑prohibited power. Finally, any decision to become a GSA becomes effective under the procedural mechanics set out in Section 10723.8, which governs filing and the ministerial steps that produce legal effect.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill names 19 statutorily created agencies (A through S in the text) as the presumptive, exclusive authorities to comply with SGMA inside their statutory boundaries, explicitly including the Tule East Groundwater Sustainability Agency.
A listed agency may ‘opt out’ by sending notice to the state Department of Water Resources; the department must post that opt‑out on its website within 15 days of receipt.
If a listed agency opts out, any other local agency or combination of local agencies operating inside those statutory boundaries may notify the department under Section 10723.8 to become the groundwater sustainability agency for that area.
A listed local agency may instead satisfy its SGMA obligations by meeting the requirements set out in Section 10733.6 — an alternative compliance pathway that avoids formal designation under Section 10723.
When a listed agency’s principal enabling statute restricts authorities granted by SGMA, the agency cannot use those SGMA authorities unless its governing board issues a written finding that the agency cannot sustainably manage the basin without the otherwise‑prohibited authority.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Local agencies may elect to become GSAs
This subsection restates the baseline SGMA principle: local agencies or combinations of local agencies overlying a basin retain the discretion to become the responsible groundwater sustainability agency. Practically, it preserves local action for entities not caught by the later statutory default — useful for basins where statute doesn’t already create a named entity or where overlapping jurisdictional interests produce different organizing choices.
Required public notice and hearing
Before an agency adopts GSA status, the bill requires publication of notice under Government Code Section 6066 and a public hearing in the counties overlying the basin. That ties GSA declarations to established public‑meeting and notice rules, ensuring opportunities for local stakeholders and county officials to weigh in before an agency assumes basin management responsibilities.
List of statutorily created agencies deemed exclusive defaults
This paragraph lists the named water and groundwater agencies that the statute treats as the default entities entitled to comply with SGMA inside their statutory footprints. By codifying defaults (for example, Alameda County Water District, Orange County Water District, Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, and the Tule East GSA), the statute changes the baseline governance landscape for multiple basins and limits competing formations unless an opt‑out occurs.
Opt‑out procedure and subsequent claim process
A named agency can decline the default role by notifying the Department of Water Resources; the department must publish that opt‑out within 15 days. Once an opt‑out is posted, other local agencies operating within the statutory boundary can file notice under Section 10723.8 to assume GSA responsibilities. This creates a tight administrative rhythm: an opt‑out is public quickly, and it opens a defined pathway for others to step in.
Alternative compliance and principal‑act limitation
A listed agency may comply with SGMA by meeting the requirements of Section 10733.6 instead of formally designating itself as a GSA under this section. The provision also protects the limits of an agency’s principal enabling statute: if the principal act prohibits certain SGMA authorities, the agency cannot use the SGMA powers inconsistently with that act unless its governing board finds the restriction would prevent sustainable management. That creates a procedural check when statutory powers collide.
Effectiveness tied to statutory filing rules
The statute ties the effective date of any agency’s decision to become a groundwater sustainability agency to Section 10723.8, which governs the notice and filing process with the department. In practice, an agency’s authority under SGMA is not simply a local board action; it becomes legally operative through the state’s recording and posting procedures described elsewhere in the statute.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Named statutory agencies (e.g., Tule East GSA, Orange County Water District): They gain default priority to carry SGMA responsibilities within their statutory boundaries, reducing the risk of competing GSA formations and giving them a clearer mandate to plan and allocate resources.
- Counties overlying affected basins: Counties get clearer interlocutors for basin planning and fewer simultaneous GSA actors to coordinate with, which can simplify permitting, land‑use coordination, and county‑level water management.
- Department of Water Resources (DWR): The department benefits from a narrower, more predictable set of filings to track and a simple posting requirement (15 days) to make opt‑outs public, which can streamline its administrative workload related to GSA recognition.
- Large water managers and agricultural stakeholders in named jurisdictions: Consolidated local governance can reduce transaction costs for stakeholders who must engage with a single, statutory manager rather than multiple competing entities.
Who Bears the Cost
- Other local agencies and small special districts overlapping statutory boundaries: These entities may be precluded from becoming the primary GSA unless a listed agency opts out, reducing their ability to manage local groundwater interests and potentially forcing them into coordination or reliance on a default agency.
- Water users in areas where statutory boundaries do not match groundwater basin boundaries: Users may face governance mismatches (different managers for parts of the same basin), complicating basinwide planning and potentially shifting costs to parties outside the statutory footprint.
- DWR operational staff: Although the posting task is short, DWR will need to develop intake, website posting, and record‑keeping workflows to comply with the 15‑day posting requirement and to reconcile filings under Section 10723.8.
- Agencies with restrictive principal acts: If an agency’s principal statute limits SGMA authorities, that agency may face complex internal decisionmaking and potential governance gaps unless its board issues the required finding to exercise additional powers.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central tension is between the desire for clarity and stability in who manages groundwater (a single, named default reduces competing claims and simplifies coordination) and the equally legitimate interest in local choice and hydrologically coherent governance (statutory footprints and principal‑act limits may not match basin needs, and defaulting to named agencies can displace locally preferred arrangements).
AB 568 trades a decentralized scramble over GSA formation for a statutory default model. That simplification creates familiar implementation headaches: statutory boundaries for an agency rarely map perfectly to hydrologic basin boundaries, so a single listed agency’s authority may not correspond to the practical limits of groundwater flow or to the communities that use the same aquifer.
When statutory footprints carve across basins, the bill could produce patchwork governance where some portions of a basin are managed by a named agency while adjacent portions remain without a default manager unless another agency opts in.
The opt‑out mechanism reduces the risk of an unwanted default but depends on quick administrative action (a 15‑day website posting) and local capacity to step into management roles. If a listed agency opts out and no other local agency files under Section 10723.8, the basin segment could be left in limbo.
The principal‑act carveout is sensible on its face but raises procedural and evidentiary questions: what standard must the governing board use to conclude it “cannot sustainably manage the basin” without otherwise‑prohibited authority, and how will that finding survive judicial review? Finally, the bill assumes DWR can operationalize intake and postings without new statutory funding or guidance, a gap that could slow implementation or create inconsistent postings across regions.
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