SB 1173 revises Penal Code section 93 — the statute that criminalizes bribery of judges, jurors, and other decisionmakers — by modernizing wording and recalibrating the statute’s restitution-fine language. The amendment keeps the underlying offense intact while reworking how fines are framed in the statute’s text.
The bill also inserts an express instruction that courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a restitution fine under §93. On its face the measure is presented as technical drafting updates, but the changed fine language and the new ability-to-pay clause have concrete implications for sentencing practice and for lawyers who litigate bribery cases.
At a Glance
What It Does
SB 1173 rewrites the text of Penal Code §93 to modernize pronouns and phrasing, restates the imprisonment term for the offense, and recasts the statute’s restitution-fine provisions to spell out minimums, possible caps, and relationships to the amount of any bribe received. It also adds a separate provision directing the court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing a restitution fine under the section.
Who It Affects
The statute applies to judicial officers, jurors, referees, arbitrators, umpires and anyone else authorized by law to decide controversies; the bill directly affects prosecutors and defense counsel who handle bribery charges and sentencing judges who must calculate and impose fines. Clerks and probation offices that execute fine orders will also confront the new statutory phrasing when computing amounts.
Why It Matters
By making ability-to-pay an explicit statutory consideration and by tying fine calculations to both flat-dollar amounts and the bribe amount, the bill changes the calculus at sentencing: low-income defendants gain an affirmative statutory hook for limiting fines, while convictions involving large bribes can trigger significantly larger statutory exposure. The drafting changes also raise practical questions about how courts will interpret and compute the revised fine formulas.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The bill leaves the core crime — asking for, receiving, or agreeing to receive a bribe with the understanding that an official’s vote, opinion, or decision will be influenced — intact. It continues to treat that misconduct as a felony and preserves the statute’s existing imprisonment range.
What SB 1173 does is rewrite the statutory paragraph that describes the offense and the penalties, replacing older gendered language and streamlining the sentence structure.
On penalties, the statute continues to authorize state prison for two, three, or four years. The statutory language that specifies restitution fines is rewritten to set a flat-dollar baseline for cases where no bribe was actually received and to set a separate baseline and upper figure when a bribe was received.
Practically, that means sentencing will require the court to identify which scenario applies and then calculate a restitution fine within the statute’s stated ranges or linked to the bribe amount.Importantly, SB 1173 inserts an explicit clause directing the court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a restitution fine under §93. That creates a clear statutory basis for defense arguments about affordability and may change outcomes for indigent defendants or others with limited resources, even as it leaves open the possibility of larger fines in cases involving sizable bribes.Finally, the bill’s redrafting is not purely cosmetic.
The revised fine formula mixes flat minimums, comparisons to the actual bribe amount, and a potential multiplier (up to double the bribe amount) or fixed-dollar cap — language that will require sentencing judges and clerks to interpret how the pieces interact. Defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts will need to develop consistent calculation practices and likely litigate borderline applications until appellate guidance appears.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The statute continues to make it a felony for judicial officers, jurors, referees, arbitrators, umpires, and anyone authorized to decide controversies to ask for or receive a bribe intended to influence their vote, opinion, or decision.
Conviction remains punishable by state prison for two, three, or four years.
If no bribe is actually received, the rewritten statute authorizes a restitution fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $10,000.
If a bribe was actually received, the statute requires a restitution fine of at least the amount of the bribe received or $2,000, whichever is greater, and allows a larger amount up to either double the bribe received or $10,000 — the text couples those figures with language that creates alternative caps.
SB 1173 adds an explicit statutory instruction that courts must consider the defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a restitution fine under §93.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Offense definition and imprisonment term
This subsection restates who is covered by the bribery offense (judicial officer, juror, referee, arbitrator, umpire, and any person authorized to hear or determine controversies) and preserves the felony classification with a 2–4 year state prison exposure. Practically, this keeps the criminal element and custody exposure the same as before while aligning the text to contemporary drafting conventions (gender-neutral pronouns and pluralization). For prosecutors and defense counsel, the change to wording should not alter elements they must prove, but the cleaner language may reduce argument over archaic phrasing.
