The bill tasks the Secretary of Commerce (through the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information) with producing a comprehensive report and then a government-wide strategy focused on the economic competitiveness of the information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain. The report must identify ICT items critical to U.S. competitiveness, evaluate the industrial capacity of U.S. and trusted vendors, estimate reliance by advanced telecommunications providers on vendors deemed "not trusted," and recommend federal actions and resources to reduce that reliance.
Following the baseline report, Commerce must develop a whole-of-government plan that assigns responsibilities, recommends changes to federal authorities or programs where necessary, and specifies any additional funding required. For practitioners: the bill links national-security-oriented trust determinations to economic policy planning, creates a centralized analytic requirement at Commerce, and directs tangible deliverables that could reshape procurement, industrial support, and interagency roles if implemented.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill requires Commerce to produce an inventory-style report within one year of enactment identifying critical ICT, assessing U.S. and 'trusted' vendor industrial capacity, and measuring dependence on suppliers previously designated 'not trusted.' Within 180 days after that report, Commerce must deliver a whole-of-government strategy with recommended federal actions, defined lines of effort, and descriptions of any needed legal or resource changes.
Who It Affects
Telecommunications carriers and other providers of 'advanced telecommunications capability,' U.S. and foreign ICT manufacturers (especially vendors already labeled 'trusted' or 'not trusted'), Commerce and other federal agencies named for consultation (State, DHS, DOJ, ODNI, FCC), and procurement/compliance teams that manage supplier risk and sourcing.
Why It Matters
This bill formalizes a single-agency analytic role for Commerce on ICT competitiveness and ties national-security trust determinations to an economic strategy. The outcome could drive procurement preferences, signal where federal support or regulation will flow, and establish agency responsibilities for supply-chain resilience.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill creates a two-step, analytically driven effort anchored at the Commerce Department. First, Commerce must assemble a report — within a year of the law taking effect — that maps the ICT supply chain for items important to U.S. economic competitiveness, evaluates how much production capacity exists among U.S. firms and among those vendors the Secretary considers "trusted," and measures how reliant U.S. providers of advanced telecommunications capability are on technology or companies that are "not trusted." The reporting obligation is specific about content: identification of critical ICT, industrial-capacity assessments, dependence analysis, federal action needs, and assignment of lines of effort.
Second, using that report as the evidence base, Commerce must craft a whole-of-government strategy and provide it to the two congressional committees named in the statute within 180 days. The strategy must recommend how federal structure, authorities, and resources should be strengthened to support trusted vendors; explain how the government can remove barriers to market-driven competitiveness; assign responsibilities across agencies; and specify any changes to federal programs or laws and the additional funding necessary to carry out the recommendations.
In short, the bill expects Commerce to move from analysis to actionable proposals that could include legal changes, program redesign, or new expenditures.The statute builds in multi-agency consultation. Commerce must consult a cross‑section of trusted vendors and the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the FCC Chair, and any other agency heads Commerce deems necessary.
Finally, the bill codifies key definitions: it borrows the Telecommunications Act definition for advanced capability, defines ICT broadly to include software and radio- or wire-based components, treats the ICT supply chain as all companies that produce such technology, and defines 'not trusted' by reference to determinations listed in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. The definition of 'trusted' is simply the absence of a 'not trusted' determination, which places considerable discretion on the Secretary and on the underlying 2019 statutory framework.
The Five Things You Need to Know
Commerce must submit a baseline report to House and Senate commerce committees within one year of enactment detailing critical ICT, vendor industrial capacity, and dependence on suppliers characterized as 'not trusted.', The bill requires Commerce to assess industrial capacity both for U.S. vendors and for vendors the Secretary deems 'trusted,' separately reporting those capacities.
Commerce must specifically evaluate whether providers of 'advanced telecommunications capability' rely on ICT that has been determined 'not trusted' under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019.
Within 180 days of delivering the baseline report, Commerce must produce a whole‑of‑government strategy that assigns agency responsibilities, recommends changes to federal programs or laws, and identifies additional federal resources needed.
The statute defines 'not trusted' by sole reference to the determinations enumerated in section 2(c) of the 2019 Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, making that prior framework the gatekeeper for trust status.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short title
Gives the act the name 'Information and Communication Technology Strategy Act.' This is ceremonial but signals the statute's orientation: the emphasis is competitiveness and strategy rather than specific procurement prohibitions or subsidies.
