H.J. Res. 110 proposes an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would require federal expenditures and receipts to be balanced, with limited definitional carveouts and a timetable for compliance.
The amendment excludes payments “for payment of debt” from the expenditure side and excludes borrowing from receipts, allows balance to be achieved over multiple years, and obliges Congress to reach balance within ten years after ratification. It also creates a two‑thirds‑majority emergency mechanism in both chambers to temporarily exceed the rule.
If enacted, the amendment would convert what is now a statutory and political fiscal discipline into a constitutional constraint. That shift would change how Congress, the Treasury, OMB, and courts approach budgeting, borrowing, entitlement funding, and emergency responses — raising legal, operational, and macroeconomic questions about enforcement, definitions, and transitional mechanics.
At a Glance
What It Does
The resolution inserts a new constitutional article requiring expenditures and receipts to be balanced, excluding debt payments and borrowing, and gives Congress ten years after ratification to achieve that balance. It permits both Houses, by two‑thirds vote, to authorize temporary excess spending for emergencies, and requires debts incurred from such emergency spending to be repaid as soon as practicable.
Who It Affects
Directly affects Congress’s budget and appropriations process, the Department of the Treasury’s borrowing and cash management, OMB’s baseline rules, and federal program administrators for entitlement and discretionary programs. Indirectly affects bond markets, investors, beneficiaries of federal programs, and state fiscal planning tied to federal funds.
Why It Matters
Turning balanced-budget rules into constitutional text elevates the constraint above ordinary legislation, narrowing Congress’s toolbox (borrowing and statutory fixes) and shifting potential disputes into constitutional law. The amendment’s definitions and limited emergency exception create legal ambiguities that would determine how much fiscal flexibility remains in practice.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The joint resolution proposes adding a single constitutional article that makes federal expenditures and receipts equal as a constitutional requirement. The amendment explicitly says expenditures include “all expenditures of the United States except those for payment of debt,” while receipts include “all receipts of the United States except those derived from borrowing.” The text says balance may occur “over more than one year,” and it requires Congress to achieve balance within ten years after the amendment is ratified.
Ratification itself follows the usual Article V model: the amendment becomes part of the Constitution if legislatures in three‑fourths of the states ratify it within seven years of submission.
The amendment builds a narrow emergency path: for limited times, both the House and Senate, each acting by two‑thirds, can authorize expenditures that exceed the constitutional rule. Any debt incurred to finance those emergency expenditures must be paid “as soon as practicable.” The resolution does not define key terms such as “limited times,” “payment of debt,” or what procedural steps Congress must take to demonstrate compliance, and it does not include a statutory enforcement mechanism or specify transitions for existing statutory commitments.Practically, the amendment constrains the two levers Congress currently uses to close deficits: raising receipts (taxes or other non‑borrowing receipts) and reducing expenditures.
Because borrowing is excluded from receipts, the Treasury could not lawfully rely on new borrowing to make up an imbalance. At the same time, excluding “payment of debt” from expenditures makes clear that servicing existing debt would not count toward the balancing calculation — but the phrase leaves ambiguous whether principal redemptions, interest, or intragovernmental accounting entries are covered.Those drafting and implementing rules post‑ratification would face immediate choices: whether to measure balance on annual, multi‑year rolling, or cumulative bases; how to treat mandatory trust funds and dedicated receipts; and how to reconcile existing statutory obligations that create projected deficits.
Absent implementation language, courts and Congress would likely be asked to fill gaps regarding timing, permissible instruments for balancing, and the scope of the emergency exception.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The amendment requires that federal expenditures equal federal receipts, but explicitly excludes from expenditures “payment of debt” and from receipts any amounts derived from borrowing.
Ratification must occur within seven years and, once ratified, Congress has ten years to achieve balance under the amendment’s terms.
The text allows balance to be achieved “over more than one year,” which permits multi‑year compliance approaches rather than strictly annual balancing.
For emergencies, both the House and Senate, by two‑thirds vote, may authorize temporary excess expenditures; debts from those authorizations must be repaid “as soon as practicable.”, The amendment contains no implementing procedures, enforcement mechanism, or definitions for key terms (e.g.
