SB 738 creates a categorical moratorium: no research grants supported by federal funds may be awarded to any institution of higher education or other research institute that is conducting gain‑of‑function research as the bill defines it. The measure defines gain‑of‑function to cover genetic alterations that change or enhance biological functions (including increased infectivity, transmissibility, pathogenicity, or host range) and lists covered organisms and regulated agents by reference to federal Select Agents rules.
The bill matters because it moves from project‑level oversight to an institution‑level funding cutoff, lacks a waiver or transition process, and relies on broad statutory definitions. That combination could immediately reshape where and how high‑risk pathogen research is done, affect federally funded surveillance, diagnostics, and countermeasure work, and raise hard questions about monitoring, enforcement, and unintended shifts of research outside federal oversight.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill forbids federal agencies from awarding research grants to universities or research institutes that are conducting gain‑of‑function research as defined in the statute. It ties the ban to a statutory definition of gain‑of‑function and to a specific list of organisms and regulated agents, including synthetic constructs.
Who It Affects
Institutions of higher education, government‑affiliated research institutes, principal investigators working with listed viruses or Select Agents, technology‑transfer offices, and federal grantmaking agencies such as NIH and NSF. Indirectly, industry partners, veterinary and agricultural research programs, and international collaborators would feel the effects.
Why It Matters
By targeting institutional eligibility rather than particular projects, the measure can remove an institution’s access to a wide range of federal grants. That creates incentives to relocate risky work, seek private or foreign funding, or avoid certain research areas — with consequences for biosurveillance, vaccine development, and the retention of specialized lab capacity.
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What This Bill Actually Does
SB 738 is short but wide in effect. It adds statutory definitions and a single substantive prohibition.
The definitions identify gain‑of‑function research as genetic alteration that changes or enhances biological functions — explicitly naming outcomes like greater infectivity, transmissibility, pathogenicity, or expanded host range — and also captures research that may be reasonably anticipated to confer such attributes or otherwise pose threats to national security, public safety, or the health of humans and animals.
The bill then specifies which organisms and agents it targets. That list includes influenza viruses; coronaviruses (calling out MERS, SARS–CoV–1, SARS–CoV–2, and SARS‑like viruses); agents and toxins listed on federal Select Agents and Toxins regulations across USDA, HHS, and CDC regulatory citations; and any synthetic construct of those viruses, agents, or toxins.
By cross‑referencing existing Select Agents regulations, the statute pulls in a preexisting regulatory list rather than creating a new catalog.The operative prohibition states, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” that federal research grants may not be awarded to institutions of higher education or other research institutes that are conducting gain‑of‑function research. The bill therefore directs the effect — denial of grant awards — at the institutional recipient rather than at a named project, investigator, or contract vehicle.
The text does not name an implementing agency, set a review or certification process to determine whether an institution is “conducting” covered research, nor provide a transition period or waiver.Practically, that combination matters. Agencies that distribute grant funding will need to decide how to interpret “conducting” and whether grants unrelated to the risky work must be withheld from an institution that hosts it.
The statute speaks only to grants “supported by Federal funds,” which raises immediate questions about federal contracts, cooperative agreements, subawards, private funding, and cross‑institution collaborations. Because the bill is silent on enforcement mechanisms and does not carve out exemptions for countermeasure or public‑health essential work, institutions and funders will face legal and operational uncertainty about compliance and the continued viability of certain research programs.
The Five Things You Need to Know
Section 2(a)(1) defines gain‑of‑function to include genetic alterations that increase infectivity, transmissibility, pathogenicity, or host range, and also research reasonably anticipated to confer such attributes or otherwise threaten public safety or animal health.
Section 2(a)(2) lists covered organisms by name (influenza viruses and coronaviruses including MERS, SARS‑CoV‑1, SARS‑CoV‑2, and SARS‑like viruses) and pulls in agents and toxins on the federal Select Agents and Toxins lists and any synthetic constructs of those entities.
The ban applies at the institutional level: federal agencies may not award research grants to any institution of higher education or other research institute that is conducting the defined gain‑of‑function research.
The prohibition is prefaced by a “notwithstanding any other provision of law” clause, signaling an intent to override competing statutory authorities or grant rules that might otherwise permit funding.
The bill contains no implementing bureaucracy, no certification or notification process to determine when an institution is ‘conducting’ covered research, and no grandfathering or explicit exemptions for ongoing or essential public‑health work.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short title
Provides the Act’s short title, “Dangerous Viral Gain of Function Research Moratorium Act.” This is purely stylistic but frames the bill’s focus on viral and select‑agent related gain‑of‑function work.
