AB 747 rewrites the procedures for entering defaults and default judgments under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 585. For contract or money-damage actions where defendants have been served (other than by publication) and fail to respond in time, the clerk must enter the default and immediately enter judgment for the principal amount demanded (plus interest and costs).
For other case types, the clerk enters the default but the court must take evidence before entering judgment; the bill also spells out evidence rules for service by publication, permits affidavits in lieu of live witness testimony, addresses defaults on cross-complaints, defines a notice-of-motion-to-strike, and includes a hard sunset: the entire section expires January 1, 2027.
This is a procedural reallocation: it accelerates recovery for plaintiffs in many money cases by shifting initial entry and some judgment authority to clerks, while preserving judicial fact-finding in non-money and publication-service matters. The temporary nature makes this an experimental, two-year regime that will affect litigation strategy, court operations, and the risk calculus for unresponsive or hard-to-locate defendants.
At a Glance
What It Does
Requires clerks to enter defaults and immediately enter judgments for the principal amount in contract and pure money-damage cases when a timely response is missing; for other actions the court must hold a hearing before entering judgment. It sets evidentiary rules for service by publication, permits affidavits in lieu of testimony, and allows defaults on cross-complaints with limits on separate judgments.
Who It Affects
Civil plaintiffs and creditors (including debt purchasers) seeking faster judgments, defense counsel and unrepresented defendants—especially those served by publication or out of state—court clerks implementing immediate-entry procedures, and judges who will manage affidavit-based proofs and post-judgment disputes.
Why It Matters
It short-circuits some of the pre-judgment adversarial process in money cases and standardizes certain evidentiary shortcuts, potentially speeding collections while increasing the risk of default judgments against absent or hard-to-reach defendants. The sunset makes this a short-term procedural experiment that could change litigation tactics and operational practices in courts and law firms.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill focuses on three operational changes. First, in actions that arise on contract or are solely for recovery of money or damages, if at least one defendant has been served (not by publication) and no responsive pleading or listed procedural motion is filed within the summons period, the clerk must enter the default and then immediately enter judgment for the principal amount demanded in the complaint (subject to credits), plus lawfully allowed interest and costs.
Clerks may include attorneys’ fees in that judgment only if the court has adopted a schedule of fees by rule and the contract or statute authorizes fees; otherwise a plaintiff can ask the court to fix fees after default is entered.
Second, for other types of cases the clerk still enters a default on application, but the court retains the fact-finding role: the plaintiff must present evidence to support the relief claimed, the court can take accounts, order references, or submit damages to a jury when appropriate. When service was by publication, the bill requires proof of publication and absence of responsive pleadings before any default entry and gives courts specific latitude to require sworn examinations of the plaintiff or its agent when defendants are nonresidents; the bill also imposes stricter proof requirements in cases affecting title or possession of real property.Third, the bill makes two procedural clarifications.
It allows courts, in their discretion, to accept affidavits in lieu of live testimony for evidence supporting default judgments, but requires those affidavits to state facts with particularity and to be within the affiant’s personal knowledge. It also permits defaults on cross-complaints where the cross-defendant fails to respond, while preventing separate judgments on such cross-complaints when doing so would substantially delay final disposition.
The statute is explicitly temporary: it is repealed on January 1, 2027.
The Five Things You Need to Know
In contract or pure money-damage cases where a defendant (other than by publication) fails to respond, the clerk must enter default and immediately enter judgment for the principal amount demanded, plus interest and costs.
Clerks may include attorneys’ fees in the judgment only if a court-adopted fee schedule exists and the contract or statute authorizes fees; otherwise the court hears a separate fee application after default.
When service was by publication, the plaintiff must prove publication and absence of response; for nonresident defendants the court may require the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s agent to be examined on oath about prior payments.
The court may allow affidavits instead of live testimony to support default-judgment proof, but each affidavit must show particularized facts within the affiant’s personal knowledge and affirm competence to testify.
The entire Section 585 regime created or modified by this bill is temporary and automatically repeals on January 1, 2027.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Clerk entry and immediate judgment in contract/money cases
Subdivision (a) authorizes the clerk, upon a plaintiff’s written application and proof of service, to enter the default and then immediately enter judgment for the principal amount demanded in contract or pure money-damage claims when no timely response or specified procedural motion has been filed. Practically, this shifts the initial entry-and-judgment step from a judge to court staff in a defined subset of cases, speeding enforcement but creating an administrative checkpoint: clerks must verify service and the absence of listed responsive pleadings before entering judgment.
How attorneys’ fees are handled in clerk-entered judgments
The same subdivision lets clerks include attorneys’ fees in the judgment only where the court has a rule-adopted fee schedule and either the contract provides for fees or a statute entitles the plaintiff to recover them. If a fee schedule is not used or the fees require judicial determination, the plaintiff must request that the court fix fees after default has been entered, at which point the court will hold a hearing and render a separate fee award. This creates a two-step pathway for fees—administrative inclusion under narrow circumstances or post-default judicial determination.
