ACA 9 rewrites Article XII of the California Constitution to change how the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is composed, how some of its procedures are governed, and how the state treats telephone, telecommunications, and broadband services. The amendment increases the PUC from five to nine commissioners, shifts two appointment slots to the Legislature (Senate Committee on Rules and Speaker of the Assembly), and requires approval by both houses for commissioners.
The measure removes a constitutional grant that the commission “may establish its own procedures” and the companion provision allowing a designated commissioner to act on behalf of the commission, with legislative intent to recast those procedural rules by statute. It also strips the automatic constitutional label that made telephone and telegraph carriers public utilities and gives the Legislature explicit authority to define the PUC’s duties over telephone, telecommunications, and broadband services, including reassigning those responsibilities to another state entity; the bill expresses intent to establish a separate broadband entity by January 1, 2028.
Finally, it adds an express constitutional requirement that the commission consider affordability when fixing rates.
At a Glance
What It Does
The amendment expands the PUC to nine members, shifts two commissioner appointments to the Legislature, requires House approval for each commissioner, removes the constitutional provision that lets the commission set its own procedures and for a designated commissioner to act, and authorizes legislative redefinition of the PUC’s role over telephone, telecom, and broadband. It also mandates that the commission consider rate affordability.
Who It Affects
State executive and legislative branches (new appointing power for the Senate Committee on Rules and the Assembly Speaker), current and future PUC commissioners and staff, utilities and telecommunications providers subject to PUC jurisdiction, consumer advocates and low-income ratepayers, and entities that might be created to oversee broadband deployment.
Why It Matters
ACA 9 shifts the balance of appointing authority and constitutional protections that have undergirded PUC independence, elevates affordability as a constitutional factor in ratemaking, and creates a clear path for the Legislature to reassign broadband regulation — all of which could change regulatory outcomes, investment signals, and the institutional locus for telecommunications policymaking.
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What This Bill Actually Does
ACA 9 makes three interlocking changes to Article XII of the California Constitution: who sits on the PUC, where procedural authority resides, and how telephone/telecommunications/broadband are treated. On composition, the amendment increases the commission from five to nine members and alters who appoints them: the Governor keeps a plurality of appointments (five), while the Senate Committee on Rules and the Speaker of the Assembly each appoint two commissioners.
Every commissioner must be confirmed by both legislative houses (a majority of each). Terms remain staggered and six years, and vacancies are filled for the balance of the term.
Procedurally, the measure removes the constitutional sentence that currently allows the commission to establish its own procedures and the clause permitting a commissioner designated by the commission to hold hearings or issue orders subject to commission approval. The Legislature states an intent to recodify those procedural tools as statutes in the Public Utilities Code, which would place routine rulemaking and delegation mechanisms under ordinary legislative amendment rather than constitutional protection.
That change lowers the legal insulation around internal PUC rules and the mechanism for delegating authority to an individual commissioner.ACA 9 also revises the constitutional language on what counts as a public utility. It eliminates the historic constitutional line that automatically labeled entities owning telephone or telegraph transmission lines as public utilities, instead allowing the Legislature to specify duties, functions, and jurisdiction for telephone corporations, telecommunications service, and broadband — including the authority to move those responsibilities to another state entity.
The measure includes explicit legislative intent to establish, by January 1, 2028, a separate state entity focused on achieving ubiquitous broadband deployment, raising adoption, and promoting competition.Finally, the bill adds a substantive constraint to the commission's rate-making clause: when fixing rates the PUC must consider affordability. The rest of the commission’s powers (issuing subpoenas, examining records, prescribing accounts, etc.) remain in the constitutional text.
Taken together, these edits make appointment routes and legislative authority more prominent, shift procedural governance from constitutional to statutory footing, and put broadband policy and affordability squarely into constitutional language.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The commission increases from 5 to 9 members; the Governor appoints five commissioners, the Senate Committee on Rules appoints two, and the Speaker of the Assembly appoints two.
Every commissioner must be approved by both the Senate and the Assembly (a majority of each house), and commissioners serve staggered six-year terms with vacancies filled for the unexpired term.
The amendment removes the constitutional sentence that lets the commission establish its own procedures and the clause allowing a designated commissioner to act; the Legislature intends to recodify those delegation and procedural authorities in statute.
The Constitution’s automatic designation of telephone/telegraph owners as public utilities is struck; instead, the Legislature gets explicit constitutional authority to define the PUC’s duties for telephone, telecommunications, and broadband and may reassign those duties to another entity.
The PUC must consider rate affordability when setting rates, and the measure expresses an intent to create a separate state broadband entity by January 1, 2028 to promote deployment, adoption, and competition.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Restructuring PUC membership and appointment procedure
This provision expands the commission from five to nine commissioners, keeps six-year staggered terms, and prescribes how appointments are allocated: five appointed by the Governor, two by the Senate Committee on Rules, and two by the Speaker of the Assembly. It also changes confirmation: each commissioner must be approved by both legislative houses by majority vote. The practical effect is to dilute sole gubernatorial appointment power and give the Legislature direct appointment influence, which will change the political dynamics of commissioner selection and likely the composition of expertise and priorities on the bench.
