SB402 amends Title 11 of the District of Columbia Official Code to replace archaic and offensive phrases that refer to people with intellectual disabilities. The bill swaps language such as “substantially retarded persons” and “the at least moderately mentally retarded” for the phrase “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.”
On its face the measure is a targeted, textual modernization: it does not change procedural rules, create new remedies, or add substantive standards beyond the replacement words. Nevertheless the swap matters because statutory terminology shapes judicial interpretation, administrative forms, and the stigma that attaches to people who appear in court or are the subject of court actions.
At a Glance
What It Does
SB402 amends three separate provisions in Title 11 of the D.C. Official Code by striking outdated pejorative phrases and inserting the term “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.” The bill’s changes are limited to replacing language; it contains no new definitions or procedures.
Who It Affects
The immediate text-level effect falls on the D.C. courts (U.S. District Court for D.C., Superior Court, and Family Court), judges, court clerks, litigators, and experts who supply medical or psychological evaluations in proceedings where statutory references to intellectual disability determine jurisdiction or process. Disability advocates and the individuals named in proceedings will experience the change in statutory labeling.
Why It Matters
Modernizing statutory language reduces stigma and aligns the code with contemporary clinical terminology, but swapping terms can change how courts apply jurisdictional triggers if the replacement phrase is read differently. Practitioners should expect follow-up questions about scope, definitions, and document/form updates.
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What This Bill Actually Does
SB402 performs a concentrated textual edit across three provisions of Title 11 of the D.C. Official Code.
In each place where the code currently uses the phrases “substantially retarded persons” or “the at least moderately mentally retarded,” the bill removes those phrases and substitutes “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.” The change repeats the same replacement wording in each affected subsection rather than introducing a single defined term elsewhere in the code.
Because the bill changes only wording and does not add definitions, the practical effect will depend on how judges, agencies, and experts interpret “moderate intellectual disabilities” in jurisdictions where the old phrases currently serve as jurisdictional references or eligibility markers. Clinicians and forensic evaluators will likely remain the primary source for establishing a person’s status in any given proceeding, but courts may need to decide whether the new wording maps directly onto prior practice or alters the threshold for inclusion.Administratively, courts and litigants will need to update forms, pleadings, and internal guidance where the old phrases appear.
That process typically falls to clerks and administrative offices; it can be straightforward for text changes, but the lack of a statutory definition raises the prospect of litigation over whether any substantive interpretation changed when the statutory phrase was modernized.The bill contains no effective-date clause or definitional section. That omission leaves two follow-up tasks: if enacted, an implementing authority will need to decide when the revised language takes effect and whether to publish guidance defining “moderate intellectual disabilities” for purposes of Title 11.
Without that work, frontline adjudicators will resolve disputes about meaning in real time, producing case law that could either confirm continuity with prior practice or create new doctrinal lines.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill replaces “substantially retarded persons” in D.C. Code 11–501(2)(D) with “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.”, It makes the identical substitution in D.C. Code 11–921(a)(4)(D) for Superior Court jurisdictional language.
It replaces the phrase “the at least moderately mentally retarded” in D.C. Code 11–1101(a)(15) with “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.”, SB402 does not include a statutory definition of “moderate intellectual disabilities,” leaving interpretation to courts, clinicians, and agencies.
The bill contains no explicit effective date or implementation instructions, so timing and operational changes (forms, training, guidance) are left unresolved.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Replace District Court jurisdiction language
This amendment strikes the phrase “substantially retarded persons” from the provision that helps define jurisdictional scope in the District of Columbia for certain proceedings and substitutes “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.” Practically, the change is textual: it does not add or remove a grant of jurisdiction. Where it matters is in interpretation—if courts previously applied a particular clinical or IQ-based threshold tied to the old phrase, judges will need to decide whether to treat the new phrase as synonymous or as reflecting a different diagnostic framework.
Update Superior Court reference to disability status
The identical linguistic substitution occurs in Superior Court jurisdictional language. This affects pleadings, dockets, and internal instructions that reference the statutory phrase. Court administrators will need to revise forms and bench guides, while litigants should anticipate early motions or evidentiary disputes in cases where the classification of an individual’s disability status is outcome-determinative.
Modernize Family Court statutory wording
Family Court text that formerly read “the at least moderately mentally retarded” is replaced with “persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.” Family Court matters—such as dependency proceedings, guardianship considerations, or services-related hearings where statutory language triggers particular processes—will carry the same practical questions: does the new phrasing preserve historic thresholds, and how should experts frame evaluations under modern diagnostic standards?
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Individuals with intellectual disabilities — the statute removes pejorative, outdated language that contributes to stigma in court records and proceedings, offering a more respectful statutory label.
- Disability rights advocates and NGOs — they gain a statutory example of person-first, clinically current terminology that supports advocacy and broader legal reforms.
- Judges, court staff and clerks — they get cleaner, modernized statutory text that reduces the risk of offensive wording appearing in public dockets and court communications.
- Legislative drafters and counsel — the bill provides a small model for future targeted statutory language updates without broader substantive overhaul.
Who Bears the Cost
- D.C. courts and administrative offices — they must update templates, forms, internal manuals, and training materials to reflect the new language and may need to allocate staff time for those changes.
- Practitioners and litigants — expect near-term litigation and evidentiary disputes over the meaning of “moderate intellectual disabilities” that could increase litigation costs in contested cases.
- Medical and forensic evaluators — experts may face more contested retention and deeper record review where parties litigate whether a person meets the (now untranslated) statutory threshold.
- Agencies and service providers tied to Title 11 references — they will need to review policies and eligibility criteria that reference the amended text to ensure consistency and compliance.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between the legitimate goal of removing offensive, outdated language to preserve dignity and the risk that swapping in an undefined clinical phrase will introduce legal uncertainty—improving labels while potentially changing, intentionally or not, how courts identify who falls within statutory jurisdictional triggers.
The bill’s virtue—removing demeaning, outdated terminology—also creates the principal implementation problem: the replacement phrase is not defined. Historically, statutory labels can function as shorthand for an adjudicative threshold; changing the shorthand without a definitional anchor can produce ambiguity.
Courts will either treat the substitution as purely cosmetic or they will interpret the new phrase against contemporary clinical standards (IQ ranges, adaptive functioning), with potentially different results.
A second tension concerns the allocation of interpretive labor. Without a definition, judges will rely on expert testimony and case law to determine who qualifies as a “person with moderate intellectual disabilities.” That process may improve accuracy by tying the statutory phrase to current diagnostic frameworks, but it also invites litigation costs, inconsistent rulings, and a period of doctrinal uncertainty.
Administrative burdens (updated forms, training, and public-facing language) are predictable but manageable; the harder-to-quantify risk is the litigation-driven development of new precedent that could shift which cases belong before which court.
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