The American Science First Act prohibits the Director of the National Science Foundation from providing grants or any other forms of assistance to individuals or entities that have an affiliation or relationship with specified Chinese military-linked companies. The bill identifies those companies by reference to U.S. export-control listings and NDAA-mandated lists and extends the ban to parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and entities owned or controlled by listed companies.
This is a targeted statutory carve‑out that tightens NSF’s eligibility rules and shifts compliance pressure onto the agency and prospective grantees. For universities, research consortia, and companies that work with Chinese partners, the bill narrows the universe of eligible collaborators and creates operational questions about screening, certifications, and handling of existing agreements.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill forbids the NSF Director from awarding grants or other assistance to any person or entity that is affiliated with entities listed in: Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations; the lists mandated by section 1237 of the 1999 Strom Thurmond NDAA or section 1260H of the 2021 Mac Thornberry NDAA; or any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or entity owned or controlled by those listed entities.
Who It Affects
NSF and its program officers, universities and research institutions that accept NSF funding, private sector research contractors, and foreign entities that participate in U.S.-funded collaborations and are connected—directly or indirectly—to listed Chinese military-linked firms.
Why It Matters
By tying NSF eligibility to export-control and NDAA lists, the bill converts existing national-security designations into an absolute bar for NSF assistance and creates new compliance duties: screening prospective partners against those lists and documenting the absence of disqualifying affiliations.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The bill operates as a straightforward statutory prohibition: it tells the Director of the National Science Foundation that, despite any other law, the agency may not provide grants or other assistance to anyone who has an affiliation or relationship with certain China-linked military companies. The text lists three sources for identifying disqualified companies—the Export Administration Regulations supplement and two NDAA-mandated lists—and then folds in parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and entities owned or controlled by those companies.
Practically, the statute covers a wide range of connections: it explicitly cites research partnerships, joint ventures, and contracts as examples of disqualifying relationships. It also defines “Export Administration Regulations” by reference to the relevant part of the Code of Federal Regulations, anchoring one of the bill’s key references in existing regulatory text.
The net effect is to make those external national-security lists determinative for NSF eligibility unless and until Congress or a court says otherwise.Notably, the bill does not lay out an enforcement regime, waiver process, certification requirement, or transitional rules for existing awards. It says NSF “may not provide” assistance to disqualified entities but leaves the operational details—how NSF will screen applicants, how it will treat multi‑party proposals, or how current grants with third‑party links are handled—to agency implementation.
That gap will force NSF to design compliance procedures, and it will create uncertainty for applicants who have Chinese collaborators tied indirectly to listed companies.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The prohibition is expressed as 'notwithstanding any other provision of law,' making it an overriding bar on NSF assistance to disqualified entities.
The bill references Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations and two NDAA-mandated lists (section 1237 of the 1999 NDAA and section 1260H of the FY2021 NDAA) as the sources for covered companies.
Affiliation is broadly defined in practice: the text expressly includes research partnerships, joint ventures, and contracts as examples of relationships that trigger the ban.
Coverage extends beyond named companies to any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or entity owned or controlled by a listed company, creating multi‑tier disqualification risk.
The statute contains no waiver, exceptions, penalty schedule, or specific compliance process—NSF must decide how to screen and refuse assistance under the new rule.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title: 'American Science First Act'
This single-line section provides the act's name for citation. That matters because congressional reports, agency implementing guidance, and legal citations will refer to the statute by this title—useful when searching legislative histories or regulatory updates.
Absolute prohibition on NSF assistance to affiliated entities
The core operative paragraph bars the NSF Director from providing grants or other 'forms of assistance' to any individual or entity affiliated with covered Chinese military-linked companies. The phrasing 'grants or other forms of assistance' is broad and could encompass cooperative agreements, contracts, cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs), and potentially informal support, depending on how NSF interprets 'assistance.' The bar applies 'notwithstanding any other provision of law,' which elevates this prohibition above conflicting statutory authorities and may limit administrative discretion.
Sources for identifying covered entities and scope of affiliates
The bill specifies three categorical sources for disqualifying entities: (1) Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations; (2) lists required by two earlier NDAA provisions; and (3) any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or entity owned or controlled by an entity on those lists. That design delegates the identification task to existing executive-branch lists but expands scope to corporate families and controlled entities, increasing the likelihood that seemingly neutral partners will be excluded because of indirect ties.
Definition of 'Export Administration Regulations'
This short clause anchors the bill’s reference to export-control listings by defining the Export Administration Regulations as the regulations in subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, CFR. By doing so, the bill ties one of its triggers to an enumerated regulatory citation rather than a loose policy description, which reduces ambiguity about which regulatory text congress intended to use.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Science across all five countries.
Explore Science in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. national-security community: intelligence and defense officials gain a statutory tool that helps block federal funding from flowing to actors identified as linked to Chinese military interests, thereby reducing a pathway for potential technology transfer.
- NSF program managers focused on sensitive research: program officers running grants in areas like advanced microelectronics, quantum information, or biotech will have a clearer statutory mandate to screen collaborators and can use the ban to justify conservative eligibility decisions.
- Contractors and companies that already avoid China-linked partners: firms and institutions that have insulated their supply chains or research partnerships from listed entities get competitive advantage for NSF funding because disqualified competitors become ineligible.
Who Bears the Cost
- National Science Foundation: the agency must build and fund new screening and compliance systems, draft implementing guidance, and adjudicate edge-case affiliation disputes without statutory implementation detail or additional appropriations.
- Universities and research consortia with China collaborations: institutions that currently collaborate with Chinese universities, companies, or researchers face higher administrative burdens to vet collaborators and may have to restructure or terminate agreements to preserve eligibility.
- Private-sector research partners and startups: small companies that participate in cross‑border joint ventures or have investors with ties to listed entities risk exclusion and may need legal and compliance support to demonstrate lack of disqualifying affiliation.
- Multinational research collaborations: projects that include non-U.S. partners may see their ability to accept NSF funds constrained if any participant—directly or through ownership links—is tied to a listed entity.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill wrestles with an unavoidable trade-off: protecting sensitive U.S. research and limiting potential technology transfer versus preserving the openness and collaborative nature of academic science; the statute leans decisively toward security but leaves practical questions about scale, fairness, and administrative feasibility unresolved.
The statute is short and leaves significant implementation work to NSF. It does not define key operational terms such as 'other forms of assistance,' nor does it prescribe procedures for applicant screening, notice, or appeal.
That absence creates legal and administrative risk: NSF will need to decide whether to require affirmative certifications from applicants, impose contractual covenants, or rely on its own vetting processes. Each approach has trade‑offs—certifications reduce NSF’s administrative cost but increase litigation risk if incorrect; agency-led screening is costlier and may delay awards.
Another friction point is reliance on external lists as triggers. Using export-control and NDAA lists delegates the identification of risky entities to other processes that are themselves political and sometimes opaque.
Lists can lag behind networks of ownership and control or fail to capture emerging affiliate relationships, producing both under‑ and over‑inclusion. The broad sweep—covering parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and entities owned or controlled by listed companies—raises questions about how deep ownership chains must be traced and how to treat minority investments or academic collaborations mediated by third parties.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.