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Bill bars enforcement in U.S. courts of foreign judgments tied to U.S. sanctions

Stops foreign courts and arbitral panels from using U.S. sanctions as a basis to collect against U.S. persons, and forces removal and dismissal of enforcement actions in U.S. courts.

The Brief

This bill adds a new section to Title 28 that prevents private parties (other than the United States itself or agents acting for it) from enforcing foreign judgments or foreign arbitral awards in U.S. state or federal courts when those awards arise from disputes caused by compliance with U.S. sanctions or when the foreign tribunal based jurisdiction on U.S. sanctions or foreign laws enacted in response to them. It also gives any defendant the right to remove an enforcement action to federal court, and requires dismissal.

The measure is aimed at shielding U.S. persons — companies, banks, insurers, contractors and individuals — from having to pay damages or accede to awards that flow from their attempts to obey U.S. sanctions and export-control rules. If enacted, it reshapes the remedies available to foreign claimants and inserts a statutory bar that will affect how private international disputes tied to sanctions are litigated and enforced in the United States.

At a Glance

What It Does

Creates 28 U.S.C. §1660 to bar private enforcement in U.S. courts of foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards when the underlying claim arises from actions taken to comply with U.S. sanctions or when a foreign tribunal asserted jurisdiction based on U.S sanctions or foreign laws enacted in response to them. It allows defendants to remove such enforcement suits to federal court and requires dismissal.

Who It Affects

Directly affects foreign plaintiffs seeking to collect against U.S. persons through U.S. courts or U.S.-based assets, U.S. companies and financial institutions that comply with sanctions, and arbitration and litigation counsel who enforce cross-border awards. It also matters to banks, insurers, contractors with sanctioned-party exposure, and judges asked to apply the new statutory bar.

Why It Matters

The bill substitutes a statutory public-policy bar for ordinary comity and treaty-based enforcement practice, potentially insulating U.S. actors from foreign enforcement while inviting legal challenges over treaty conflicts, proof standards, and the limits of judicial review. For practitioners, it changes enforcement risk calculations and may shift disputes away from U.S. enforcement venues.

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What This Bill Actually Does

The bill places a categorical limitation on private attempts to collect foreign judgments and arbitral awards in U.S. courts when those awards are tied to U.S. sanctions. It covers two pathways: where the claim exists because a U.S. person took steps to comply with sanctions that made contract performance impossible or materially impaired it; and where the foreign court or arbitral tribunal grounded its jurisdiction on the fact that U.S. sanctions or foreign responses to them applied.

The limitation applies in both state and federal courts and targets enforcement actions — not necessarily the original foreign litigation that produced the judgment or award.

Procedurally, the bill makes enforcement suits removable to federal court by any defendant and requires dismissal of those suits once removed. That combination eliminates state-court enforcement relief as a practical route for affected foreign claimants and funnels disputes into a single, dismissal-bound federal process.The statute preserves several narrow categories of relief: actions brought by the United States (or its agents); statutory causes of action for victims of terrorism, torture, and similar crimes specified by the text; and contractual claims where the parties agreed to litigate or arbitrate within the United States.

The bill defines “United States sanctions” broadly — including prohibitions under IEEPA and other export-control authorities — but explicitly excludes ordinary import duties.Finally, the bill applies to civil enforcement actions pending on or after enactment, so parties with existing enforcement proceedings in U.S. courts would face a statutory bar and mandatory dismissal once the law takes effect. That retroactive reach is explicit and will produce immediate litigation over which pending matters fall within the new exclusion.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

The bill adds 28 U.S.C. §1660 to block private enforcement of foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards tied to compliance with U.S. sanctions or to foreign tribunals that asserted jurisdiction based on U.S. sanctions or foreign laws enacted in response to them.

2

Any defendant to a U.S. action to recognize or enforce such a foreign judgment or award may remove the case to federal district court, and the statute requires the federal court to dismiss the action.

3

The statute carves out specific exceptions: enforcement actions by the U.S. government or its agents; causes of action for victims of terrorism, torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking under enumerated statutes; and disputes where parties agreed to U.S. litigation or arbitration venues.

4

The bill defines “United States sanctions” to include prohibitions imposed under section 203 of IEEPA and other statutory authorities (including export controls), while clarifying that import duties are not covered.

5

The law expressly applies to civil enforcement actions pending on or after enactment, so existing recognition/enforcement proceedings in U.S. courts are subject to the new bar and mandatory dismissal.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Section 1

Short title

Provides the act’s name, “Protecting Americans from Russian Litigation Act of 2025.” This is purely captioning but signals the legislative focus on litigation tied to sanctions and foreign-state responses; practitioners should note the title when tracking related statutory citations and bill histories.

Section 2

Statement of policy

Sets out Congress’s policy goals: protect U.S. persons from disadvantage when complying with sanctions and prevent foreign parties from recovering for harms caused by such compliance. The policy language is non-operative but frames statutory interpretation — courts may use it to resolve ambiguity, especially on questions like whether a particular enforcement action ‘resulted from’ compliance with sanctions.

