The Securing Energy Supply Chains Act directs the Secretary of Energy to identify entities whose activities threaten the United States in national security, economic security, or foreign policy terms and to establish the Energy Non-Procurement List within 90 days of enactment. The list will prioritize entities involved with critical materials and batteries and can include subsidiaries of listed entities and others the Secretary designates.
Beginning one year after enactment, the Department of Energy may not enter into or renew contracts with a covered entity or its first-tier subcontractors if procuring goods or services from that entity would be impracticable to obtain elsewhere. Bidders for DOE contracts must certify they are not covered entities, and contract termination can occur if a covered entity is found to be involved, subject to certain exceptions.
The act also requires a cross-agency overlap study to harmonize related lists and ensure consistent treatment across federal procurement.
At a Glance
What It Does
Establishes the Energy Non-Procurement List within 90 days, prioritizing entities tied to critical materials and batteries and allowing inclusion of entities on sanctions and watch lists. The list is updated annually and consultative in nature.
Who It Affects
DOE contracting and program offices, bidders for DOE contracts, and entities seeking to contract with the federal government, especially players in critical minerals and battery supply chains.
Why It Matters
Provides a national security frame for procurement decisions by excluding risky suppliers and aligning energy policy with broader sanctions and export controls, while signaling a shift toward domestic resilience in key energy sectors.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The bill creates a new instrument to screen who federal buyers can work with in energy-related procurement. It requires the Secretary of Energy to build an Energy Non-Procurement List, drawing from multiple sources that flag foreign-aligned or problematic entities and their subsidiaries.
The listing is designed to target actors that could threaten U.S. energy security, national security, or foreign policy goals, with a focus on critical materials and battery components.
Once the list is in place, the Act imposes procurement restraints one year after enactment. DOE contracts and first-tier subcontracts may not be awarded to any covered entity unless no alternative supplier is available in the required time, quantity, or manner.
Bidders must certify they are not covered entities, and contracts can be terminated if a covered entity is found in the supply chain, again subject to exceptions for ensuring project viability.The Act also requires a cross-agency List Overlap Study to identify and harmonize overlapping lists from different Federal departments. The results and a harmonization plan would be reported to Congress, with unclassified material published publicly, and classified annexes provided where appropriate.
This structure aims to reduce duplication and improve clarity for procurement officials while maintaining robust controls over sensitive suppliers.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The Secretary must establish the Energy Non-Procurement List within 90 days of enactment, prioritizing critical materials and batteries.
The List may include entities owned by foreign entities of concern and those on major sanction and screening lists, plus subsidiaries of listed entities.
Beginning one year after enactment, DOE contracts cannot be awarded to covered entities unless procurement from alternatives is not feasible; bidders must certify their status.
DOE must annually revise the Energy Non-Procurement List and publish unclassified updates; a classified annex may accompany the report.
A List Overlap Study will identify cross-list overlaps across multiple agencies and propose harmonization to guide future procurement decisions.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short Title
The act may be cited as the Securing Energy Supply Chains Act.
Definitions
Defines Energy Non-Procurement List, Foreign Entity of Concern, and Secretary. Sets the scope for how entities are evaluated, including cross-reference to critical minerals and battery components and alignment with other statutory lists.
Energy Non-Procurement List establishment and management
Requires the Secretary to establish the Energy Non-Procurement List within 90 days, prioritizing entities involved with critical materials or batteries and permitting inclusion of certain list-based entities and subsidiaries. The Secretary may revise the list annually and may consult with other federal agencies.
Prohibition on Procurement
Implements procurement prohibitions starting one year after enactment for covered entities and their first-tier subcontracts, with a compliance certification for bidders. Provides termination authority for DOE contracts if a covered entity is involved, subject to exceptions where alternative procurement is not feasible.
List Overlap Study
Mandates a cross-agency study to map list overlaps created by different departments and agencies, with a report to Congress and harmonization recommendations to clarify procurement restrictions across the government.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Energy across all five countries.
Explore Energy in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- DOE contracting officers gain a clear, enforceable framework for supplier vetting
- Domestic manufacturers of critical minerals and battery components benefit from a more secure, predictable procurement base
- Procurement professionals and compliance teams in federal contractors gain clearer rules and reduced risk of noncompliant bids
- National security and policy analysts obtain better data and risk indicators for energy supply chain decisions
- Congress and oversight bodies receive structured reporting and transparency on procurement sources
Who Bears the Cost
- Contractors and suppliers identified on the Energy Non-Procurement List face potential loss of business and added compliance burden
- Small and mid-sized suppliers may incur higher costs to meet certification and sourcing requirements
- DOE program offices bear ongoing administrative costs to maintain the list and manage revisions
- Federal agencies may experience short-term disruption as supply chains adjust to restricted entities
- Potential adverse effects on international suppliers who are unable to meet new U.S. procurement criteria
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is balancing strict security controls with maintaining robust, timely access to critical energy inputs. A broad, aggressive list can prevent dangerous actors from supplying the federal government but risks excluding legitimate suppliers and slowing clean energy and defense-related initiatives.
The bill creates a powerful new gatekeeping tool that can reduce exposure to foreign- and risk-associated entities in energy supply chains. But it raises several analytical questions about implementation: How broadly will the list be drawn, and what standards govern inclusion?
How will the identity and status of listed entities be verified, updated, and reconciled with evolving sanctions regimes? The annual revision cadence could itself destabilize suppliers if the market cannot quickly adapt, and the requirement for a bidder certification places responsibility on bidders to self-attest, which may invite disputes over accuracy or timeliness of data.
The interplay with existing export controls and sanctions regimes will determine whether this mechanism adds real resilience or simply adds procurement friction.
Because the list must cover a global set of supply chain actors, careful governance is needed to avoid chilling legitimate trade, protect due process for entities that may be misclassified, and ensure that the HUD-like oversight that often accompanies such lists does not become a bottleneck in critical projects. The act also relies on interagency coordination to harmonize lists, which could be slow but is essential for cohesive federal procurement policy.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.