Codify — Article

NEDD Act of 2025: DOE UAS exemptions from foreign-entity bans

Expands DOE authority to procure, operate, and fund unmanned aircraft for nuclear security, with new exemptions from foreign-entity prohibitions.

The Brief

SB1762, the Nuclear Ecosystem Drone Defense Act of 2025, seeks to add the Department of Energy to a set of exemptions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 related to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from covered foreign entities. The bill would insert the Secretary of Energy into sections that ban procurement, operation, and use of UAS sourced from foreign entities, effectively allowing DOE more latitude to obtain and deploy drones for nuclear-security purposes.

It also authorizes DOE to determine usage of classified tracking for UAS and provides an accounting exception for the Department. Finally, the act expands DOE’s authority under the Atomic Energy Defense Act to cover certain nuclear facilities and assets from UAS, including non-nuclear components used in nuclear weapons.

Why it matters: the bill centralizes drone-enabled defense of nuclear assets within the DOE lane, potentially speeding procurement and deployment of UAS and tracking capabilities. The changes sit at the intersection of national security, procurement controls, and interagency coordination, and they raise questions about oversight, foreign-sourcing risk, and the scope of DOE’s new authorities across procurement, funding, and facility protection.

At a Glance

What It Does

Adds the Secretary of Energy to NDAA 2024 prohibitions related to UAS from covered foreign entities, across procurement (1823), operation (1824), and use of federal funds (1825). It also authorizes DOE to determine usage of classified tracking (1827) and inserts DOE into related accounting exceptions (1827(c)). Additionally, it expands DOE authority under the Atomic Energy Defense Act to protect nuclear facilities and assets from UAS, including non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons.

Who It Affects

Federal agencies involved in UAS programs, DOE and its contractors, and facilities housing special nuclear material. The changes touch procurement and operation pathways for UAS from foreign entities and affect defense, energy security, and infrastructure protection programs.

Why It Matters

Establishes DOE as a central actor in drone-based nuclear security, potentially accelerating drone-enabled protective measures while requiring new governance to manage interagency and international implications.

More articles like this one.

A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.

Unsubscribe anytime.

What This Bill Actually Does

The Nuclear Ecosystem Drone Defense Act of 2025 would insert the Department of Energy into existing NDAA 2024 restrictions on unmanned aircraft systems when those systems come from covered foreign entities. By amending multiple sections (1823(b), 1824(b), and 1825(b)), the bill would allow DOE to procure, operate, and use UAS from sources that would otherwise be prohibited.

It also authorizes the DOE to determine how classified tracking information is used in relation to these UAS, and it makes an accounting exception for DOE-related UAS activities. In the realm of nuclear security, the act expands DOE authority under the Atomic Energy Defense Act (specifically 4510(e)(1)(C)) to cover facilities and assets—whether owned by the United States or contracted to it—from unmanned aircraft, including non-nuclear components used in nuclear weapons, broadening protection and surveillance capabilities.

In practical terms, the bill would narrow the regulatory friction for DOE when acquiring and operating UAS for nuclear-security purposes, while still aligning with broader defense and safety objectives. It does not create new funding, but it does set a legal pathway for DOE to leverage drone technology and tracking infrastructure more freely in the protection of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials.

The proposal is narrowly tailored to DOE’s mission, leaving other agencies’ restrictions largely intact, and it anticipates interagency coordination around classified-tracking data and accounting practices.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

The bill adds the Secretary of Energy to NDAA 2024 prohibitions on UAS from covered foreign entities for procurement, operation, and use.

2

It amends Sections 1823(b), 1824(b), and 1825(b) to insert DOE after the Secretary of State.

3

It grants DOE authority to determine usage of classified tracking for UAS (Section 1827(b)).

4

It inserts the Department of Energy into the accounting exception related to UAS (Section 1827(c)).

5

It expands DOE protection authority under the Atomic Energy Defense Act to include non-nuclear components used in nuclear weapons (Section 4510(e)(1)(C)).

Section-by-Section Breakdown

Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections. Expand all ↓

Section 2(a)

Exemption from procurement prohibitions

Section 1823(b) is amended to insert the Secretary of Energy after the Secretary of State, creating an exemption framework that allows DOE to procure Covered UAS from entities that would otherwise be restricted. This broadens the set of suppliers and technologies DOE can acquire to support nuclear-security missions, subject to the same underlying legal and national-security constraints that govern other agencies’ drone programs.

