The bill directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation to convene an interagency working group that will develop, publish, and periodically update a National Strategy for Combating Scams. The strategy must reflect input from a broad set of community stakeholders and lay out a coordinated federal approach to defining, measuring, preventing, and responding to scams.
The statute focuses on practical obstacles to coordination: it requires the working group to analyze data collection gaps, propose methods for harmonized reporting and data interoperability (including modern technologies such as AI), identify agency roles and duplication, outline private‑sector coordination, and evaluate cross‑border enforcement and victim recovery options. The result: a single roadmap intended to unify federal activity without creating a new enforcement agency or attaching an appropriation.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill requires the FBI to assemble a multi‑agency working group and produce a publicly available National Strategy for Combating Scams. The strategy must define “scam,” map agency roles, evaluate prevention and victim recovery practices, analyze data collection and interoperability, and recommend legislative, regulatory, or administrative changes.
Who It Affects
Federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies named in the bill (FBI, FTC, CFPB, DHS, Treasury, FCC, SEC, CFTC, banking regulators, SSA and others), plus State/local/Tribal prosecutors and Adult Protective Services, financial institutions, telecom and technology companies, and organizations serving older adults and individuals with disabilities.
Why It Matters
The bill tries to solve longstanding fragmentation across at least a dozen agencies by producing a single strategy, a common operational definition of ‘scam,’ and frameworks for data sharing and private‑sector collaboration—tools that could materially change how scams are identified, reported, and disrupted.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill does not create a new agency or new criminal penalties; it creates a process. Within a short window after enactment the Director of the FBI must assemble a working group composed of specified federal agencies and any additional agencies the FBI deems appropriate.
The working group’s deliverable is a public National Strategy for Combating Scams that brings together operational guidance, data strategies, prevention best practices, and a proposed common definition of “scam.”
The statute requires the working group to solicit and incorporate broad community feedback. That includes survivors, elder and disability advocates, prosecutors and law enforcement with scam expertise, Adult Protective Services and Area Agencies on Aging, businesses that play frontline roles (telecommunications, financial institutions, social media, retailers, technology firms), and experts in human behavior and prevention.
The bill expects the strategy to address both on‑ramp prevention measures and downstream victim recovery options, with attention to accessibility for people with disabilities and older adults.On the technical side, the working group must do two things in parallel: (1) propose concrete steps to harmonize data on scams across agencies—including improved complaint reporting, consistent incident classifications, interoperable law enforcement data platforms, and options to use AI for data synthesis; and (2) identify whether a government‑wide estimate of scam incidents and dollar losses is feasible and either produce a plan to maintain such an estimate or explain the legislative, regulatory, or administrative barriers preventing one. Those analyses are central to the bill’s goal of producing comparable measurements and clearer situational awareness across actors.The bill also frames private‑sector engagement as an operational requirement: the strategy must recommend mechanisms for rapid, lawful sharing of data from banks, carriers, and tech platforms to support investigations, transaction and communication authentication, preemptive takedowns, and timely public warnings.
Finally, the statute requires the strategy to analyze cross‑border enforcement needs and to identify resource needs and any legislative changes necessary to implement a coordinated federal response. The bill directs public release of the strategy and periodic updates to keep the document current.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The Director of the FBI must assemble the working group within 90 days of enactment and coordinate specified member agencies (including FTC, CFPB, FCC, SEC, CFTC, DHS, Treasury, banking regulators, Secret Service, SSA, and others).
The working group must submit a publicly available National Strategy for Combating Scams to the Senate Special Committee on Aging and the Senate and House Judiciary Committees within one year of its formation.
The strategy must either produce a government‑wide plan to estimate scam incidents and dollar losses (including unreported incidents) or analyze the barriers to creating such an estimate and propose fixes.
After publication, the working group must update the strategy at least once every five years; updates must be submitted to the same congressional committees and posted publicly within 30 days.
The FBI, FTC, and CFPB are required to adopt the working group’s recommended common definition of “scam” within one year of the strategy’s publication (and within one year of any later updates to that definition).
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title
Gives the Act its name: "National Strategy for Combating Scams Act of 2025." This is purely captionary but signals the statute’s focus on cross‑agency planning rather than new regulatory authority.
Findings
Sets factual context the drafters relied on—prevalence and cost of scams, AI‑enabled threats, disproportionate harms to older adults, and GAO recommendations for a coordinated federal strategy. Findings are not operative law but frame congressional intent and help courts or agencies interpret the statute in future disputes.
