This Act directs the executive branch to seek the immediate extradition or return to the United States of Joanne Chesimard, William Morales, and other fugitives residing in Cuba who faced charges or confinement for U.S. offenses. It frames this as a bilateral diplomatic objective grounded in existing extradition treaties and U.S. law.
The bill creates a formal reporting regime that tracks steps taken, assesses Cuba’s compliance, and estimates the number of fugitives in Cuba, with a first report due within 180 days and then annually. It also restricts use of funding from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account until Cuba meets specified conditions, and it sets a sunset trigger tied to consecutive favorable reports on compliance and returns.
At a Glance
What It Does
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, must pursue extradition or return of Chesimard, Morales, and other fugitives in Cuba under bilateral treaties, and report on progress and compliance.
Who It Affects
Key U.S. government actors (State Department, DOJ), the Cuban regime, fugitives in Cuba, and victims and their families seeking justice.
Why It Matters
It formalizes a diplomatic and enforcement pathway to resolve long-running fugitive cases and creates a measurable mechanism to monitor Cuba’s compliance.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The Frank Connor and Trooper Werner Foerster Justice Act seeks to secure the immediate extradition or return to the United States of Chesimard, Morales, and other fugitives who are believed to be living in Cuba to avoid prosecution. It leans on existing bilateral extradition treaties and compels the executive branch to use diplomatic tools to press Cuba for these returns.
The bill also imposes a reporting requirement: within 180 days of enactment, and annually thereafter, the State Department must report on steps taken to secure extraditions, assess whether Cuba is fulfilling its treaty obligations, and estimate how many fugitives remain in Cuba. In addition, no funds from the INCLE account may be used for programs in Cuba until Cuba is in compliance with the conditions described and conditions for re-engagement under LIBERTAD.
The sunset provision means the reporting requirement ends only after two consecutive reports certify that Cuba is actively fulfilling its obligations and returning fugitives. The overall aim is to convert diplomatic pressure into concrete action and to provide Congress with ongoing visibility into Cuba’s cooperation on extradition.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill directs the Secretary of State and Attorney General to press for the extradition or return of Chesimard, Morales, and other fugitives in Cuba under existing treaties.
It identifies Chesimard, Morales, and other named fugitives as targets and frames Cuba's cooperation as a treaty obligation.
A first progress report is due within 180 days of enactment, with annual updates thereafter.
The bill restricts INCLE funding to Cuba until Cuba demonstrates compliance with the treaty obligations and LIBERTAD-related conditions.
A sunset triggers once two consecutive reports certify active compliance and returns, ending the reporting obligation.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title
This section designates the act as the Frank Connor and Trooper Werner Foerster Justice Act.
Findings
The bill lays out findings about Chesimard and Morales allegedly seeking safe haven in Cuba to avoid U.S. prosecution, notes their past offenses and deaths of U.S. victims, and cites bilateral extradition treaties with Cuba as the basis for cooperation.
Sense of Congress
This section states that Congress believes Chesimard, Morales, and other fugitives in Cuba must be extradited or returned promptly, consistent with treaties, and that the Executive should use all appropriate diplomatic tools to secure cooperation.
Annual Report and Determination on Fugitives in Cuba
The State Department, with the Attorney General, must raise the issue in bilateral talks and produce a report within 180 days and annually thereafter describing steps taken, Cuba’s compliance with treaties, and estimates of fugitives in Cuba; a sunset is triggered if two consecutive reports show active compliance and returns.
Prohibition on INCLE funding in Cuba
No INCLE-funded activities may occur in Cuba until Cuba meets conditions described earlier—treaty obligations and LIBERTAD-related economic engagement prerequisites.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. Department of State and Department of Justice, which gain clear directives and measurable progress on extradition efforts.
- Families of victims and survivors seeking accountability, who benefit from renewed pursuit of fugitives and closure of cases.
- U.S. policymakers and Congress, which receive regular, structured updates on Cuba’s cooperation and the status of fugitives.
Who Bears the Cost
- Cuban regime, which bears diplomatic and potentially economic pressure from intensified extradition efforts and constraints on engagement.
- U.S. taxpayers and agencies, which shoulder resources for diplomacy, reporting, and enforcement activities.
- Other Cuba-based actors and communities that could be affected by changes in U.S.-Cuba cooperation and potential shifts in aid or engagement strategies.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is whether pressuring Cuba via treaty-based extradition demands and funding restrictions will reliably secure extraditions without undermining broader diplomatic channels or triggering counterproductive retaliation.
The bill’s approach hinges on Cuba’s willingness to cooperate and on whether the defined treaty obligations are interpreted and applied consistently. While the annual reporting regime provides visibility, it also raises questions about what happens if Cuba disputes obligations or if fugitives are not located within Cuba’s borders.
The combination of instant extradition rhetoric and funding restrictions could create friction in broader U.S.-Cuba diplomacy, including non-extradition areas and humanitarian engagement. The central practical challenges include accurately identifying fugitives in Cuba, ensuring due process in extradition requests, and aligning LIBERTAD-era policy tools with current diplomatic realities.
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