“limited times,” scope of “payment of debt”), leaving substantial interpretive work to Congress and the courts.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Submission and time limits for ratification
The resolution follows the standard Article V form: the proposed article becomes part of the Constitution if three‑fourths of state legislatures ratify it. It adds a seven‑year deadline for that ratification, creating a finite window for states to act. That deadline matters because it fixes when the constitutional constraint would begin to take effect and triggers the separate ten‑year adjustment period Congress gets to reach balance after ratification.
Core balanced‑budget requirement and definitional carveouts
Section 1 establishes the central rule: expenditures and receipts must be balanced. It defines expenditures to include all federal spending except payments “for payment of debt,” and it defines receipts to include all incoming funds except those from borrowing. The section also allows the balancing to occur over more than one year and directs Congress to achieve balance within ten years after ratification. Those few words set the substantive rule but leave open measurement details (annual vs. cumulative balance), the treatment of trust funds and intragovernmental borrowing, and how existing statutory commitments are reconciled.
Emergency override and repayment obligation
Section 2 creates a high‑threshold escape valve: both chambers can, by two‑thirds vote, authorize time‑limited deviations from the balanced‑budget rule for emergencies. It mandates that debts incurred under those authorizations be paid as soon as practicable. This provision preserves a path for extraordinary spending but imposes a political supermajority barrier and a repayment expectation, without specifying timing, oversight, or what qualifies as an emergency.
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Who Benefits
- Long‑term taxpayers and deficit‑conscious citizens — by design, the amendment reduces the option to finance government by ongoing borrowing, which could lower upward pressure on future taxes tied to servicing rolled deficits.
- Fiscal‑discipline advocates and organizations that prioritize constitutional constraints — the amendment converts a policy preference into enforceable constitutional text, advancing their goal of institutionalizing deficit limits.
- Certain fixed‑income investors if markets perceive lower structural deficits — investors could view a constitutional cap as reducing sovereign‑credit risk over the very long term, depending on implementation and political credibility.
Who Bears the Cost
- Congress and federal policymakers — the amendment removes ordinary borrowing as a routine deficit‑financing tool and narrows discretionary budgeting choices, forcing politically difficult tradeoffs between raising revenues and cutting programs.
- Beneficiaries of federal programs (especially discretionary programs and some entitlement expansions) — achieving constitutional balance may require program cuts or revenue increases that alter benefit levels and eligibility unless Congress uses the emergency supermajority mechanism.
- Treasury and OMB operations — day‑to‑day cash management, debt issuance strategy, and baseline scoring would need redesign to comply with a rule that disallows borrowing as a receipt and excludes debt payments, complicating short‑term financing and intragovernmental accounting.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between locking in long‑term fiscal discipline and preserving short‑term governmental flexibility: the amendment protects future taxpayers from chronic borrowing but also removes a primary tool (new borrowing) for responding to recessions, wars, and disasters unless a high two‑thirds supermajority agrees to override — a trade‑off with no mechanically clean resolution.
The amendment packs more questions than answers. Key phrases — “payment of debt,” “derived from borrowing,” and “limited times” for emergency authorizations — are undefined.
Those definitional gaps create practical ambiguity: for example, does ‘‘payment of debt’’ exclude both interest and principal, and how are trust funds and intragovernmental balances treated? The absence of statutory implementing language means Congress and federal agencies would have to create measurement rules (annual vs. cumulative balance), enforcement procedures, and transition mechanics for existing multi‑year commitments.
The emergency clause likewise leaves open operational and political questions. A two‑thirds threshold preserves a path for large bipartisan actions but is high enough that it may be impractical in polarized periods; the requirement to repay debts “as soon as practicable” gives no timetable or oversight role for how repayment plans are approved or enforced.
Finally, converting fiscal policy into constitutional law shifts disputes from budget politics into constitutional litigation — courts could be asked to resolve the finer points, but Article V amendments generally leave implementation to political branches, which would create a period of legal and fiscal uncertainty.
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