H.J. Res. 61 is a single-purpose joint resolution that declares null and void the Environmental Protection Agency rule titled "National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Rubber Tire Manufacturing" (89 Fed.
Reg. 94886 (Nov. 29, 2024)). The resolution invokes chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code — the Congressional Review Act (CRA) — and states the specified rule "shall have no force or effect."
That outcome is consequential for regulated firms and regulators because a CRA disapproval does more than repeal a rule: it triggers the statutory prohibition on reissuing a substantially similar rule absent new legislation. Practically, the resolution eliminates the subject federal standard and creates a legal and operational opening for industry, states, EPA, and affected communities as they sort out compliance, enforcement, and next steps.
At a Glance
What It Does
The resolution disapproves a specific EPA NESHAP for rubber tire manufacturing (89 Fed. Reg. 94886) and declares the rule void. It does this under chapter 8 of title 5, commonly called the Congressional Review Act.
Who It Affects
Rubber tire manufacturers, EPA, state environmental agencies that coordinate implementation, vendors of emissions-control equipment, and communities near tire plants are the immediate stakeholders. Trade associations, environmental NGOs, and compliance/legal teams will also be directly engaged by the change.
Why It Matters
A CRA disapproval removes the federal rule from effect and prevents the agency from issuing a substantially identical rule without express statutory authorization. That shifts regulatory authority, creates legal uncertainty about enforcement and prior compliance investments, and shapes how EPA can address the same hazards going forward.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The resolution contains one operative sentence: Congress disapproves the EPA’s NESHAP for rubber tire manufacturing (identified by its Federal Register citation) and declares that rule to have no force or effect. By framing the action as a disapproval "under chapter 8 of title 5," the text places this vote squarely within the Congressional Review Act framework rather than as an ordinary amendment or appropriations rider.
Under the CRA, a joint resolution of disapproval that becomes law voids the specified rule and imposes a statutory bar: the agency may not promulgate a new rule that is "substantially the same" as the disapproved rule unless Congress authorizes it through subsequent legislation. The bill itself does not define "substantially the same," so that legal standard will fall to courts and future agency guidance if tested.
The resolution is narrowly targeted to the December 2024 Federal Register action and contains no savings clauses, transitional provisions, or carve-outs for enforcement actions taken under the rule prior to disapproval. That economy of text means the downstream consequences — for example, whether permits issued, compliance work already completed, or civil penalties assessed under the rule survive the disapproval — will be subject to legal and administrative clarification.
Finally, because the resolution nullifies a federal standard addressing hazardous air pollutants from a particular industrial sector, affected states, industry actors, and EPA will need to decide next steps: states may rely on their own laws, EPA could pursue alternative regulatory approaches not "substantially the same," and regulated entities will reassess capital plans and compliance timelines in light of the new regulatory baseline.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The resolution expressly disapproves the EPA rule titled "National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Rubber Tire Manufacturing" (89 Fed. Reg. 94886 (Nov. 29, 2024)) and states the rule "shall have no force or effect.", It invokes chapter 8 of title 5, the Congressional Review Act, which both nullifies the rule and triggers the statutory bar on issuing a "substantially the same" rule in the future absent new legislation.
The text is single-sentence and contains no transitional or savings provisions, leaving unresolved whether actions already taken under the rule (permits, compliance work, or enforcement orders) survive the disapproval.
Because the resolution targets a specific Federal Register action by citation rather than altering statutory text, EPA would need either a materially different regulatory approach or express congressional authorization to address the same emissions under the same rule framework.
The joint resolution’s effect turns on CRA mechanics: once enacted as law, the rule is void and must be removed from the Code of Federal Regulations, but the scope of the reissuance bar and consequences for existing administrative acts are legally unsettled and likely to prompt litigation or administrative guidance.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Standard joint resolution structure and caption
The resolution opens with the formal enacting language used in congressional joint resolutions and a caption that identifies the subject rule by name and Federal Register citation. That precise citation is the operative identifier: the disapproval applies to the rule published at 89 Fed. Reg. 94886 (Nov. 29, 2024). For practitioners, the exact citation matters because CRA disapprovals are tied to particular submissions to Congress and the Federal Register entry.
