The bill inserts a new section into title 28, U.S. Code (proposed 28 U.S.C. §1632) that defines “litigation activities,” prohibits any Federal agency from exercising supervisory, enforcement, or regulatory authority over those activities, and bars civil actions in United States courts seeking relief for alleged misconduct tied to an opposing attorney’s litigation activities. It also amends the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Consumer Financial Protection Act to carve out litigating attorneys from the statutory definition of “debt collector” when collecting debts through litigation.
This is a structural reset: it funnels disputes about attorney conduct during litigation into state and federal courts’ own disciplinary and remedial systems, rather than permitting agency rulemaking or private federal suits as alternative enforcement mechanisms. The practical effect would be to narrow the role of federal regulators (notably the CFPB and FTC) in matters that involve courtroom advocacy and to limit certain federal remedies that plaintiffs have used to challenge attorneys’ litigation conduct.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill creates 28 U.S.C. §1632, defines “litigation activities,” and (1) bars Federal agencies from regulating or enforcing rules with respect to those activities and (2) prohibits private parties from bringing civil actions in U.S. courts based on alleged misconduct tied to an opposing attorney’s litigation activities. It also amends FDCPA and the CFPA to exclude attorneys engaged in litigation to collect debts from the statutory definition of “debt collector.”
Who It Affects
Litigating attorneys and law firms (including creditor-side debt‑collection counsel), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and other Federal regulators that have asserted authority over attorney conduct, private plaintiffs who bring federal causes of action against opposing counsel, and state courts and disciplinary agencies that would remain the primary venues for addressing attorney misconduct.
Why It Matters
The bill codifies a jurisdictional and enforcement choice: move regulation of courtroom conduct back to courts and bar authorities and away from federal agencies and federal private litigation. That changes enforcement pathways, shapes agency rulemaking possibilities, and alters risk calculations for law firms, insurers, and consumer advocates.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill adds a new, stand‑alone federal statute that does three things in plain terms: it defines what counts as an attorney’s “litigation activities,” it tells every federal agency that regulating those activities is off limits, and it prevents private parties from suing opposing counsel in United States courts for conduct that occurred during litigation. The definition of litigation activities is broad: it expressly lists filing pleadings, discovery, court communications and enforcement of judgments, and then sweeps in “any other activities” that state law treats as part of practicing law in the licensing State.
That definitional choice ties the federal limit back to state law boundaries rather than creating a new federal test.
By barring federal agencies from exercising oversight, the bill limits administrative enforcement that agencies such as the CFPB have used to address allegedly abusive debt‑collection practices when a lawyer is involved. The parallel prohibition on bringing federal civil suits means plaintiffs cannot use federal courts as the forum for claims that hinge on an opposing attorney’s litigation behavior; they would need to pursue whatever remedies remain available in state court or through bar discipline.
At the same time the bill makes targeted statutory fixes to federal consumer statutes: it inserts a litigation‑activity exclusion into the FDCPA’s “debt collector” definition and adjusts the CFPA provision that already carved out practice‑of‑law activities, thereby closing a path that some regulators have relied upon to bring enforcement actions against litigating attorneys.Those changes will reshape incentives. Law firms will confront a reduced risk of federal administrative and private‑federal‑court exposure for courtroom conduct, but state disciplinary bodies and the courts themselves will be the primary enforcement channels.
For matters that sit at the intersection of litigation and other commercial lawyering (for example, pre‑suit communications or business practices connected to litigation), the bill’s reliance on state law definitions and the “any other activities” catchall will be the source of future disputes about boundaries. The bill does not create a federal private remedy to enforce state bar rules; instead, it channels enforcement back to the traditional, often decentralized, state systems and to federal courts’ own intrinsic disciplinary powers.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill creates 28 U.S.C. §1632, which defines “litigation activities” and establishes the statutory rules in that new section.
It prohibits any Federal agency from exercising supervisory, enforcement, or regulatory authority over attorneys’ litigation activities “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”, It bars private parties from bringing civil actions in courts of the United States for harm allegedly arising from an opposing attorney’s litigation activities.
It amends the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to add an express exclusion for licensed attorneys and law firms when they are engaged in litigation activities to collect a debt (new FDCPA §803(6)(F)).
It amends the Consumer Financial Protection Act to preserve the CFPA’s practice‑of‑law exclusion as applied to attorneys engaged in litigation to collect debts, tying that exclusion to the new §1632 definition.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short title
Names the measure the “Restoring Court Authority Over Litigation Act of 2025.” This is purely cosmetic but signals the bill’s intent to reassert judicial primacy over attorney regulation.
Findings and congressional sense
Recites Congress’s view that attorney regulation has historically been a court and state matter, cites agency rules and court decisions (e.g., Heintz v. Jenkins) as background, and sets up the policy rationale for the statutory changes. The findings are non‑operative but frame statutory interpretation and legislative purpose—useful if courts later assess preemption or statutory construction questions.
