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SB 3746 bars public-assistance recipients from sending remittance transfers, adds $100,000 fine

Requires written declaration under penalty of perjury and ties remittance ban to the EFTA remittance definition — raises enforcement, scope, and constitutional questions for agencies and recipients.

The Brief

SB 3746 makes receipt of certain federal public assistance conditional on a written promise not to send remittance transfers while receiving benefits. Applicants and reapplicants must sign a declaration under penalty of perjury; a breach carries a flat $100,000 fine.

The bill reaches across the listed public assistance programs in 20 C.F.R. 416.1142(a) and borrows the remittance-transfer definition from the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(g)). It takes effect for benefits provided more than 30 days after enactment, creating near-immediate operational and legal questions for benefit administrators, compliance teams, recipients, and remittance providers.

At a Glance

What It Does

The bill requires heads of federal agencies that administer enumerated public assistance programs to obtain a written declaration from applicants and reapplicants that they will not make any remittance transfer while they receive benefits. If a recipient signs the declaration and later makes a remittance transfer during the benefit period, the bill imposes a $100,000 fine on the individual.

Who It Affects

The requirement applies to recipients of the public-assistance programs referenced by cross‑reference to 20 C.F.R. 416.1142(a)(1),(2),(3),(4),(5),(7) — not all federal benefits — and to the federal agencies that administer those programs, which must collect declarations. It also touches remittance providers because the definition of 'remittance transfer' is the same as under the EFTA.

Why It Matters

This statute inserts a criminal-style enforcement device (perjury declaration plus a large civil fine) into routine benefits administration and ties program compliance to an existing federal definition of remittances. That combination creates novel administrative, privacy, and compliance demands with potentially large downstream legal and operational costs.

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What This Bill Actually Does

SB 3746 makes two simple-looking moves that create disproportionate operational complexity. First, it requires anyone applying or reapplying for a covered public assistance payment to sign a written statement, under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C. 1746), promising not to make any remittance transfer while they receive benefits.

Second, the bill makes violation of that promise a basis for a $100,000 fine.

The bill does not itself define which programs are covered; instead it points to paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) of 20 C.F.R. 416.1142(a) “as in effect on the date of enactment.” That cross-reference fixes the covered program list at the regulatory text in effect on enactment rather than in statute, which can make the scope depend on current regulatory wording and leaves ambiguity about whether later regulatory amendments change coverage.'Remittance transfer' is incorporated by reference to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act’s definition (15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(g)), so the prohibition reaches transfers that meet that federal consumer-protection definition — typically consumer-initiated international money transfers handled by remittance providers and financial institutions. The bill is explicit that agencies must collect the declaration on application and reapplication; it does not provide a statutory enforcement mechanism describing how agencies detect remittance transfers, how fines are imposed or collected, or whether there are administrative appeal rights.The statute’s effective date applies to any payment provided more than 30 days after enactment, which gives agencies only a short lead time to add forms, notice language, and any verification processes.

Because the bill ties penalties directly to a signed perjury statement, it creates exposure to criminal‑style consequences (perjury potential under 28 U.S.C. 1746) and a large civil penalty, but leaves the practical processes for monitoring, proof, and collection unspecified.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

The bill conditions receipt of covered public assistance on signing a written declaration, under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C. 1746), that the recipient will not make any remittance transfer while receiving benefits.

2

A recipient who signs the required declaration and then makes a remittance transfer while receiving benefits faces a statutory fine of $100,000.

3

The term 'remittance transfer' is adopted by reference to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act’s definition (15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(g)), bringing consumer remittance providers and covered financial transfers within scope.

4

Coverage of 'public assistance program' is determined by cross-reference to paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) of 20 C.F.R. 416.1142(a) as in effect on the date of enactment, fixing program scope to the regulatory text at enactment.

5

The rule applies to any payment or benefit provided after the date that is 30 days following enactment, giving agencies limited time to implement new declaration collection and compliance procedures.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Section 1

Short title

Designates the Act as the 'Stopping Transfers of Public Funds Abroad Act.' This is purely stylistic, but the title signals the bill’s policy aim and how agencies, courts, and practitioners will refer to it in regulations and litigation.

