The No GOUGE Act creates a statutory prohibition on selling goods at an "unreasonably high price" when the good (or a component of it) is subject to a tariff or to a publicly announced planned tariff. The bill ties the legality of a price increase to whether the increase exceeds costs directly generated by the tariff and sets an enforceable baseline and rebuttable presumptions for large sellers.
The measure directs the Federal Trade Commission to write implementing regulations, enforces the rule through the FTC’s unfair‑or‑deceptive‑practice authority, preserves state parens patriae suits, and requires agency reporting to track pricing for large companies and tariff‑related price movements. The statute also creates monetary and size thresholds and a multi‑year window during which the rule applies, all of which shape compliance risk for large, import‑dependent sellers and manufacturers.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill defines a "tariffed good" (final goods, goods assembled in the U.S. with tariffed components, and components themselves) and prohibits selling such goods at an unreasonably high price for five years after a tariff or planned tariff is announced or enters into force. It measures baseline prices by the 180‑day average prior to the tariff event and allows only cost‑based increases tied to the tariff (with narrow permitted additional costs).
Who It Affects
The rule targets companies across the supply chain but creates special thresholds: an exemption for ultimate parent entities with under $100 million in U.S. goods revenue and a presumption mechanism focused on firms or parents with $1 billion or more in U.S. goods revenue (or other characteristics the FTC may define). The reporting and investigatory duties fall to the FTC, the ITC, and the BLS.
Why It Matters
This bill links trade policy changes to a consumer‑protection standard, potentially constraining price pass‑through after tariff announcements and giving enforcers a structured basis to challenge price hikes. For compliance teams it creates new documentation requirements around cost accounting, pricing decisions, and communications about planned tariffs.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The act establishes a tariff‑linked price‑gouging rule that applies to three categories: final goods that become subject to a tariff on or after January 20, 2025; goods assembled in the U.S. that include a tariffed component; and components themselves. It also covers goods subject to a ‘‘planned tariff’’—that is, tariffs publicly indicated by senior officials—though the bill bars treating planned‑tariff costs as actually generated by a tariff until the tariff is in force.
The substantive test for an "unreasonably high price" compares post‑event pricing to the 180‑day average price before the most recent tariff announcement or imposition. A seller violates the statute if its price rise exceeds costs directly generated by the tariff, or by the tariff plus narrowly defined additional costs; the bill expressly excludes increases tied to expanded executive compensation or share buybacks.
The prohibition runs for five years from the tariff or planned‑tariff event for each tariffed good.To streamline enforcement, the bill creates a rebuttable presumption tied to so‑called tariff‑related shock dates. A shock date is triggered either when tariffs (or planned tariffs) affecting at least five tariff lines are announced or enter into force within a 30‑day window, or when an existing tariff rate is increased by more than 25 percentage points in 30 days.
If a seller has ‘‘unfair leverage’’—generally defined by an ultimate parent with at least $1 billion in U.S. goods revenue, subject to annual CPI adjustments—or another FTC‑specified characteristic, and sells above the 180‑day baseline on a shock date, the seller is presumed to have violated the law; it can rebut that presumption only with clear and convincing evidence tied to tariff‑generated costs.The Federal Trade Commission enforces the statute using its existing authority over unfair or deceptive acts, and the bill authorizes the FTC to write implementing rules after consulting the USTR, ITC, Customs and Border Protection, and BLS. States retain parens patriae authority to sue on behalf of residents, but the act does not preempt state or local law.
The bill also requires the ITC and Bureau of Labor Statistics to prepare annual price reports focused on companies earning $1 billion or more, and directs the FTC to create consumer reporting channels and publish annual enforcement reports that assess price impacts.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The prohibition applies for five years after a tariff or a publicly announced planned tariff with respect to a good enters into force or is demonstrated.
Baseline pricing is the average price over the 180 days immediately preceding the date the most recent tariff or planned tariff entered into force or was publicly demonstrated.
Companies whose ultimate parent earned under $100 million in U.S. goods revenue in the prior 12 months are exempt; that $100 million threshold is adjusted annually for inflation.
A presumption of violation can arise on a "tariff‑related shock date," defined as either at least five tariff lines changing in a 30‑day window or a tariff rate increase of over 25 percentage points in 30 days, combined with the seller having ‘‘unfair leverage’’ (generally an ultimate parent with $1 billion+ in U.S. goods revenue, CPI‑adjusted).
Enforcement is through the FTC under its unfair‑or‑deceptive‑practice authority, states may sue parens patriae, and the ITC and BLS must deliver annual reports tracking price changes for companies with $1 billion+ in revenue.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Key definitions (tariffed good, planned tariff, shock date, components)
This section supplies the statutory vocabulary the rest of the statute uses. Notable definitions include: "tariffed good," which captures final goods, U.S.‑assembled goods with tariffed components, and components themselves; "planned tariff," which is a public statement by senior officials; and "tariff‑related shock date," which sets an objective trigger for the presumption mechanism. For compliance teams, the definitions determine which SKU lines and supply‑chain inputs must be tracked and documented.