Section 2(b)

Exemption from operation prohibitions

Section 1824(b) is amended in the same way to permit DOE to operate Covered UAS sourced from foreign entities that would normally be prohibited. The operational allowances enable DOE to deploy drones for monitoring, risk assessment, and protective measures around nuclear facilities or assets, with the expectation of accompanying safeguards and oversight.

Section 2(c)

Exemption from use of federal funds

Section 1825(b) is amended to allow the use of federal funds for procurement and operation of Covered UAS by the Secretary of Energy, ensuring the financial pathway for DOE drone initiatives aligned with national-security objectives while preserving existing funding controls and accountability mechanisms.

3 more sections
Section 2(d)

DOE authority on classified-tracking usage

Section 1827(b) is amended to replace a DOE designee reference with the Secretary of Energy or their designee, clarifying who may determine the use of classified tracking for UAS. This centralizes decision-making within DOE for tracking and monitoring technologies integral to nuclear-security operations.

Section 2(e)

Accounting exception for DOE

Section 1827(c) is amended to insert the Department of Energy into the accounting exception alongside other agencies, ensuring DOE-specific financial and audit considerations are recognized in the context of UAS programs and tracking expenditures.

Section 2(f)

Expansion of DOE protection authority (AEC Act)

Section 4510(e)(1)(C) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended to broaden DOE protections for U.S.-owned or U.S.-contracted facilities and assets, explicitly covering storage, transport, or use of special nuclear material and expanding to include research, design, manufacture, or production of non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons. This expands the scope of UAS-related protective measures around critical nuclear capabilities.

At scale

This bill is one of many.

Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Defense across all five countries.

Explore Defense in Codify Search →

Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration programs receive explicit procurement and operational latitude for UAS to defend nuclear facilities and assets.
  • DOE contractors and security-focused service providers gain new avenues to deploy drone and tracking solutions in nuclear-security contexts, enabling mission-specific deployments.
  • Federal agencies coordinating nuclear security (e.g., DHS, DoD) benefit from clarified interagency alignment and shared use of UAS technologies in national-security operations.
  • Nuclear facilities and sensitive materials programs gain formal protection capabilities leveraging UAS and tracking systems.

Who Bears the Cost

  • DOE and its contractors will incur compliance, oversight, and potential integration costs to implement new UAS authorities.
  • Other federal agencies may face interface and governance complexities due to the DOE-specific exemptions added to NDAA 2024 prohibitions.
  • Budgets may need to accommodate procurement, maintenance, and upgrade of UAS and associated tracking infrastructure, potentially drawing from security or defense funding pools.
  • There may be increased scrutiny and administrative workload for audits and accountability around foreign-source UAS contracting and operations.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

Balancing expanded DOE drone-enabled nuclear-security capabilities against the risk of eroding foreign-entity prohibitions and broadening DOE authority beyond existing safeguards, with insufficient detail on oversight and implementation.

The bill tightens the focus on nuclear-security drone capabilities by privileging DOE as a central actor in UAS procurement and protection. That focus raises questions about interagency balance, oversight of foreign-source drone technology, and the appropriate scope of DOE authority relative to other national-security bodies.

A critical question is whether DOE’s expanded latitude could erode existing checks on foreign-source procurements or create new gaps in governance for drone-derived data, tracking, and operations. The language does not specify safeguards, reporting timelines, or thresholds for risk, leaving important implementation details to future rulemaking or agency guidance.

A second tension concerns the expansion under the Atomic Energy Defense Act to cover non-nuclear components used in nuclear weapons. While this broadens protective capabilities, it also broadens the regulatory footprint of U.S. nuclear-weapon-related programs and could implicate a wider array of suppliers and technologies.

Without explicit guardrails or sunset clauses, the bill risks introducing long-term changes to procurement and security practices based on a narrowly defined policy objective. The central policy trade-off is between stronger protective capabilities for nuclear assets and the potential for scope creep or misalignment with other foreign-entity restrictions across the federal drone ecosystem.

Try it yourself.

Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.