Statutory definition of gain‑of‑function research
Sets out a two‑part definition: (A) genetic alteration that changes or enhances biological functions (with examples such as increased infectivity, transmissibility, pathogenicity, or host range), and (B) any research reasonably anticipated to confer those attributes or that would pose threats to national security, public safety, or health of humans and certain animals. The phrasing ‘reasonably anticipated’ is intentionally broad and creates room for regulatory interpretation — and legal challenge — over predictive thresholds and risk assessments.
Scope of covered organisms and constructs
Identifies covered organisms by name (influenza viruses, coronaviruses including MERS, SARS–CoV–1, SARS–CoV–2, and SARS‑like viruses) and incorporates by reference agents and toxins listed on the Select Agents and Toxins rules (citations to 7 CFR 331, 9 CFR 121, and 42 CFR 73). It also includes synthetic constructs of those viruses or agents. Using cross‑references to existing federal regulations makes the list administrable but ties coverage to any future updates of those regulatory lists.
Prohibition on awarding federal research grants
Imposes the central rule: federal research grants may not be awarded to institutions of higher education or other research institutes that are conducting the defined gain‑of‑function research, and does so ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law.’ The practical effect will depend on how agencies interpret ‘research grants supported by Federal funds,’ how they define ‘conducting,’ and whether they treat the prohibition as affecting only particular grant programs or all awards to covered institutions.
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Who Benefits
- Communities concerned about laboratory‑origin risks: Local populations and animal agricultural interests gain a reduced statutory pathway for federally funded research that the bill’s drafters view as increasing the chance of accidental release.
- Institutions that avoid high‑risk pathogen work: Universities and research centers that do not engage in covered gain‑of‑function activities may benefit competitively by retaining access to a broader share of federal grants.
- Biosecurity and oversight organizations: NGOs and advisory bodies focused on laboratory safety and risk reduction gain a statutory lever aligned with precautionary principles that they have advocated.
- Certain private funders and foreign labs: Entities willing to support or host gain‑of‑function research could receive more research activity as institutions shift away from federally funded work, creating competitive opportunities outside the federal grant system.
Who Bears the Cost
- Universities with BSL‑3/BSL‑4 capacity and infectious‑disease programs: Those institutions risk losing entire streams of federal grant funding if regulators determine they are ‘conducting’ covered work, affecting training, maintenance of specialized facilities, and unrelated research supported by general grants.
- NIH, NSF, and other grantmaking agencies: Agencies will face new compliance and monitoring burdens to screen applicants and determine institutional eligibility, potentially delaying funding decisions and increasing administrative costs.
- Researchers and public‑health programs focused on surveillance and countermeasures: Scientists working on diagnostics, vaccines, and pathogen characterization for influenza and coronaviruses may lose federal support or find collaborations restricted, hindering preparedness.
- Agricultural research and veterinary science programs: Because the organism definition explicitly covers animal health, state and federal agricultural research projects that interface with university labs could face funding disruptions or partnership complications.
- International collaborators and subcontractors: Cross‑border partnerships that involve covered organisms may face contracting and funding obstacles if a U.S. institution is judged to be conducting the prohibited work.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill forces a trade‑off between two legitimate objectives: reducing the risk that laboratory work will create or amplify pandemic‑capable pathogens, and preserving the scientific capacity needed to surveil, understand, and counter naturally emerging infectious diseases; a categorical institutional ban reduces one set of risks but also erodes public‑health and biodefense capabilities that depend on the very expertise and facilities the bill would restrict.
The bill leaves several key implementation questions unanswered, creating operational risk. First, it does not set a test for when an institution is ‘conducting’ covered research: is the presence of a single investigator sufficient, or must the institution’s leadership formally approve projects?
Will intramural vs extramural distinctions, subcontracting, or collaborative experiments be treated the same? Agencies must develop criteria, but the statute’s language invites litigation over vagueness and scope.
Second, the statute addresses “research grants supported by Federal funds” but is silent on federal contracts, cooperative agreements, regulatory funding, or loans. That gap may lead agencies to interpret the ban narrowly or broadly, but either path produces tradeoffs: a narrow reading preserves federal contracting authority but undermines the bill’s stated purpose; a broad reading could upend procurement and mission‑critical work.
Third, by tying coverage to Select Agents regulations, the bill imports a moving regulatory target — future additions or removals from those lists will alter statutory coverage without new legislation. Finally, the absence of an exemption procedure or transition period raises practical problems for ongoing projects and for research essential to surveillance, diagnostics, and rapid response.
Those tasks are often the same technical skills used in experiments the bill aims to constrain, and losing institutional capacity may reduce preparedness even as it lowers one category of lab‑associated risk.
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