Substantive prohibition, price test, exemptions and presumptions
The core prohibition bars selling a tariffed good at an "unreasonably high price" during a five‑year window. The price test allows increases only to the extent they reflect costs directly generated by the tariff (or the tariff plus narrow additional costs), measured against a 180‑day pre‑event average. The statute carves out small sellers via a $100 million ultimate parent revenue exemption and sets a presumption of violation for large firms on shock dates, shifting practical proof burdens and creating a heightened risk profile for firms meeting the "unfair leverage" threshold.
Rulemaking, interagency consultation, and enforcement mechanics
The FTC may adopt regulations under APA notice‑and‑comment and must consult USTR, ITC, CBP, and BLS when doing so, which creates touchpoints between trade and consumer protection agencies. Enforcement treats violations as unfair or deceptive acts under the FTC Act; the FTC gets its normal investigatory and remedial toolbox, and states can bring parens patriae actions (with notice to the FTC). That dual‑track enforcement model increases private‑litigation risk and requires coordinated agency guidance to avoid inconsistent enforcement outcomes.
Consumer reporting and Commission investigatory processes
The FTC must build a consumer reporting mechanism within 180 days that accepts complaints by phone, mail, or web and promulgate rules describing how it will evaluate and escalate reports into investigations. This formal complaint channel codifies a public intake path and requires the FTC to articulate investigatory priorities and triage criteria, which will be important for market participants trying to anticipate agency scrutiny.
Annual data and enforcement reporting by ITC, BLS, and FTC
The ITC and BLS must jointly publish annual reports analyzing prices charged by any company earning $1 billion or more in gross revenue, with a focus on tariffed goods; the BLS must assess whether its current surveys provide adequate price granularity and add questions if necessary. Separately, the FTC must publish annual enforcement reports assessing the law’s impact on consumer prices. These data provisions create the basis for ongoing monitoring but also obligate agencies to develop new surveillance and analytic capacity.
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Explore Trade in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. consumers — receive statutory protection against price jumps that are untethered to demonstrable tariff costs, lowering exposure to opportunistic pass‑through after tariff announcements.
- Domestic buyers and smaller manufacturers — gain a clearer legal claim against large suppliers who raise prices beyond tariff‑driven cost increases, potentially leveling the playing field where dominant suppliers previously captured windfall margins.
- State attorneys general and consumer‑protection offices — get an explicit parens patriae vehicle to challenge price spikes on behalf of residents, backed by a federal standard and FTC engagement.
Who Bears the Cost
- Large import‑dependent manufacturers and national retailers — face compliance costs to document cost causation, increased litigation risk under the presumption regime, and potential limits on pricing flexibility.
- Ultimate parent companies meeting the $1 billion threshold — will need enhanced accounting and recordkeeping to rebut presumptions, and may incur operational costs to justify price changes or adjust sourcing.
- Federal agencies (FTC, ITC, BLS) — must redirect analytic and enforcement resources to implement rules, stand up consumer reporting channels, and produce annual reports, creating administrative burdens that may require new funding or reprioritization.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill pits two legitimate goals against one another: protecting consumers from opportunistic, tariff‑driven price hikes versus preserving sellers’ ability to adjust prices to absorb real cost increases and to signal supply constraints. Crafting a rule that stops exploitative pass‑through without chilling lawful price adjustments or creating unmanageable compliance burdens is the statute’s central, unresolved dilemma.
The statute ties legal liability to a causal cost test—price increases must be explained by costs "directly generated" by the tariff, with narrow allowance for other costs. In practice, allocating which costs were "directly generated" by a tariff versus pre‑existing inflationary pressures, supply disruptions, or strategic pricing decisions will be messy.
Companies will need to produce contemporaneous cost accounting and decision‑making records, but the bill leaves substantial room for dispute over acceptable accounting methods and the level of aggregation (SKU, model, product family) to use when measuring the 180‑day baseline.
The presumption tied to "tariff‑related shock dates" is administratively attractive but blunt: the shock date test aggregates across tariff lines and ignores trading‑partner heterogeneity, so it may flag price movements that are unrelated to the specific tariff impacting a given good. The rebuttal standard—clear and convincing evidence—raises the evidentiary bar for defendants and amplifies litigation risk.
Finally, the act does not address how measures interact with existing trade remedies, duties, or international obligations; while the statute preserves state law actions, parallel state prosecutions could produce inconsistent remedies and forum complexity.
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