The LIABLE Act inserts a new Chapter 97A into Title 28 of the U.S. Code that strips jurisdictional immunity from international organizations in narrowly defined terrorism-related civil suits. Under §1621 the bill permits money-damage claims for personal injury or death caused by specified acts — including torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, and the provision of material support — when those acts are committed by an official, employee, or agent of the organization acting within the scope of employment.
The bill conditions jurisdiction on additional predicates: the international organization must have conspired with or materially supported an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization, and the claimant or victim must be a U.S. national, a member of the U.S. armed forces, a U.S. government employee or contractor acting within scope; alternatively jurisdiction can rest on the organization’s substantial presence in the United States. The Act also sets a 20‑year statute of limitations for such suits and explicitly includes agencies and affiliated entities of international organizations.
At a Glance
What It Does
The Act amends Title 28 by adding §1621 (Chapter 97A), which removes jurisdictional immunity for international organizations in civil suits seeking money damages for death or personal injury caused by enumerated terrorist-type acts committed by organization personnel acting within the scope of their duties. A claim requires proof that the organization conspired with or materially supported a designated foreign terrorist organization, plus a U.S.-connected victim or the organization’s substantial U.S. presence.
Who It Affects
International organizations (and their agencies/affiliates) operating in or connected to the U.S. face potential exposure to tort suits; U.S. nationals, service members, government employees and contractors become eligible plaintiffs in those suits; U.S. federal and state courts will gain jurisdictional authority to adjudicate these claims.
Why It Matters
The bill narrows customary immunity protections that international organizations have enjoyed under the International Organizations Immunities Act, creating a new avenue for accountability tied to terrorism-designated groups. That shift could produce more litigation, require new risk-management by organizations, and raise diplomatic and evidentiary challenges for courts handling transnational terrorism-linked claims.
More articles like this one.
A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.
What This Bill Actually Does
The LIABLE Act works by adding a new chapter to the federal civil jurisdiction statutes. It defines international organization using the existing International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) cross‑reference and explicitly includes agencies and affiliated entities.
Rather than reworking IOIA wholesale, the bill creates a standalone exception to jurisdictional immunity for a narrow set of harms — death or personal injury caused by a list of violent acts or by provision of material support for such acts — when those harms are caused by an organization’s official, employee, or agent acting within the scope of their role.
The Act does not make all torts actionable; it ties liability to two additional conditions. First, the organization itself must have conspired with, materially supported, or otherwise aided and abetted a group already designated as a foreign terrorist organization under INA §219.
Second, the claimant must have a U.S. nexus: the victim or claimant must be a U.S. national, a member of the armed forces, or a U.S. government employee/contractor acting within scope — unless the organization has a substantial presence in the United States, in which case jurisdiction may be asserted on that ground instead. Those predicates create both jurisdictional and merits hurdles that plaintiffs must satisfy before a court will hear the case.On timing, the Act prescribes a 20‑year limitations window measured from the date the cause of action arose.
Mechanically, courts will be asked to police the scope-of-employment question for international organization personnel, evaluate allegations that an organization conspired with or materially supported a designated FTO, and interpret what qualifies as a substantial presence in the United States. The Act deliberately references existing definitions in §1605A for certain terms (like material support and extrajudicial killing), so courts will import those statutory meanings and precedent when resolving disputes under §1621.Finally, the bill includes a technical amendment to the table of chapters in Title 28 to add the new chapter number.
It does not change available remedies beyond money damages nor does it alter criminal liability or grant new criminal enforcement tools; it simply creates a civil cause of action opportunity where immunity would otherwise block suit.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill inserts Chapter 97A (§1621) into Title 28 to create a terrorism exception to international-organization immunity for money-damage claims tied to death or personal injury.
Liability attaches only where the injury was caused by torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support for such acts, and the perpetrator was an official, employee, or agent acting within scope.
A court may hear a claim only if the international organization conspired with or materially supported an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization, and the claimant/victim has a U.S. nexus (U.S. national, armed forces member, U.S. government employee/contractor) or the organization has substantial presence in the U.S.
The Act sets a statute of limitations of 20 years from the date the cause of action arose for suits under §1621.
The definition of international organization expressly includes agencies and affiliated entities, and the Act draws key term definitions from existing §1605A precedent.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title: LIABLE Act
Provides the Act’s short name (Limiting Immunity for Assisting Backers of Lethal Extremism Act or LIABLE Act). Its only legal effect is to label the statute for citation; no substantive rules flow from this short-title clause.