Removing constitutional procedural delegation (to be recodified statutorily)
ACA 9 deletes the constitutional authorization that allowed the commission to set its own procedures and permitted a commissioner to act as the commission’s designee. The bill’s intent language signals the Legislature plans to re-create those procedural mechanisms in the Public Utilities Code. Practically, that moves core internal governance from a protected constitutional floor to ordinary statute, making procedures and delegation rules subject to legislative amendment — and, potentially, more frequent change or political negotiation.
Removing automatic constitutional status for telephone/telegraph and expanding legislative control over telecom/broadband
This amendment strips the historical constitutional clause that automatically classed telephone and telegraph infrastructure as public utilities. Instead, it expressly Authorizes the Legislature to define which entities are public utilities and to prescribe the PUC’s duties, functions, and jurisdiction regarding telephone corporations, telecommunications service, and broadband service. Importantly, the Legislature may reassign those duties to another state entity — creating an explicit constitutional path for a transfer of regulatory jurisdiction away from the PUC.
Affordability added as a constitutional ratemaking consideration
The PUC retains its enumerated powers (rates, subpoenas, accounts, contempt), but the amendment inserts a new constitutional command: when fixing rates, the commission shall consider the affordability of rates. Embedding affordability in the Constitution elevates it above ordinary policy guidance and could require the commission to modify typical cost-of-service analyses, rate designs, and subsidy mechanisms to demonstrate how rates meet affordability considerations.
Recodification and planned broadband entity
The bill includes legislative intent language: it intends to recodify the repealed procedural provision in the Public Utilities Code and to establish a separate state entity for statewide broadband deployment and adoption by January 1, 2028. That intent creates a deadline-driven policy goal but leaves details — governance, funding, statutory authority, and division of responsibilities between the PUC and any new entity — to subsequent legislation or administrative design.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Low-income and affordability-focused ratepayers — the constitutional instruction to consider affordability gives consumer advocates a stronger legal hook to press for rate designs, lifeline programs, or subsidies targeted at lower-income households.
- Rural and underserved communities — the declared intent to create a dedicated broadband entity aimed at ubiquitous deployment could accelerate resources and programs directed at areas private providers have not prioritized.
- Legislators and legislative appointers — the Senate Committee on Rules and the Assembly Speaker gain direct appointment power, increasing legislative influence over regulatory priorities and commissioner selection.
- Consumer and broadband access advocates — moving telecom/broadband authority into express legislative purview and creating a broadband entity offers clearer targets for policy advocacy and potential new funding vehicles.
Who Bears the Cost
- The PUC as an institution — loss of constitutional procedural protections and new legislative appointees could erode institutional independence, force internal reorganizations, and increase political management overhead.
- Utilities and telecom providers — an affordability mandate and potential reassignment of regulatory jurisdiction may require altered rate structures, new reporting, additional compliance, or shifting regulatory relationships, increasing administrative and compliance costs.
- State budget/taxpayers — standing up a new broadband entity and funding expanded deployment/adoption programs will require appropriations, grants, or bond financing that could increase state costs.
- The Governor’s office — reduction of unilateral appointment influence and sharing of appointment slots with the Legislature diminishes executive control over PUC composition and policy direction.
- Attorneys and litigants — ambiguity created by moving procedural rules from the Constitution to statute and the creation of new entities will likely spur litigation and rulemaking disputes during the transition.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
ACA 9 pits stronger legislative control and explicit policy goals (affordability and ubiquitous broadband) against regulatory independence and institutional stability: it empowers the Legislature and creates new appointing authorities while stripping constitutional protections for PUC procedures, creating a dilemma between democratic accountability and the need for a technically insulated, predictable regulator.
ACA 9 combines institutional redesign with substantive policy signals, but it also creates several material implementation and legal questions. Moving internal procedural authority from constitutional text into ordinary statute changes the stability of those rules; statutes are easier to amend and therefore more susceptible to political shifts.
That raises practical questions: which specific delegation mechanisms and internal processes will be recodified, on what timetable, and with what safeguards for due process and administrative independence? If the Legislature fails to recodify needed delegation language promptly, the PUC could face operational paralysis or prolonged legal uncertainty about who can issue orders and run hearings.
The broadband provisions likewise leave open major design choices. The constitutional intent to create a separate broadband entity by Jan 1, 2028 does not specify governance, funding, or the scope of transferred powers.
Transitioning telecommunications or broadband oversight from the PUC to a new entity could disrupt ongoing proceedings, reorder regulatory priorities, and create duplication or gaps unless statutes comprehensively assign responsibilities and interoperability with existing state programs. Finally, the new affordability mandate is conceptually simple but technically complex: courts and stakeholders will contest what “consider affordability” requires in practice, how it interacts with cost-of-service and investor-return principles, and whether it creates enforceable standards vs. a policy preference.
Those unresolved questions point to a deeper trade-off: the amendment seeks more democratic control and a stronger policy orientation toward affordability and broadband access, but it does so by weakening constitutional protections that have insulated the PUC’s process and by leaving many crucial implementation choices to future legislation. The path from constitutional text to functioning institutions will determine whether the changes produce clearer, faster policy outcomes or prolonged regulatory fragmentation and litigation.
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