SB 1374 gives the chief administrative officer of a postsecondary institution — or an employee the chief designates to maintain order — the authority to file for temporary restraining orders (TROs) and orders after hearing on behalf of a student (with the student’s written consent) or on behalf of the institution itself and its property after incidents of unlawful violence or credible threats. The bill defines key terms (like “course of conduct” and “credible threat of violence”), preserves constitutional speech protections, and clarifies that these petitions do not change any existing duty a school may have to provide a safe environment.
Why it matters: the measure centralizes one pathway for institution-led legal intervention on campus, potentially speeding protection for groups of students or campus assets while creating new procedural, evidentiary, enforcement, and administrative responsibilities for campuses, courts, and law enforcement.
At a Glance
What It Does
Allows campus chiefs or their designees to seek ex parte temporary restraining orders and orders after hearing for unlawful violence or credible threats directed at students, other persons on campus, or campus property; TROs must be granted or denied the same day (with narrow exceptions), and hearings generally occur within 21 days. Orders after hearing may last up to three years and can be renewed without proof of new violence.
Who It Affects
Presidents, principals, or other top administrators of vocational and postsecondary institutions (and their designated campus-order personnel); current applicants and enrolled adult students; respondents (students and nonstudents); campus public-safety staff; local law enforcement and agencies that maintain CLETS records.
Why It Matters
The bill ties court orders into policing and weapons controls (mandatory firearm relinquishment while an order is in effect) and requires rapid transmission of orders to the Department of Justice or CLETS, shifting some enforcement logistics onto courts, campuses, and police while also creating a new institutional tool to address campus threats.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
SB 1374 creates a standalone statutory process tailored to postsecondary campuses where the chief administrative officer — or an employee the chief designates to maintain order — can initiate limited civil protective proceedings after unlawful violence or a credible threat. The statute lists specific examples of a “course of conduct” (following, entering campus, repeated calls or correspondence) and defines a “credible threat” as knowing, willful conduct or statements that would put a reasonable person on campus in fear and that serve no legitimate purpose.
The provision expressly excludes constitutionally protected speech from being enjoined.
The bill sets tight timelines for temporary relief: the court must grant or deny an ex parte request for a TRO the same day it is submitted unless filed too late for effective review, and TROs typically expire within 21 days (or 25 days if the court extends time for hearing). Hearings on petitions must be held within the same 21- or 25-day windows.
At a contested hearing the judge takes relevant testimony, may conduct independent inquiry, and if the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat, the court issues an order prohibiting further violence or threats.Practical mechanics: service is generally personal with at least five days’ notice before the hearing, though courts may shorten service time for good cause. The statute provides multiple options for enforcement and verification: law enforcement at the scene can be given an endorsed copy of an order and verbally notify a respondent of terms (the officer’s verbal notice counts as service for enforcement purposes), and courts must transmit orders or details to law enforcement and the Department of Justice within one business day either by physical transmission to agencies authorized to enter orders into CLETS or by direct CLETS entry with DOJ approval.
The orders carry collateral consequences: the court must order relinquishment of firearms held by a restrained person, possession or attempts to obtain firearms while an order is in effect are punishable under the Penal Code, and intentional disobedience of the order is criminally punishable.Administrative and access features: Judicial Council forms for petitions and responses are mandatory and must be simple and concise; the bill waives filing and related fees for petitions and responses alleging unlawful violence or credible threats, and it waives sheriff or marshal service fees in specified circumstances. The statute also preserves parties’ rights to counsel and grants respondents at least one continuance as of course, with additional continuances available for good cause.
Finally, the law stipulates operational detail such as the form language the Judicial Council must include and sets an effective date (January 1, 2026).
The Five Things You Need to Know
A court must rule the same day on an ex parte request for a temporary restraining order unless the petition is filed too late in the day to permit effective review.
A temporary restraining order issued under the statute lasts up to 21 days (up to 25 days if the court extends time for hearing); an order after hearing may last up to three years.
The court may renew an order for up to three additional years without requiring a showing of additional violence or threats, and renewal requests may be filed any time within three months before expiration.
When an order is issued, the court must ensure transmission of the order and proof of service to law enforcement and the Department of Justice—either by delivering a physical copy to agencies authorized to enter CLETS records or by entering the order into CLETS with DOJ approval—within one business day.
A person subject to an order must relinquish firearms while the order is in effect, and possessing, purchasing, or attempting to obtain firearms during that period is punishable under Penal Code provisions.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Who may file and on whose behalf
Subdivision (a) authorizes the chief administrative officer of a postsecondary institution, or a designee charged with maintaining order, to petition for TROs and orders after hearing. It distinguishes two petitioner roles: filing on behalf of a student (requiring the student's written consent) and filing on behalf of the institution and its property after threats or unlawful violence directed at the campus. Practically, this creates an institutional plaintiff role that can aggregate protection requests for groups of similarly situated students or for campus assets.
Definitions and scope of conduct covered
Subdivision (b) supplies operative definitions: who qualifies as a ‘chief administrative officer,’ what counts as a ‘course of conduct’ (a nonexclusive list including following, entering campus, telephone or written contact), and what constitutes a ‘credible threat of violence.’ It also enumerates the types of restraining orders—covering harassment, stalking, property destruction, and specified distance restrictions—so practitioners can map conduct allegations to the civil prohibitions the court may impose.
