SB2115 (Safe and Open Streets Act) amends 18 U.S.C. §1951 to add a new subsection that criminalizes purposely obstructing, delaying, or otherwise affecting commerce by blocking a public road or highway. The change makes attempts and conspiracies to do so federal offenses, punishable by fines and up to five years in prison.
The bill also strips language referencing “threats or violence” from the section heading and several cross-references, broadening the statute’s drafting and signaling a shift toward treating physical blockades of roadways as standalone federal interference with commerce. The change has practical consequences for protest policing, interstate logistics, and federal-state prosecutorial choices because it creates a clearer federal charging option tied to movement of goods and people on public roads.
At a Glance
What It Does
SB2115 inserts a new subsection into 18 U.S.C. §1951 that makes it a federal crime to purposely obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by blocking a public road or highway, and it covers attempts and conspiracies. Conviction can bring a fine and up to five years imprisonment.
Who It Affects
The bill directly affects people who organize or participate in road blockades, federal and local prosecutors deciding whether to bring federal charges, transportation and logistics firms whose routes are disrupted, and law enforcement agencies responsible for clearing obstructions.
Why It Matters
By adding an express road-blocking offense to the Hobbs Act framework and removing language limiting the statute to threats or violence, the bill expands the scope of federal interference-with-commerce prosecutions and creates a clearer federal option for responding to demonstrations that block public ways.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill creates a specific federal offense tied to the movement of goods and people: if someone 'purposely' blocks a public road or highway in a way that obstructs, delays, or otherwise affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, they can be prosecuted under federal law. The statute applies to completed acts as well as attempts and conspiracies, and it carries a maximum prison term of five years plus whatever fines the courts impose.
That single paragraph folds the act of blocking into federal interference-with-commerce law rather than leaving such conduct solely to state or local law enforcement.
SB2115 also cleans up statutory language that previously limited some federal provisions to cases involving 'threats or violence.' The bill redesignates the existing subsections in §1951 and adjusts cross-references in Title 5 and Title 18 to remove those phrases. Practically, that alteration reduces textual friction when prosecutors try to apply §1951 to nonviolent blockades; it is a drafting change with operational effects because it eliminates textual arguments that the statute only covers violent or threatening conduct.The new offense relies on a purposeful mental state, which narrows the statute to actors who intend to obstruct commerce rather than to those whose presence incidentally slows traffic.
But the statutory phrase 'in any way or degree' signals Congress intends to cover even relatively modest disruptions if the defendant's purpose was to affect commerce. The statute ties federal jurisdiction to commerce or the movement of articles or commodities, which preserves a federal nexus test but invites litigation over when local roadway slowdowns reach the requisite interstate or commercial impact.Enforcement will depend on charging decisions and resource allocations.
Federal prosecutors can use the new subsection to bring cases that previously would have been lodged in state courts or handled administratively; that shift could change plea bargaining leverage and sentencing outcomes. The text does not create new investigatory powers or immunity for law enforcement; it simply creates a standalone federal offense and updates cross-references so related penalties and definitions align with the new language.
The Five Things You Need to Know
SB2115 inserts a new subsection (b) into 18 U.S.C. §1951 creating the offense 'Interference with commerce by blocking public roads.', The statute criminalizes purposeful obstruction, delay, or other effects on commerce caused by blocking a public road or highway, and it explicitly covers attempts and conspiracies.
Conviction under the new subsection exposes a defendant to a fine, imprisonment for up to five years, or both.
The bill removes the phrase 'by threats or violence' from the §1951 heading and amends related cross-references in Title 5 and Title 18, broadening the textual scope beyond violent or threatening conduct.
The offense requires a commerce nexus—the obstruction must affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce—but uses the broad qualifier 'in any way or degree,' which lowers the threshold for what counts as an effect on commerce.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short title
Declares the bill's citation as the 'Safe and Open Streets Act.' This is a technical placement; the title signals congressional intent to emphasize keeping streets open for commerce and travel, which frames judicial interpretation even though it carries no legal force.
Insertion of new subsection into 18 U.S.C. §1951
Adds subsection (b) to §1951 to create a standalone federal offense for purposely obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce by blocking a public road or highway; it also covers attempts and conspiracies. Practically, this establishes a federal charging statute tailored to roadway obstructions rather than relying on broader or tangential statutes; prosecutors can cite this specific text when alleging protest activity or intentional blockades that disrupt commercial movement.
Redesignation of existing subsections
Redesignates the preexisting subsections (b) and (c) of §1951 as (c) and (d). This preserves the existing statutory structure while inserting the new offense, which minimizes downstream numbering disruption in statutory citations and preserves the rest of §1951's penalties and defenses.
Conforming amendments across titles
Amends the section heading of §1951 to remove the words 'by threats or violence' and edits the table of sections accordingly. It also amends Title 5 (5 U.S.C. §8332(o)(2)(B)(xx)) and parts of Title 18 (including changes to section 1961(1) and section 2516(1)(c)) to strike similar phrasing. Those edits reduce textual constraints that might be used to argue the statute applies only to violent or threatening conduct, effectively aligning cross-references with the new, broader wording.
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Explore Criminal Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Interstate carriers and logistics firms: The statute gives shippers and carriers a clearer federal remedy when blockades delay or reroute freight, potentially shortening disruptions and improving loss recovery when federal enforcement intervenes.
- Federal prosecutors and law enforcement: The bill supplies a targeted federal charging option tailored to road blockades, simplifying case drafting and increasing leverage in negotiations where interstate commerce is affected.
- State and local governments responsible for traffic management: Municipalities get an additional legal avenue to request federal assistance in clearing prolonged blockades that strain local resources or choke major transportation corridors.
Who Bears the Cost
- Protest organizers and participants: Individuals who intentionally block public roads face new federal criminal exposure (attempts and conspiracies included), increasing legal risk and potential incarceration compared with solely local enforcement options.
- Defense counsel and civil-rights organizations: Increased federal prosecutions will require additional defense resources and may shift litigation strategies toward constitutional challenges, mounting costs for legal defense and advocacy groups.
- State courts and local law enforcement budgets: The law may produce intergovernmental friction—states might shoulder immediate enforcement costs while federal prosecutors decide whether to take cases, and some matters may still land in state court, creating coordination burdens.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is balancing two legitimate objectives: protecting interstate commerce and public safety by deterring roadway blockades, versus safeguarding political expression and protest tactics that may temporarily impede traffic without violent intent; the bill narrows mens rea but widens factual reach, resolving one problem while heightening the risk of chilling lawful demonstrations and raising federalism concerns.
The statute's reliance on a 'purposeful' mental state narrows coverage to actors who intend to affect commerce, but the insertion of the phrase 'in any way or degree' expands the factual scenarios that can meet the commerce-impact element. That combination creates a litigation battleground: prosecutors can argue small or temporary road closures qualify if the defendant intended to affect movement of goods or people, while defenders will press that isolated, local slowdowns lack a sufficient commercial nexus.
Courts will need to reconcile the mens rea requirement with a potentially broad factual reach for the commerce element.
The bill also raises First Amendment and federalism questions. Criminalizing deliberate blockades targets conduct commonly used in demonstrations; courts will have to sort out when expressive conduct crosses the line into unprotected criminal obstruction.
At the same time, the law creates an explicit federal option that may displace or duplicate state and local charges, producing coordination and venue issues. Finally, removing 'by threats or violence' from cross-references reduces an argument that §1951 required violent means, but it may invite constitutional or statutory challenges claiming the statute is overbroad or vague in contexts involving nonviolent protest.
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