Creates an interagency working group convened by the FBI
Requires the FBI Director to assemble a working group within 90 days that includes a long list of federal agencies (banking regulators, financial crimes unit, law enforcement, communications and securities regulators, SSA, HHS, State, etc.) and allows the FBI to include other agencies as appropriate. Practically, this makes the FBI the coordinating lead for the initial planning process, but it does not transfer enforcement powers or reassign statutory authority among members.
Specifies what the National Strategy must contain
Lists an extensive set of deliverables: stakeholder engagement across survivors, elder and disability groups, prosecutors, businesses, and service providers; a recommended definition of “scam” with an analysis; a risk assessment; evidence‑based prevention methods; role and responsibility mapping for agencies; a plan or barrier analysis for creating a single government‑wide estimate of scam incidents and losses; recommendations for data harmonization, private‑sector coordination, victim recovery, cross‑border enforcement, and needed legislative/regulatory changes. For implementers, this section functions as a work plan with many discrete research and policy tasks rather than an authorization of specific programs.
Submission, public posting, and periodic updates
Requires the working group to submit the completed strategy to the Senate Special Committee on Aging and the Judiciary Committees of both chambers and to publish it on a public website within one year of the group’s formation. It also requires updates at least every five years with the same submission and posting obligations and a 30‑day deadline for public posting after an update. These mandates create transparency and recurring review cycles but do not include appropriations for execution or monitoring.
Agency adoption of a common definition of “scam”
Compels the FBI, FTC, and CFPB to adopt the working group’s recommended definition of “scam” within one year of the strategy’s publication and to adopt subsequent updates within one year after each update. This creates a binding timeline for these three agencies to harmonize terminology, which could affect enforcement priorities, complaint classification, and interagency data comparability.
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Explore Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Scam survivors (including older adults and people with disabilities): A centralized strategy promises clearer, coordinated recovery resources, more consistent public warnings, and potentially improved redress pathways across agencies and private sector actors.
- State, local, and Tribal prosecutors and law enforcement: Better data interoperability and federal coordination can reduce investigative duplication and provide clearer channels for federal support in complex, cross‑jurisdictional scams.
- Consumer advocacy groups and researchers: A public strategy, harmonized definitions, and improved data aggregation make research and advocacy more evidence‑based and comparable across jurisdictions.
- Large financial institutions, telecom carriers, and major technology platforms: Though the bill asks for private‑sector cooperation, clearer protocols and government coordination can reduce uncertainty about who to contact during incidents, enable preemptive mitigations, and standardize expectations for rapid data sharing during investigations.
Who Bears the Cost
- Federal agencies named in the working group (especially the FBI): Convening, coordinating, conducting analyses, and maintaining updates will require staff time and technical resources not accompanied by explicit new funding.
- Private sector entities (banks, credit unions, telecoms, tech platforms): The strategy anticipates rapid data sharing and authentication work; implementing interoperable reporting, takedown coordination, or transaction‑authentication systems will impose compliance and engineering costs.
- State and local governments and Adult Protective Services: The bill asks the working group to analyze the feasibility of local elder justice task forces and improved coordination, which may create expectations for resource commitments at sub‑federal levels without providing funding.
- Privacy and compliance officers: Expanding data sharing and law‑enforcement interoperability raises GLBA, BSA, and other compliance issues that financial institutions and carriers will need to navigate, potentially increasing legal and operational costs.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill pits the value of a centralized, government‑wide approach—consistent definitions, harmonized data, coordinated takedowns—against the friction of agency turf, statutory privacy and financial secrecy constraints, and the absence of dedicated funding; centralization improves coherence but may struggle in practice unless agencies and private actors accept new data‑sharing practices and Congress provides clearer legal or financial support.
The statute is procedural and analytic rather than prescriptive: it compels study, coordination, and timelines for publication and agency adoption of a common definition, but it does not appropriate funds or change enforcement powers. That structure limits the bill’s immediate operational impact—achievement depends on agency bandwidth, existing legal authorities for data sharing, and private‑sector cooperation.
The working group faces a heavy deliverable list; prioritization and sequencing will matter but the bill does not set those priorities or provide implementation funding.
Key implementation questions remain open. A central recommended definition of “scam” will be useful for comparability but risks over‑ or under‑inclusivity; the bill requires an analysis of the choice but does not constrain how narrow or broad the adopted definition may be.
Data harmonization and rapid private‑sector data sharing are core goals, yet existing legal boundaries—privacy law, financial secrecy rules, and platform terms—could limit what can be shared without new statutory changes. The bill anticipates recommending legislative or regulatory fixes, but until Congress acts those legal frictions could blunt the strategy’s effectiveness.
Finally, international cooperation is critical for many large‑scale scams, but the statute’s mechanisms for cross‑border enforcement rely on existing diplomacy and mutual legal assistance frameworks that can be slow and politically fraught.
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