Baseline report requirements
Directs Commerce to produce a report within one year that is essentially an inventory and risk/competitiveness assessment. Practically, Commerce must (1) identify ICT critical to economic competitiveness; (2) analyze industrial capacity of U.S. vendors and of 'trusted' vendors; (3) examine dependence by advanced-telecommunications providers on 'not trusted' ICT; (4) list federal actions and resources needed to support trusted vendors and reduce reliance on not‑trusted suppliers; and (5) define lines of effort and assign responsibilities across government. For implementers this creates a data-collection mandate across private sector and agencies and an expectation of concrete, evidence-based findings.
Whole-of-government strategy and follow-up report
Requires Commerce to translate the baseline report into a cross-agency strategy and to report that strategy to Congress within 180 days. The strategy must recommend how to strengthen federal structure, authorities, and resources to help trusted vendors; identify barriers to market solutions and how to address them; assign agency responsibilities for execution; and enumerate any statutory or programmatic changes and additional funding required. This provision converts analysis into an implementation blueprint and implicitly asks agencies to accept accountability for assigned lines of effort.
Consultation obligations
Mandates that Commerce consult both a cross-section of 'trusted' vendors and a set of named agency principals (State, DHS, Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, FCC Chair) and any others Commerce finds necessary. This builds in security, diplomatic, and regulatory perspectives but also adds coordination complexity: the statute requires both private‑sector input and the buy-in of national-security and regulatory agencies.
Definitions and trust framework
Provides working definitions: advanced telecommunications capability adopts the Telecommunications Act term; ICT is defined broadly to include software and radio- or wire-based components; the ICT supply chain covers all companies producing such technology. Crucially, 'not trusted' is defined by sole reference to determinations in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, and 'trusted' is the absence of that designation. That cross-reference anchors the bill to prior national-security findings and channels future analysis through that existing legal test.
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Explore Technology in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. 'trusted' ICT manufacturers — The bill creates a formal analytic and policy process focused on increasing their competitiveness and could lead to federal support, clearer procurement preferences, or targeted programs.
- Federal policy makers and interagency planners — Commerce-led reporting and a required strategy give agencies a consolidated evidentiary base and assigned lines of effort, reducing ambiguity about roles.
- Telecommunications providers and large network operators — If the strategy reduces reliance on 'not trusted' suppliers and strengthens alternative sources, operators gain supply-chain visibility and potentially more reliable sourcing options.
- Investors and domestic industrial actors — A government strategy that signals where resources and legal changes may flow helps the private sector target investments in capacity, R&D, or re-shoring initiatives.
Who Bears the Cost
- Companies designated 'not trusted' — Those firms face an elevated economic risk: the bill's focus on reducing reliance could translate into procurement restrictions or de facto exclusion from markets tied to federal policy.
- Commerce Department — The agency must lead comprehensive data collection, interagency coordination, and strategy drafting, tasks that will require analytic capacity and possibly new appropriations.
- Other federal agencies (State, DHS, DOJ, ODNI, FCC) — These agencies must participate in consultations and may be assigned responsibilities in the strategy, adding program and coordination workload.
- Telecom operators and private buyers — Reducing dependence on certain suppliers may force network operators to re-source equipment, incur higher costs, or accelerate capital replacement cycles.
- Taxpayers/general fund — If the strategy recommends subsidies, procurement guarantees, or new industrial support programs, those measures will likely require federal funding.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is balancing national-security-driven reductions in reliance on 'not trusted' suppliers with preserving market-driven competitiveness and cost-efficient sourcing: excluding or sidelining certain suppliers can protect networks but may raise costs, slow deployments, and require the government to pick winners through subsidies or regulatory preference — a trade-off between security imperatives and open-market efficiency with no easy technical fix.
The bill ties economic strategy to an existing national-security determination framework by defining 'not trusted' through the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. That linkage simplifies trust categorization but also imports the legal and evidentiary constraints of the earlier statute; Commerce's analysis will therefore be shaped by prior findings rather than a wholly independent risk calculus.
The Secretary's power to declare 'trusted' by default (i.e., any firm not formally 'not trusted') places a premium on the accuracy and timeliness of those 2019-based determinations and on Commerce's ability to gather up-to-date industrial-capacity data.
Operationally, the statute creates significant coordination and information challenges. Measuring industrial capacity and dependence requires confidential commercial data, potential classified inputs about national-security risks, and cross‑agency cooperation.
The bill anticipates legal or programmatic changes but does not appropriate funds or establish concrete procurement rules — implementation will likely require follow-on legislation or agency action. Finally, recommending federal support for certain vendors carries the risk of distorting markets, provoking trade tensions, or starting a subsidy race; the statute directs analysis and proposals but leaves the politically difficult questions of how to fund and execute industrial policy unresolved.
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