This resolution amends Rule XVII of the House Rules by adding a new clause that requires at least 60 percent of the Members voting, with a quorum present, to approve any resolution to censure or disapprove a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, or to remove such a person from committee membership. The change moves the threshold for those specific disciplinary actions from a simple majority (the historical practice) to a fixed supermajority rule tied to the share of Members who actually vote.
The provision alters how the House enforces member conduct and manages committee assignments. It makes successful discipline or involuntary committee removal more difficult to achieve, shifts bargaining incentives for those pursuing sanctions, and creates procedural levers (quorum and turnout) that can be used strategically by both majority and minority Members.
At a Glance
What It Does
Adds clause 11 to Rule XVII requiring 'not less than 60 percent of the Members voting, a quorum being present' to approve censure, disapproval, or removal from committee membership. The threshold is calculated as a percent of Members who cast a vote on the measure, not as a fraction of the full House.
Who It Affects
Applies to all Representatives, non-voting Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner when the House votes to censure, disapprove, or remove a Member from committee assignments. It also affects House leadership, committee chairs, the House Ethics process, and any Member or group seeking to bring disciplinary measures to the floor.
Why It Matters
Raising the voting bar changes the strategic calculus for bringing discipline: sponsors must secure broader cross-party support or rely on full turnout. The rule reduces the ability of a bare majority to enforce internal sanctions and therefore shifts institutional power toward coalitions and procedural tactics (quorum calls, absences).
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What This Bill Actually Does
The resolution inserts a single, concise rule into the House rulebook: the House may not censure or disapprove a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, nor remove that person from committee membership, unless at least 60 percent of those voting on the question — with a quorum present — vote in favor. The text is limited to that change; it does not create new investigatory procedures, new penalties, or any separate enforcement mechanism beyond the House’s existing voting processes.
Because the threshold is phrased as a percentage of Members voting, the actual number required to reach 60 percent will move with turnout on the specific motion. The clause also explicitly ties the requirement to the presence of a quorum, allowing quorum procedures to interact with the new threshold: if quorum is absent, the vote cannot proceed as framed.
The provision therefore combines two voter-related mechanics (percentage of votes and quorum presence) to set the bar for discipline and committee removal.Operationally, the rule funnels censure, disapproval, and committee removal into a higher-consensus pathway. Sponsors of a disciplinary resolution will need to secure at least 60 percent support among those voting, which typically requires cross-party backing unless the majority has large, reliable margins.
The rule applies uniformly to Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner, so it covers Representatives with full voting rights and non-voting delegates alike when the House addresses internal disciplinary and assignment questions.The amendment does not address other internal remedies: caucus expulsions, committee-led removals under committee rules, or the House’s constitutional power to expel a Member (which requires two-thirds) are not amended by this text. Nor does the resolution specify whether certain procedural votes (e.g., adopting a privileged motion or referring to committee) are subject to the 60 percent requirement; the plain language restricts its effect to resolutions that would 'subject' an individual to censure, disapproval, or committee removal, meaning the primary impact is on final House action to impose those outcomes.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The resolution adds a new clause (designated clause 11) to Rule XVII of the House Rules, creating a standalone rule for these disciplinary actions.
It sets the threshold at 'not less than 60 percent of the Members voting, a quorum being present'—so the numerical requirement varies with how many Members actually vote on the resolution.
The rule covers three distinct outcomes: censure, disapproval, and removal from committee membership; all three now require the same 60% threshold.
Delegates and the Resident Commissioner are explicitly included alongside Representatives, bringing non-voting Members into the same disciplinary standard for these actions.
The clause ties the vote to a quorum being present, meaning quorum-related procedures (calls, objections, or engineered absences) can affect whether and how a vote meets the new threshold.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Creates a 60% supermajority requirement for specific disciplinary votes
This is the operative language: it bars censure, disapproval, or committee-removal votes unless at least 60 percent of Members voting (with a quorum present) approve. Practically, that transforms these actions from decisions a bare majority can impose into measures that require broader support. The text is deliberately brief and does not set procedures for counting abstentions or resolving disputes over whether the vote reached the 60 percent mark, leaving those details to House practice.
Who is covered: Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner
The provision names Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner, so both voting Representatives and non-voting delegations fall under the rule when the House considers censure, disapproval, or committee removal. Including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner avoids a loophole in which non-voting Members could be treated differently for internal discipline, but it raises questions about how their limited floor voting rights intersect with the mechanics of House votes on internal matters.
Threshold calculation tied to 'Members voting' and quorum presence
The clause calculates the 60 percent figure against the subset of Members who actually cast a vote, not the full membership, and conditions the vote on a quorum being present. That design makes turnout and quorum tactics meaningful levers: opponents can attempt to defeat a resolution by reducing turnout among supporters or by contesting quorum. The rule leaves open how to treat 'present but not voting' Members, so customary counting practices and precedent will determine close cases.
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Explore Government in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Individual Members facing sanction: The higher threshold makes it harder to secure a House-imposed censure, disapproval, or committee removal, increasing the protection for Members targeted by intra-House discipline.
- Minority party Members: A supermajority requirement increases the minority’s leverage because their votes become more pivotal to reach 60 percent, enabling them to block or extract concessions.
- Committee members and chairs: The rule reduces the risk that a narrow majority can reshuffle committee rosters via floor removal votes, preserving committee stability and continuity.
- Members seeking negotiated resolutions: Representatives who prefer informal or negotiated remedies gain bargaining power; parties must build wider coalitions rather than rely on simple majority action.
Who Bears the Cost
- Accountability advocates and complainants: Constituents, staff, or outside groups pushing for public discipline may find it substantially harder to secure House action against misconduct.
- Majority party leadership (in some cases): When the majority lacks a consistent supermajority, leaders will need to invest political capital to secure cross-party support, complicating internal discipline.
- House Ethics Committee and investigatory bodies: These bodies may see more deadlocked recommendations or fewer successful enforcement outcomes, which could require retooling remedies outside the floor vote.
- Members pursuing committee realignments: Those who rely on floor votes to remove or punish colleagues for committee-related behavior will face a higher procedural barrier and potential strategic retaliation.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill trades ease of disciplinary action for protection against partisan weaponization: raising the bar reduces the risk that a narrow majority will use censure or committee removal as political tools, but it also makes it materially harder to hold Members accountable, especially in instances where misconduct lacks bipartisan consensus. The central dilemma is whether institutional stability and protection from partisan discipline outweigh the risk that serious misconduct goes unaddressed because the supermajority threshold cannot be met.
The resolution’s brevity produces several implementation questions. First, the phrase 'Members voting' is susceptible to differing interpretations: does it exclude 'present but not voting' Members and how are abstentions counted?
The House’s customary practice will fill that gap, but close cases could produce procedural disputes or challenges to the vote count. Second, tying the requirement to a quorum being present creates an interaction between two procedural devices: opponents can attempt to prevent a valid vote either by denying quorum or by manipulating turnout among those present, meaning minority tactics could become more effective at blocking discipline than under a simple-majority rule.
A second tension arises from scope and remedies left untouched. The clause applies to censure, disapproval, and committee removals but says nothing about committee internal processes, caucus discipline, or expulsion (which the Constitution sets at two-thirds).
That leaves room for parties and committees to shift enforcement toward internal mechanisms not covered by the rule, potentially fragmenting enforcement norms. Finally, including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner raises technical questions because those offices have limited floor voting rights on some matters; applying a uniform disciplinary standard to them may require new precedent about how internal House votes count their participation.
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