Creates a terrorism exception to jurisdictional immunity
Adds a new statutory scheme that removes jurisdictional immunity for international organizations in specified terrorism-related civil suits seeking money damages for death or personal injury. The provision applies when an organization’s official, employee, or agent, acting within the scope of employment, causes the covered harm; courts are thus tasked with assessing scope-of-employment during threshold immunity disputes. By design, the provision references and imports several definitions from §1605A, ensuring consistency with prior terrorism-liability jurisprudence.
Predicate requirements for hearing claims
Sets two interlocking predicates before a court will hear a claim: (1) the international organization must have conspired with, materially supported, or otherwise aided and abetted an entity already designated as a foreign terrorist organization under INA §219; and (2) the claimant or victim must be a U.S. national, a U.S. armed forces member, or a U.S. government employee/contractor acting within scope — unless the organization is based in or has a substantial presence in the United States, in which case jurisdiction can be grounded on that presence. Those predicates serve both to limit the pool of actionable cases and to focus jurisdiction on U.S.-connected harms or organizations with significant U.S. ties.
Limitations period and technical updates
Establishes a 20‑year statute of limitations for causes of action under §1621, measured from when the cause of action arose. Also updates the Title 28 chapter table to include the new Chapter 97A. The statutory text does not specify remedies beyond money damages or add criminal penalties; its scope is strictly civil and jurisdictional.
This bill is one of many.
Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Foreign Affairs across all five countries.
Explore Foreign Affairs in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. victims and families of covered acts — they gain a new path to money-damage relief against international organizations when the statutory predicates are met, potentially improving access to civil remedies for deaths or injuries tied to listed terrorist acts.
- Plaintiffs’ attorneys and civil litigators — the Act creates litigation opportunities to bring transnational tort claims against international organizations and their affiliates when FTO-support predicates and U.S. nexus requirements exist.
- Advocacy groups focused on accountability — organizations that press for redress and deterrence of terrorism-linked harms gain a statutory basis to pursue institutional accountability beyond state or criminal channels.
- U.S. government contractors and employees harmed overseas — the Act explicitly covers U.S. government personnel and contractors acting within the scope of employment, widening the set of plaintiffs who can establish U.S. jurisdiction.
Who Bears the Cost
- International organizations and their agencies/affiliates — they face increased litigation exposure, potential judgments, and higher compliance and insurance costs, and may need to reassess employment practices and oversight of staff actions.
- U.S. diplomatic and foreign-policy apparatus — the State Department and related actors may shoulder the burden of responding to immunity disputes, managing diplomatic fallout, and balancing litigation exposure with operational priorities abroad.
- U.S. courts and litigators — federal and state courts will see more complex jurisdictional and merits fights involving classified evidence, extraterritorial conduct, and tangled corporate/organizational structures, increasing docket and evidentiary burdens.
- Humanitarian or operational programs run by or with international organizations — programs could be chilled if organizations curtail activities or tighten staff delegations to reduce liability risk, potentially affecting aid delivery or multilateral cooperation.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is accountability versus functionality: the bill expands victims’ access to civil remedies by piercing organizational immunity for grave terrorism-linked harms, but doing so risks impairing the functional immunities that let international organizations operate and cooperate across borders — a trade-off between justice for victims and preserving the international institutions and activities those immunities were designed to protect.
The Act creates several implementation and doctrinal challenges. First, proving that an international organization ‘‘conspired with’’ or ‘‘materially supported’’ a designated foreign terrorist organization imports complex factual inquiries and may hinge on classified intelligence or foreign‑policy determinations.
Courts will have to reconcile evidentiary rules and state‑secrets protections with plaintiffs’ need to prove links between an IO and an FTO. Second, the statute relies on scope‑of‑employment and ‘‘substantial presence’’ doctrines that are underdeveloped in the context of international organizations; litigants and courts will face fights over whether personnel actions abroad fall within an IO official’s duties and what level of U.S. activity counts as substantial presence.
The carve‑out sits uneasily beside the International Organizations Immunities Act, which grants broad immunities to IOs. Though §1621 is drafted as an exception ‘‘in any case not otherwise covered’’ by IOIA, disputes will arise about overlap with IOIA waivers, treaty obligations, and bilateral privileges.
There is also a practical policy trade‑off: exposing IOs to civil liability for terrorism-linked acts may increase accountability but could also prompt organizations to withdraw or rework risky programmes, contract differently, or demand indemnities — outcomes that could reduce operational flexibility in crisis zones. Finally, the 20‑year limitations period is long enough to revive old claims, raising difficult questions about evidence decay and the reconstruction of historical chains of support.
Try it yourself.
Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.