This bill widens the statutory class of persons protected when charged assaults interfere with public servants and medical staff by redefining “emergency medical care provider” to cover any staff member performing any function related to medical care at hospitals, health-care facilities, or in ambulances. It also changes the culpable mental state for one mode of second-degree assault — where the defendant seeks to prevent certain public servants from performing lawful duties — from intentionally causing bodily injury to knowingly causing bodily injury.
In addition, HB26-1290 clarifies sentencing treatment for repeat strangulation convictions: a conviction under the strangulation subsection that follows a prior, separately prosecuted conviction for the same offense must be sentenced under the statutory scheme for crimes of violence (section 18-1.3-406), and the charging document must allege the prior conviction. The act takes effect September 1, 2026, and applies to offenses committed on or after that date.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill expands the definition of “emergency medical care provider” to include anyone on a hospital or health‑care facility staff or security force who performs any function related to medical care, and it lowers the mens rea for one category of second‑degree assault from "intentionally" to "knowingly". It also mandates crime‑of‑violence sentencing under 18‑1.3‑406 for repeat convictions of the strangulation subsection, provided a prior conviction is pleaded in the charging documents.
Who It Affects
Emergency and hospital staff beyond clinicians — including aides, assistants, support and security personnel — become explicitly covered. Prosecutors and defense attorneys face altered proof requirements; courts must process charging allegations about priors; hospitals and public safety units will need to adjust policies and training.
Why It Matters
Lowering the mental‑state element reduces the prosecution’s burden for one mode of assault and therefore can expand enforceability against people who interfere with public servants’ duties. The expanded definition broadens who qualifies for enhanced protections, and the sentencing clarification creates a mandatory pathway for harsher penalties when a defendant has a prior qualifying strangulation conviction alleged in the charging papers.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
HB26-1290 modifies three parts of Colorado’s assault law. First, it rewrites the statutory definition of “emergency medical care provider” so that protection is not limited to those directly engaged in emergency treatment: anyone on a hospital or health‑care facility staff or security force who performs any function related to medical care — for example a nurse aide, physician assistant, or certain nonclinical staff working in an ambulance — falls within the term.
That change brings more employees under the second‑degree assault provisions that target attacks intended to prevent public servants and care providers from doing their jobs.
Second, the bill changes the required mental state for one subsection of second‑degree assault (the provision aimed at preventing known peace officers, firefighters, or emergency medical service providers from performing lawful duties). Where the statute previously required proof that the defendant acted intentionally to cause bodily injury, the bill requires only that the defendant knowingly caused bodily injury.
In criminal law terms, prosecutors will need to prove that the defendant was aware that their actions would cause bodily injury, rather than proving a conscious objective to cause that injury.Third, the bill adds a sentencing rule specific to the strangulation subsection: if a defendant is convicted under that subsection and has a prior, separately prosecuted conviction under the same subsection that occurred before the present act, the court must sentence under section 18‑1.3‑406 — the sentencing structure applicable to crimes of violence. Crucially, the prior conviction must be alleged in the present complaint, indictment, or information; this creates a pleading and notice requirement for prosecutors before the enhanced sentencing applies.Finally, the bill contains a standard effective‑date clause: it takes effect September 1, 2026, and applies only to offenses committed on or after the effective date, subject to any referendum challenge.
These changes will mainly affect charging strategies, plea negotiations, and the scope of protected workers who can trigger assault prosecutions tied to interference with lawful duties.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill expands “emergency medical care provider” to include any hospital or health‑care facility staff or security force member performing any function related to medical care, explicitly adding nurse aides and physician assistants to the list of covered roles.
It lowers the mens rea in subsection (1)(c) of second‑degree assault from “intentionally causes bodily injury” to “knowingly causes bodily injury” when the conduct is intended to prevent known public servants (e.g.
peace officers, firefighters, EMS) from performing lawful duties.
The bill keeps the higher “intentional” standard for causing serious bodily injury in the comparable subsection but narrows proof required for the ordinary bodily‑injury variant, creating a mens rea split within the same section.
For repeat strangulation convictions under the specific strangulation subsection, the court must sentence under Colorado’s crime‑of‑violence sentencing statute (section 18‑1.3‑406) if a prior qualifying conviction — separately brought and tried before the current act — is alleged in the current charging document.
The act takes effect September 1, 2026, applies prospectively to offenses on or after that date, and contains the usual referendum trigger that would delay enactment if a valid petition is filed.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Expands who qualifies as an emergency medical care provider
This amendment replaces “involved in providing emergency medical care” with “performing any function related to medical care” and enumerates roles such as nurse aide and physician assistant. Practically, the language reaches beyond clinicians actively treating patients to include staff whose work supports medical care in hospitals, health‑care facilities, and ambulances. The broader phrase invites administrative disputes about whether particular duties (logistics, security, transport, nonclinical support) fall within the protection; those boundary questions will be litigated in charging and qualification hearings.