Default entry and judicial proof for other actions
For non-money and mixed-relief cases, subdivision (b) preserves judicial gatekeeping: clerks enter the default, but the plaintiff must then apply to the court, which will hear evidence and render judgment only after fact-finding. The court may take an account, order a reference, or call a jury for damages. This maintains traditional safeguards where factual determinations or complex accounting are required before a final award.
Special rules when service is by publication
Subdivision (c) conditions default entry on proof of publication and the absence of listed responses. For nonresident defendants the court may require sworn examination of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s agent about payments and related facts. In actions affecting title or possession of real property the court cannot rely on mere occupancy as proof of entitlement unless statutory prescription elements are met; where claims rest on paper title the plaintiff must prove equitable right to judgment. These provisions raise the evidentiary bar for judgments obtained through publication.
Affidavits as alternative to live testimony
Subdivision (d) authorizes courts, in their discretion, to accept affidavits instead of oral testimony in the hearings referenced in subdivisions (b) and (c) and in post-default fee determinations. It requires affidavits to be particularized and based on the affiant’s personal knowledge, and to affirm that the affiant could testify competently if sworn. That standard is aimed at preserving reliability while allowing more streamlined, documentary proof in default proceedings.
Defaults on cross-complaints and limits on separate judgments
If a cross-defendant fails to respond to a cross-complaint, subdivision (e) permits entry of default as to that cross-complaint; however, the court may not separately enter judgment on the cross-complaint unless a separate judgment is legally proper and would not substantially delay final resolution of the main action. The provision protects against piecemeal final judgments that could complicate or prolong the primary litigation.
Procedural clarification and sunset
Subdivision (f) defines a notice of motion to strike for purposes of the section and clarifies that filing such a notice does not extend the time to demur. Subdivision (g) imposes a hard sunset: the entire section remains in effect only until January 1, 2027, at which point it is repealed. The sunset makes the rules temporary and signals an evaluative posture rather than a permanent overhaul.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Plaintiff creditors and contract claimants — They gain a faster, administratively mediated path to convert an unresponded complaint into a money judgment without an initial in-court hearing, improving collection velocity and reducing upfront litigation costs.
- Debt buyers and collection firms — The immediate clerk-entry option for money judgments streamlines the enforcement pipeline and makes default judgments more predictable and efficient for standardized claims.
- Court clerks and court administration — The statute provides clearer authority for clerks to process default entries and certain judgments, which can standardize procedures and reduce docket congestion for routine money-claim work.
Who Bears the Cost
- Unrepresented and hard-to-locate defendants — Individuals served (other than by publication) who miss procedural windows face a higher risk of an immediate clerk-entered judgment without adversarial fact-checking, increasing their exposure to collection and enforcement actions.
- Defendants served by publication and out-of-state defendants — Although the bill tightens proof for publication cases, the streamlined default process still risks adverse outcomes where notice is imperfect, placing a heavier burden on absent litigants to monitor filings.
- Trial courts — Judges may see more post-judgment applications to set aside defaults, fee disputes after clerk-entered judgments, and contested affidavit sufficiency arguments, shifting some workload from pre-judgment hearings to remedial proceedings.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is efficiency versus due process: the bill speeds recovery for plaintiffs and reduces docket pressure by shifting certain judgment entries to clerks and allowing affidavit proof, but it does so at the risk of generating default judgments against absent or uninformed defendants—a distributional choice between faster enforcement for prevailing claimants and a higher likelihood of erroneous or unjust defaults for nonparticipating parties.
The bill accelerates entry of final money judgments in many cases, but that speed comes with trade-offs. Clerk-entered judgments reduce early judicial screening, which may increase the number of incorrect or premature judgments that later require setting aside; that remediation can be more expensive and procedurally complex than litigating the merits in the first instance.
The affidavit option lowers the cost of proving a default claim, yet it depends on strict judicial scrutiny to prevent hearsay or conclusory statements from substituting for probative evidence—the statutory ‘‘particularity’’ requirement will test courts’ willingness to police affidavits robustly.
Operationally, the attorneys’ fees mechanism relies on courts having adopted a fee schedule by rule; where local rules differ or no schedule exists, plaintiffs must return to court for fee determinations, creating bifurcated proceedings. The sunset creates legal and administrative uncertainty: litigants, courts, and firms must plan for a two-year experiment whose outcomes will determine whether practices revert or are made permanent, complicating long-term compliance and case-management investments.
Finally, the bill’s protections for real property and publication cases attempt to safeguard title-related fairness, but vague standards like ‘‘equitable right to judgment’’ and how courts will verify publication proofs invite litigation over procedural sufficiency rather than merits.
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