Speech protections and extension to family or other students
Subdivision (c) circumscribes the statute’s reach by barring courts from issuing orders that would prohibit constitutionally protected speech or activities protected under existing law. Subdivision (d) gives the court discretion, for good cause, to include family or household members or other students in orders, which creates a tool for broad protective coverage but also raises questions about how the court identifies ‘similarly situated’ individuals.
Temporary orders, hearing timelines, service, and continuances
These sections set the procedural timetable: petitioners may seek TROs under Section 527 mechanics, the court must rule on ex parte TRO requests the same day (except when filed too late), hearings are required within 21 days (extendable to 25 for good cause), and TROs typically expire at 21 days (or 25). Service is generally personal and must occur at least five days before the hearing unless the court shortens time for good cause, and respondents are entitled to at least one continuance as of course, with further continuances available on showing of good cause. The Judicial Council must include a notice on forms about conversion of a TRO to a longer order and the mailing process when respondents fail to appear.
Evidentiary standard, court inquiry, and duration of orders
At hearing the judge receives relevant testimony and may independently inquire into facts; if the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful violence occurred or a credible threat was made, the court issues an order. Orders after hearing may last up to three years, can be renewed for successive periods up to three years without requiring a new showing of violence, and have prescribed procedures for modification or termination and notice to protected parties when third parties seek modification.
Law enforcement transmission, verification, and firearms
These subsections create obligations to get orders into law enforcement information systems quickly: courts must ensure delivery of orders and proof of service to law enforcement and the DOJ either by sending physical copies to agencies authorized to enter CLETS or, with DOJ approval, by entering orders directly into CLETS within one business day. Law enforcement officers at incident scenes can be asked to serve orders and, importantly, an officer’s verbal notice of order terms counts as service for enforcement purposes; the statute also mandates that restrained persons relinquish firearms and makes possession or attempted acquisition during the order criminal under the Penal Code.
Forms, fees, and operational logistics
The Judicial Council must develop mandatory, user-friendly petition and response forms and related rules; failure to use the forms does not automatically render an order unenforceable. The bill waives filing and subpoena fees for qualifying petitions and responses, and under defined circumstances waives sheriff or marshal service fees; it also sets an operative date for the statute to take effect on January 1, 2026.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Education across all five countries.
Explore Education in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Students who are victims or targets of campus-directed unlawful violence: they gain a mechanism that can produce rapid, court-backed protective orders and the possibility of campus-wide coverage without each individual separately filing.
- Campus administrators and public-safety staff: they acquire an explicit statutory authority to seek civil orders on behalf of the institution and students, enabling a coordinated legal response to threats against property or groups of students.
- Campus property owners/institutions: the bill allows institutions to seek protection for campus assets and facilities directly, which can support damage prevention and operational continuity after threats or violence.
Who Bears the Cost
- Respondents (students and nonstudents): restrained persons face civil restrictions that carry criminal penalties for violation, mandatory firearm relinquishment, and possible overlap with disciplinary processes that can compound consequences.
- Courts and local law enforcement: mandated same-day TRO decisions, one-business-day CLETS transmission, verification duties at incident scenes, and increased service obligations will increase operational load and may require resource reallocation.
- Smaller institutions and campus legal offices: developing internal consent processes, coordinating with courts and police, and handling fee-waiver paperwork and CLETS interactions impose administrative costs and compliance burdens, particularly for resource-constrained campuses.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between empowering institutions to act quickly to protect students and campus property and preserving individual procedural and constitutional safeguards: faster, institution-driven civil remedies and expanded law enforcement integration improve immediate safety options but increase risk of overbroad or mistaken restraints on individuals, raise due-process questions about notice and evidence, and impose significant operational burdens on courts, police, and campuses.
SB 1374 packs operational detail into one statutory scheme: it authorizes institutional petitioning, sets tight TRO timetables, requires rapid information flow to DOJ/CLETS, and links protective orders to firearm relinquishment and criminal penalties. That bundling creates two implementation challenges.
First, the same-day decision requirement for TROs and one-business-day CLETS transmission assume courts and law enforcement have staff and processes in place to review petitions, verify identities, and enter records; under-resourced courts or rural police agencies may struggle to meet those deadlines without additional funding or process changes. Second, the statute’s service mechanics — especially permitting an officer’s verbal notice at a scene to constitute service — simplify immediate enforcement but raise due-process and evidentiary questions: courts and defense counsel may litigate whether verbal, on-scene notice satisfies notice requirements in particular factual scenarios.
There are also doctrinal and administrative frictions. The bill preserves protection for constitutionally protected speech, yet many of the statute’s listed prohibited behaviors (entering campus, sending emails) can overlap with protected expression depending on context, so judges will need to apply the statute carefully to avoid overbroad injunctions.
The statute directs courts to consider campus disciplinary decisions when the respondent is a student, which creates potential conflicts of process and record-sharing constraints (FERPA, internal investigatory confidentiality). Finally, firearms relinquishment is tied into Penal Code enforcement, but practical implementation — secure storage, timelines for surrender, and coordination with local law enforcement — is largely left to local practice and may result in inconsistent approaches across jurisdictions.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.