Disapproval and nullification of the identified EPA rule
The single substantive sentence states: "Congress disapproves the rule... and such rule shall have no force or effect." This language mirrors the statutory remedy the CRA provides — it annuls the rule rather than amending statutory text or imposing new regulatory duties. Practically, the operative clause requires administrative housekeeping (removal from the CFR) and immediately changes the federal regulatory baseline for the covered source category.
CRA framework and downstream legal effects
By grounding the resolution in chapter 8 of title 5, the text invokes the CRA’s two principal consequences: (1) the rule is void upon enactment; and (2) the agency cannot reissue a substantially similar rule without a new statute. The resolution does not attempt to define the reissuance ban or create exceptions, so implementation and litigation over the "substantially the same" standard are likely to follow.
No explicit treatment of pre-enforcement or pre-compliance actions
The resolution contains no clauses preserving permits, orders, or compliance work done under the disapproved rule. That omission leaves immediate practical questions for regulated facilities (e.g., whether investments made to comply are stranded costs) and for EPA and states (e.g., whether ongoing enforcement proceedings proceed under the voided rule or must be reframed under other authorities). Expect these points to be litigated or handled through separate administrative guidance.
Standard concluding signatures and formality
The resolution concludes with the customary attestation lines for the Speaker of the House and the Vice President as President of the Senate. While purely formal, those lines reflect that this is a joint resolution requiring enactment to have legal effect; they do not, however, add substantive exceptions or procedural variations to the CRA framework.
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Explore Environment in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Rubber tire manufacturers and plants — They avoid complying with the federal NESHAP as published, which reduces near-term capital and operational compliance costs tied to that specific rule framework.
- Industry trade associations and legal counsel for manufacturers — They gain regulatory relief that removes the immediate federal standard and creates negotiating leverage with EPA and states over future regulatory design.
- Smaller tire producers and suppliers with limited compliance budgets — Those firms face reduced short-term financial strain from postponed or cancelled regulatory upgrades tied to the disapproved rule.
Who Bears the Cost
- Communities near rubber tire plants and public-health advocates — They lose the protections the federal rule would have provided, at least until another lawful regulatory approach is implemented.
- EPA and states coordinating on air programs — They face the administrative burden of unwinding a rule, answering compliance/enforcement questions, and potentially crafting alternative regulatory approaches under different legal authorities.
- Firms that already invested to comply with the now-disapproved rule — Those companies may have sunk costs and face financial loss or contract disputes because the statutory text contains no savings clause to protect prior investments.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is straightforward but hard to resolve: the resolution gives Congress a blunt tool to overturn an agency technical rule, restoring legislative control over a policy outcome, but it does so at the expense of regulatory clarity and potentially public-health protections—creating legal and operational uncertainty for agencies, regulated entities, and impacted communities.
The resolution’s brevity is its defining feature and its principal complication. By using the CRA to void the rule without any transitional language, the text forces downstream actors to resolve several knotty questions outside the resolution itself.
First, the effect on administrative acts already taken under the rule — including permit conditions, compliance measures purchased and installed, and enforcement actions initiated — is unclear. Courts have not uniformly resolved whether such acts survive a CRA disapproval, so expect litigation or ad hoc agency guidance to fill the gap.
Second, the statutory ban on reissuing a "substantially the same" rule is intentionally vague. Agencies can respond by pursuing materially different regulatory designs or by relying on alternative statutory authorities, but where the line is drawn between permissible and prohibited changes often becomes a legal battleground.
That uncertainty raises costs for EPA and regulated parties who must weigh litigation risk against policy objectives. Finally, the resolution shifts regulatory authority in practice: states with stricter programs may continue to regulate, while states without parallel measures may see a regulatory vacuum, producing uneven protection across jurisdictions and potential market distortions for firms operating in multiple states.
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