Section 3(a) — Limitation on enforcement

Bar on enforcement of certain foreign judgments and awards

Adds §1660(a), which forbids private parties (other than the United States or its agents) from bringing civil actions in state or federal court to enforce foreign judgments or arbitral awards when the claim stems from actions to comply with U.S. sanctions that impeded contract performance, or when the foreign tribunal asserted jurisdiction based on U.S sanctions or foreign laws enacted in response. Operationally this converts a public-policy exception into a statutory prohibition and applies to both court judgments and arbitral awards.

2 more sections
Section 3(b) — Removal and dismissal

Removal right and mandatory dismissal

Creates a procedural hook: any defendant may remove a recognition/enforcement action covered by §1660 to federal district court, and the federal court must dismiss the case. That removes state-court avenues and prevents federal courts from engaging in prolonged enforcement litigation in these matters; dismissal is mandatory rather than discretionary, reducing avenues for judicial balancing.

Section 3(c)–(d) and application

Exceptions, definitions, and retroactivity

Section 3(c) lists construction rules that preserve (1) executive-branch authority (including OFAC), (2) certain statutory causes of action for terrorism and related crimes (referencing chapter 97, chapter 113B of title 18, and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act), and (3) contractual disputes where parties chose U.S. courts or arbitration in the U.S. Section 3(d) defines “United States sanctions” to include IEEPA-based measures and other statutory or export-control prohibitions while excluding import duties. A separate application clause makes §1660 applicable to enforcement actions pending on or after enactment, so the statute has explicit retroactive effect on ongoing proceedings.

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Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • U.S.-based companies and financial institutions that complied with sanctions — they gain a statutory shield against foreign judgments or awards aimed at collecting losses tied to their compliance decisions, lowering the risk that obedience to U.S. law will produce enforceable foreign liabilities.
  • U.S. government and its agents — the bill preserves the Executive’s enforcement and sanctions authorities and reduces the chance that private foreign litigation will impede diplomatic or national-security objectives.
  • In-house and outside counsel for U.S. persons — the law reduces exposure to transnational enforcement risk and simplifies advice about enforcement vulnerability and asset protection strategies, at least for litigation connected to sanctions compliance.
  • Contracting parties who negotiated U.S. forum or U.S.-based arbitration clauses — the bill preserves agreed-upon dispute-resolution avenues in the United States, strengthening the value of U.S. forum selection in contracts.

Who Bears the Cost

  • Foreign litigants and award creditors — companies and claimants abroad (including Russian entities and others) lose a major enforcement route against U.S.-connected assets and may be unable to collect on otherwise valid foreign judgments or awards.
  • International arbitration institutions and counsel — the measure weakens the practical effectiveness of arbitral awards where the losing party holds U.S. assets or where enforcement in the U.S. was expected, reducing arbitration’s enforceability leverage in certain sanctions-related disputes.
  • U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms and U.S.-based assets belonging to foreign parties — those assets may remain insulated from foreign claimants, prompting foreign plaintiffs to pursue more aggressive discovery or attachment abroad or to seek non-U.S. enforcement venues.
  • U.S. courts and judges — the mandatory dismissal rule shifts the burden to federal court to process removals and dismissals, and invites follow-on litigation (e.g., constitutional or treaty-based challenges) about the statute’s limits and applicability.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The central dilemma is straightforward: the bill prioritizes national-security and foreign-policy goals by protecting U.S. persons from foreign collection efforts tied to compliance with sanctions, but doing so undermines the predictability and enforceability of international dispute-resolution mechanisms and risks conflicts with treaty obligations and principles of international comity.

The bill trades one predictable legal problem for several difficult questions. First, it raises potential friction with international treaty commitments that govern arbitration enforcement — most prominently the New York Convention — by converting a public-policy exception into a statutory bar.

If enforcement is flatly prohibited by statute, courts will face early constitutional and statutory-preemption challenges: can Congress pass a domestic law that effectively nullifies treaty-based obligations? Courts will have to reconcile the statute with treaty duties, and that litigation will determine whether §1660 survives in full or in part.

Second, the operative text leaves significant interpretive work to judges. The statute bars enforcement when the claim “resulted from” actions to comply with sanctions, and when foreign tribunals based jurisdiction on U.S. sanctions or foreign laws enacted in response.

Those phrases are fact-intensive and ambiguous: how close a causal link counts as “resulted from”? Must a U.S. defendant prove subjective good faith to trigger the bar even though the operative text does not state a ‘good faith’ requirement?

Who bears the burden of proof? Expect extensive discovery disputes and doctrinal fights over causation, proximate cause, and the appropriate evidentiary standard.

Finally, the mandatory removal-and-dismissal mechanism is blunt. It removes state-court friction but eliminates judicial discretion to refuse enforcement in narrowly tailored cases where comity or treaty obligations might counsel otherwise.

The retroactive sweep to pending cases compounds these concerns, creating lobbying and litigation pressure and producing international responses — foreign states may adjust their own enforcement tools, treaties, or reciprocal measures. Practitioners should anticipate strategic forum-shifting, creative claims to avoid the statute’s reach, and collateral litigation about the statute’s application and constitutionality.

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