Definitions of key terms (Federal agency, litigation activities, State)
Defines ‘Federal agency’ by reference to the Administrative Procedure Act and gives “litigation activities” a broad text‑driven definition that includes filing pleadings, discovery, court communications (depositions, settlement conferences), enforcement of judgments, and a catchall for other activities that state law treats as part of the practice of law. That catchall ties federal treatment to state law boundaries but also creates a place for litigation over scope when activities straddle litigation and non‑litigation roles.
Prohibition on Federal agency authority over litigation activities
Expressly strips Federal agencies of supervisory, enforcement, or regulatory authority over litigating attorneys and firms “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” The broad, unqualified language is designed to preempt agency action in this space, but it raises implementation questions about conflicts with statutes that create agency jurisdiction and how agencies will treat mixed activities that include both litigation and non‑litigation elements.
Bar on federal private civil actions
Precludes any person from bringing a civil action in a United States court for harms tied to an opposing attorney’s litigation activities. The ban is limited to courts of the United States (federal courts) and therefore does not by its text eliminate state‑court suits or state remedies; it does, however, remove a federal‑forum enforcement path that plaintiffs and their counsel have used in FDCPA and other actions.
Conforming amendments to the FDCPA and CFPA
Adjusts 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6) (FDCPA) by adding an explicit subparagraph excluding licensed attorneys and law firms when engaged in litigation activities to collect debts. It also amends 12 U.S.C. §5517(e) (CFPA) to align that statute’s practice‑of‑law exclusion with the new litigation‑activities concept and to make clear the CFPA exclusion covers attorneys litigating to collect debts. These edits remove statutory ambiguity that agencies have previously relied upon to assert authority over litigating attorneys.
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Explore Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Litigating attorneys and law firms — they gain statutory protection from federal administrative oversight and from private federal suits for conduct that arises from courtroom advocacy, lowering the risk of parallel federal enforcement.
- Creditors and creditor‑side law firms that collect by litigation — the FDCPA and CFPA amendments reduce the chance those firms will be treated as “debt collectors” under federal consumer statutes when they pursue claims in court.
- State supreme courts and attorney disciplinary agencies — the bill restores and clarifies their primary role for policing courtroom conduct, consolidating authority and precedent at the state level.
- Law firms’ malpractice carriers and in‑house counsel — by narrowing federal exposure, the bill could reduce certain classes of federal‑forum litigation risk, which insurers and risk managers factor into underwriting and compliance.
Who Bears the Cost
- Federal regulatory agencies (e.g., CFPB, FTC) — they lose a regulatory and enforcement tool over attorney conduct during litigation, constraining their ability to pursue systemic remedies for consumer harms involving litigating attorneys.
- Consumers and private plaintiffs who relied on federal causes of action — plaintiffs may lose access to federal forums and federal statutory remedies for alleged misconduct that occurred during litigation, reducing enforcement options.
- State courts and bar disciplinary systems — they will absorb enforcement responsibilities and possibly increased caseloads and resource demands as federal channels narrow, potentially straining smaller jurisdictions’ capacity to police misconduct.
- Public‑interest litigators and consumer advocates — those groups often use federal statutes and agencies to vindicate widespread harms; those pathways are narrowed, possibly increasing litigation costs and complicating collective enforcement strategies.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill resolves one problem—preserving courts’ traditional authority over courtroom advocacy—by narrowing federal oversight, but in doing so it trades a uniform, nationwide enforcement lever (agency actions and federal statutes) for a fragmented, state‑centered system that may leave gaps in consumer protection, create uneven enforcement, and spawn litigation over the boundary between litigation and non‑litigation legal work.
The bill draws a bright line in favor of judicial supervision of courtroom conduct, but that clarity creates a series of interpretive and practical problems. First, the definition of “litigation activities” is intentionally broad and folded into state law practice definitions; that means disputes over borderline conduct (pre‑suit negotiations, counsel communications outside formal proceedings, hybrid business practices tied to litigation) will produce case‑by‑case litigation about whether an activity is protected.
Second, the prohibition is expressed as a bar on federal agencies and federal civil suits, but it does not directly address related federal supervisory tools (for example, interagency enforcement tied to institutional conduct rather than individual courtroom acts) or how agencies should treat non‑litigation activities by lawyers.
Third, the ban on federal private suits applies to “courts of the United States” and therefore leaves state‑court remedies intact; that design reduces federal forum shopping but predictably will steer more actions to state courts. That outcome could produce uneven enforcement across States, and it shifts the burden onto state bar systems that may lack resources for large‑scale consumer enforcement.
Finally, the bill’s “notwithstanding any other provision of law” wording invites litigation over whether it actually preempts specific statutory grants of authority to agencies and how it interacts with doctrines like removal, supplemental jurisdiction, and agency allocation of scarce enforcement resources.
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