Section 2(a)(1)

Declaration requirement for applicants and reapplicants

Requires the head of any federal agency that administers a covered public-assistance program to require an applicant or reapplicant to provide a written declaration — executed under penalty of perjury per 28 U.S.C. 1746 — that the applicant will not transfer funds through a remittance transfer while receiving payments. Practically, agencies must add a form or a certification box to existing intake processes and determine how to present, store, and verify those declarations within confidentiality and records-retention regimes.

Section 2(a)(2)

Monetary penalty on recipients for breach

Imposes a flat $100,000 fine on any individual who signs the declaration and subsequently makes a remittance transfer while receiving benefits. The text does not specify the procedural path to impose or collect the fine (administrative collection, civil suit, referral to Treasury, etc.), nor does it create a waiver, exception, or scaled penalty — the fine is categorical.

2 more sections
Section 2(b)

Definitions: covered programs and remittance transfers

Defines 'public assistance program' by cross-referencing specific paragraphs of 20 C.F.R. 416.1142(a) as of the enactment date, and imports the EFTA’s definition of 'remittance transfer' (15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(g)). Using regulatory cross-reference locks the list of covered programs to the regulatory text in effect at enactment, which affects legal interpretation and the set of beneficiaries subject to the prohibition.

Section 2(c)

Effective date

Makes the prohibition and declaration requirement apply to any payment or other benefit provided after the date that is 30 days following enactment. Agencies therefore have a short implementation window to modify forms, notices, and procedures; payments already provided before that window are not retroactively affected.

At scale

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Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Federal program integrity offices and agency administrators — they receive a statutory tool (a signed declaration and a high-dollar penalty) intended to deter use of benefits for remittance transfers, which centralizes an enforcement lever in the administering agency.
  • Policymakers focused on restricting cross-border flows of program funds — the statute offers a clearly identifiable prohibition and a concrete penalty that can be cited in oversight and rulemaking.
  • Compliance and legal teams at agencies — the law creates a definitive statutory requirement to implement, allowing those teams to design standardized intake language and audit protocols rather than relying on ad hoc guidance.

Who Bears the Cost

  • Benefit recipients — the bill adds a prohibition on a common financial activity (sending remittances) and exposes signatories to a $100,000 fine for breach, increasing legal and financial risk for low-income individuals.
  • Federal agencies that administer covered programs — they must add declaration collection to intake and reapplication workflows, develop monitoring and verification processes, handle disputes, and potentially litigate enforcement, without allocated implementation details or funding in the statute.
  • Remittance providers and financial institutions — while not directly regulated here, they may face compliance and privacy tensions if agencies seek transaction data to detect violations, and they may lose customers if recipients reduce remittance use.
  • Courts and the Justice Department (or other enforcement bodies) — potential increases in litigation and contested enforcement actions over constitutionality, due process, collection procedures, and evidentiary standards will create workload and costs for the judicial system.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The central dilemma is between program-integrity control and recipients’ financial autonomy and due-process protections: the bill gives agencies a blunt, punitive tool intended to stop public funds flowing abroad, but does so by restricting lawful financial behavior and imposing a severe, categorical penalty without building out practicable verification or fair‑process safeguards.

The bill raises immediate implementation and legal questions the text does not answer. It requires agencies to collect perjury-backed declarations but does not establish how agencies should determine whether a remittance transfer occurred, how to prove a transfer was made during a benefit period, or what administrative process imposes or collects the $100,000 penalty.

Those omissions force agencies to build operational mechanisms (data-sharing with financial institutions, subpoena powers, internal audit rules) or rely on external litigation, each of which raises privacy, statutory-interpretation, and resource-allocation issues.

The cross-reference to the text of 20 C.F.R. 416.1142(a) 'as in effect on the date of enactment' fixes covered programs to the regulatory landscape at enactment rather than to a statutory list; that design reduces legislative specificity but increases reliance on regulatory phrasing and invites disputes about whether later regulatory changes expand or contract coverage. The importation of the EFTA remittance definition is efficient but technical: enforcement will depend on parsing whether a given transfer falls within that consumer-protection definition, which was not designed as a social‑services enforcement tool.

Finally, the flat $100,000 fine is disproportionate to most individual transfers and invites due-process and proportionality challenges while risking chilling access to benefits where recipients fear catastrophic penalties for routine transactions.

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