Alters mens rea for one mode of second‑degree assault
Subsection (1)(c) now requires prosecutors to prove the defendant knowingly caused bodily injury rather than intentionally doing so; subsection (1)(c.5), which deals with serious bodily injury, retains the "intentionally" standard. The change reduces the level of purposeful intent prosecutors must show for ordinary bodily injury offenses in this context, potentially making convictions easier where evidence shows awareness of harmful consequences but not a specific intent to cause injury. Defense strategies will likely shift toward contesting the defendant’s subjective awareness rather than purpose.
Sentencing for repeat strangulation convictions and pleading requirement
The bill adds a mandatory sentencing provision: a defendant convicted under the statute’s strangulation subsection who has a prior separate conviction under that same subsection must be sentenced under section 18‑1.3‑406, the crimes‑of‑violence sentencing scheme. It also requires that the prior conviction be set out in the present complaint, indictment, or information. That dual requirement changes prosecutorial practice — prosecutors must affirmatively plead prior convictions to trigger enhanced sentencing — and gives defense counsel a procedural point to challenge the applicability of the sentencing enhancement if the pleading is inadequate.
Effective date and applicability
Standard effective‑date language sets the act to take effect September 1, 2026, and applies only to offenses committed on or after that date; it also contains the referendum safeguard that would delay enactment if a valid petition is filed. This means the expanded definition and mens rea change will not apply retroactively to crimes committed before the effective date, but prior convictions (for sentencing enhancements) may be used as alleged historical facts in charging documents.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Criminal Justice across all five countries.
Explore Criminal Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Emergency and hospital staff beyond frontline clinicians — nurse aides, physician assistants, transport personnel, and security staff gain explicit statutory protection when assaults interfere with their ability to perform functions related to medical care; that increases the likelihood prosecutors will bring second‑degree assault charges in incidents involving these workers.
- Prosecutors — the lowered mens rea for ordinary bodily‑injury assaults reduces the evidentiary threshold in many cases, potentially simplifying charging decisions and plea bargaining where proof of purpose would have been difficult.
- Victims seeking accountability — by broadening the protected class and easing proof for certain offenses, the law can expand avenues for criminal accountability in attacks that disrupt emergency and health‑care services.
Who Bears the Cost
- Defendants charged under the modified subsection — the shift from intentionality to knowledge means some defendants face easier prosecutions and potentially higher conviction rates for conduct previously requiring proof of a specific intent to injure.
- Defense attorneys — will need to adjust defense strategies, litigate mens rea disputes more often, and scrutinize charging documents for the new pleading requirement about prior convictions, increasing pretrial work and motion practice.
- Hospitals and health‑care employers — may face pressure to reassess training, workplace safety measures, and incident reporting to take advantage of expanded protections; they may also shoulder costs for updated policies, signage, and coordination with law enforcement.
- Prosecutors’ offices and courts — the requirement to allege prior convictions in charging papers will increase drafting and proof obligations; courts will see more pretrial litigation over whether alleged priors satisfy the statute’s separate‑prosecution and pleading prerequisites.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill pits two legitimate objectives against each other: protecting public‑serving medical and emergency workers by broadening who is covered and making some assaults easier to prosecute, versus avoiding overbroad criminalization and preserving mens rea safeguards that prevent punishment for conduct lacking a purposeful intent to injure; resolving that tension forces a choice between greater protection through broader, easier prosecutions and stricter mens rea protections that limit criminal liability.
The bill trades clarity for breadth in ways that will matter in practice. ‘‘Performing any function related to medical care’’ is expansive language that sweeps in many nonclinical roles; prosecutors may interpret it broadly while defense counsel will press narrow readings. That ambiguity will produce early litigation over whether particular employees (e.g., custodial staff, dietary workers, parking attendants) fall within the protected class when assaulted.
Absent regulatory or administrative guidance, courts will resolve those line‑drawing disputes on a case‑by‑case basis.
Lowering the mens rea from intentional to knowing for ordinary bodily‑injury offenses eases prosecutorial burden but raises normative and constitutional questions about fair notice and proportionality. The statute keeps the higher “intentionally” standard for serious bodily injury, so cases that hinge on severity will follow a different path than ordinary bodily‑injury prosecutions.
The new sentencing provision for repeat strangulation convictions requires prosecutors to plead prior convictions in the charging document; failures to allege or prove the prior may preclude the enhanced sentencing but also invite litigation under confrontation, notice, and due‑process principles. Practically, verifying and litigating priors will impose administrative work on courts and prosecutors and create additional motion practice for defense counsel.
Finally, the combination of broader protected classes, a lower mens rea, and a mandatory sentencing pathway for repeats raises concerns about net‑widening: conduct previously left to civil remedies or employer discipline may migrate into criminal courts. That shift will have distributional effects — enforcement discretion, local prosecutorial priorities, and resource constraints will determine who actually bears the burden of the change."
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.