The DHS Restrictions on Confucus Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act would withhold Department of Homeland Security funding from institutions of higher education that maintain a relationship with a Confucius Institute, a Thousand Talents Program, or any Chinese entity of concern. A Chinese entity of concern is defined by a multi-point set of criteria tied to military-civil fusion, defense industries, government affiliations, and abuses such as forced labor.
The bill creates a pathway for exemptions via waivers, subject to DNI consultation, for up to one year and renewable annually, and imposes a requirement to terminate the prohibited relationship as a condition for continued DHS funding. In addition to funding restrictions, the act directs DHS to provide outreach and technical assistance to institutions, and to report on implementation to Congress on an 18-month horizon and thereafter annually.
The overarching goal is to tighten federal funding eligibility to reduce security risks associated with foreign influence in higher education research and activities.
At a Glance
What It Does
Beginning with the first fiscal year after enactment, DHS must ensure that any institution with a relationship to a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entity of concern is ineligible for DHS funds unless the relationship is terminated. A termination makes the institution eligible again for DHS funding.
Who It Affects
Institutions of higher education in the U.S. that host Confucius Institutes or engage with related Chinese entities; DHS and the DNI are involved in enforcement and oversight; and the committees of Congress receive notices.
Why It Matters
The bill uses federal funding eligibility as a lever to curb foreign influence in higher education and safeguard sensitive research, while creating safeguards for case-by-case waivers and ongoing oversight.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill defines several terms important to enforcement, including what counts as a Chinese entity of concern, what constitutes a Confucius Institute, and what qualifies as a relationship with such entities. It then sets a hard condition: if an institution maintains any relationship with a Confucius Institute or related Chinese programs, DHS funding to that institution is blocked unless the relationship is terminated.
The termination requirement is the central lever; once severed, the institution can become eligible for DHS funds again. The act allows a narrow one-year waiver window, subject to DNI input, if the institution demonstrates robust safeguards to detect and deter attempts by affiliated individuals to access sensitive research or federally funded activities.
Waivers can be renewed annually if conditions persist and take effect 30 days after issuance or renewal. DHS must also provide outreach and technical assistance to help institutions comply and must report to Congress on implementation every 18 months and then annually, including which institutions receive DHS funds and how the provisions are applied.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill withholds DHS funding from institutions that have a relationship with a Confucius Institute, a Thousand Talents Program, or a Chinese entity of concern unless the relationship is terminated.
A definition of Chinese entity of concern includes universities involved in military-civil fusion, defense industrial base activities, or affiliations with Chinese security or political offices.
Waivers are allowed for up to one year with DNI consultation, based on safeguards against unauthorized access to sensitive research, and can be renewed annually.
Effective date for waivers is 30 days after issuance or renewal.
DHS must provide outreach to affected institutions and report on implementation to Congress 18 months after enactment and annually thereafter.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Definitions
Defines “Chinese entity of concern,” listing criteria such as involvement in military-civil fusion, links to national defense ministries, and ties to Chinese state security apparatus. It also defines Confucius Institute, institution of higher education (per the Higher Education Act, as applicable), relationship (contracts, in-kind gifts, or other arrangements), and Thousand Talents Program. These definitions set the scope of who and what is covered by the funding restrictions.
Ineligibility for DHS Funding
Establishes the core mechanism: beginning in the first fiscal year after enactment, DHS must ensure that an institution with any relationship to a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or a Chinese entity of concern is ineligible for DHS funds unless the relationship is terminated. Upon termination, the institution becomes eligible again. This creates a strong incentive for institutions to sever ties to maintain federal funding.
Waivers
Allows a case-by-case waiver for up to one year, upon consultation with the DNI, if safeguards are robust to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive research by affiliated Chinese nationals. Waivers may be renewed annually if conditions remain satisfied. A waiver takes effect 30 days after issuance or renewal and must be accompanied by notification to the relevant congressional committees.
Assistance
Requires DHS to provide outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to institutions to help them comply with the act. This signals a supportive enforcement posture to aid institutions in meeting new requirements.
Reports
Requires DHS to produce and submit an annual report detailing implementation over the prior 12 months, including institutions with relationships and whether funds were affected, as well as an assessment of how subsections (b), (c), and (d) were implemented.
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Explore Education in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- DHS and the DNI gain a precise funding-control mechanism to manage national-security risk.
- U.S. universities and colleges that do not engage in disallowed relationships can continue receiving DHS funds, avoiding disruption to compliant programs.
- The broader U.S. research ecosystem benefits from clearer guardrails against foreign influence in federally funded research.
- Congressional committees receive regular, transparent reporting on implementation and institutions affected, aiding oversight.
- The U.S. public (through taxpayers funding) benefits from a more resilient and secure research environment.
Who Bears the Cost
- Universities and faculties that maintain or fear losing Confucius Institute-related collaborations may face funding uncertainties and abrupt program disruption.
- Compliance offices and university administrators bear additional administrative burdens to audit relationships and ensure termination where required.
- Institutions that rely on Chinese partnerships may experience research delays or reorientation of funding priorities.
- DHS and related agencies incur ongoing administrative and monitoring costs to implement and report on the program.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is balancing national security interests—preventing foreign influence and access to sensitive research—with the practical needs of universities to collaborate globally and maintain robust research programs without undue disruption.
The proposed framework relies on a broad and evolving definition of a Chinese entity of concern, which could be applied variably across institutions. Implementation will require careful management to avoid chilling legitimate, beneficial collaborations while still protecting national security.
The waiver mechanism introduces flexibility, but the case-by-case nature raises questions about consistency, equity, and the potential for disparate outcomes among similar institutions. The requirement to terminate relationships could disrupt multi-institutional projects and complicate ongoing research efforts funded by other sources, potentially shifting collaboration away from U.S. institutions with Confucius ties to those without.
Finally, while the annual reporting increases transparency, it also creates ongoing administrative obligations for universities and DHS alike, which may strain resources in smaller institutions with limited compliance capacity.
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