Rewritten fine mechanics and calculation triggers
The amendment recasts the statute’s fines into two principal scenarios: where no bribe was actually received and where a bribe was received. For the first scenario the statute specifies a $2,000–$10,000 restitution fine. For the second it establishes a floor equal to the greater of $2,000 or the bribe amount and then authorizes a larger amount up to an alternative ceiling tied either to twice the bribe or $10,000. That layered construction requires the sentencing court to identify the factual scenario, determine the bribe amount (if any), and then apply a multi-step computation — a process that will fall to judges and court staff and that could produce different results depending on how the clauses are read together.
Ability-to-pay requirement for restitution fines
Subsection (b) adds a standalone instruction that courts must consider the defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a restitution fine under §93. That moves consideration of affordability from implicit sentencing discretion into the statute itself and gives defense counsel a direct statutory point to raise financial incapacity. It also creates a uniform hook for judges to document and explain any departure from statutory ranges on affordability grounds.
Recordkeeping, calculation, and appellate questions
The bill’s mixed approach to flat-dollar amounts, comparisons to the bribe amount, and an alternative multiplier/cap will require local courts to adopt consistent calculation rules and to document how each statutory strand was applied. Expect initial sentencing memoranda and clerk instructions to litigate whether the cap is the greater of the two figures, how to treat partial payments or negotiated settlements, and whether the restitution fine is cumulative with other statutory fines or restitution obligations. Those practical questions will shape administrative workflows and likely produce appeals seeking resolution from higher courts.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Criminal Justice across all five countries.
Explore Criminal Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Low-income defendants convicted under §93: the express ability-to-pay clause gives them statutory leverage to obtain reduced fines and to require the court to justify higher financial penalties.
- Defense attorneys and public defenders: an explicit statutory standard strengthens motions and plea negotiations focused on affordability and may be used to reduce client exposure at sentencing.
- Sentencing judges and court administrators: updated, gender-neutral statutory language reduces drafting confusion and the new statutory instruction provides a clear, defensible basis for considering financial capacity during sentencing.
Who Bears the Cost
- Defendants convicted of bribery involving large sums: the statute allows fines tied to the bribe amount and up to double that amount, increasing potential financial exposure for those defendants.
- County and state courts and probation offices: staff will need to compute the new fine formulas, document ability-to-pay determinations, and update forms and clerk practices, creating administrative and training costs.
- Prosecutors: when seeking higher restitution fines tied to bribe amounts, prosecutors will need to assemble reliable proof of the bribe value and be prepared to litigate the statutory interpretation of caps and multipliers.
- Correctional systems and taxpayers: even though the prison term range is unchanged, any shift in sentencing practice (for example, more contested hearings over fines or ability-to-pay findings) can increase court workload and associated public costs.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central tension is between deterrence and proportionality: the statute seeks to deter corruption by linking fines to the amount of the bribe (and allowing a multiplier), but it simultaneously directs courts to temper fines based on a defendant’s ability to pay — creating a clash between maximizing financial deterrence for large-scale bribery and ensuring that punishments remain proportionate and enforceable for defendants with limited means.
The amended fine language mixes flat-dollar ranges with comparisons to the amount of any bribe and an alternative multiplier/cap; as written those clauses interact in a way that is susceptible to differing readings. Courts will need to decide whether the ‘‘up to double the bribe or $10,000’’ cap is an absolute ceiling, how it interacts with the prior ‘‘whichever is greater’’ phrasing, and whether the statute contemplates concurrent or cumulative monetary obligations.
Those are not merely editorial questions — they determine whether a defendant facing a large bribe exposure might receive a six-figure restitution fine or a much smaller capped amount. Initial litigation is likely to focus on statutory construction and arithmetic sequence when courts apply §93’s layers.
Making ability-to-pay an explicit statutory consideration appears modest, but it has substantive consequences. On one hand, it reinforces proportionality and fairness for indigent defendants; on the other, it gives defendants a clearer pathway to argue down what the legislature framed as restitution tied to the criminal conduct.
That trade-off raises doctrinal questions about deterrence and uniformity: will judges applying ability-to-pay carve out materially different financial outcomes across counties? Finally, the bill’s textual glitches and duplicated or awkward phrases within the amendment risk procedural appeals and could force courts to interpret whether the changes are truly nonsubstantive or introduce new sentencing discretion.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.