S.J. Res. 110 is a one‑paragraph joint resolution that, if enacted, disapproves and nullifies the Department of the Treasury’s December 1, 2025 final rule titled “Regulatory Capital Rule: Modifications to the Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for U.S. Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Depository Institutions; Total Loss‑Absorbing Capacity and Long‑Term Debt Requirements for U.S. Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies” (90 Fed.
Reg. 55248). The resolution invokes chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code—the Congressional Review Act (CRA)—to declare the rule has no force or effect.
Beyond canceling the specific Federal Register action, a successful CRA disapproval would constrain the agency’s ability to reissue a substantially similar rule absent new statutory authorization, creating lasting limits on Treasury’s and other regulators’ capacity to implement the same approach to eSLR and TLAC/LTD without legislative change. That consequence, not explicit in the resolution’s single sentence, is what makes CRA disapprovals consequential to bank capital policy, market participants, and regulators planning compliance programs and debt issuance strategies.
At a Glance
What It Does
The resolution uses the Congressional Review Act to disapprove and render without force the Treasury Department’s December 1, 2025 final rule that revised enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) standards and established or modified total loss‑absorbing capacity (TLAC) and long‑term debt (LTD) requirements for U.S. global systemically important bank holding companies (G‑SIBs) and certain subsidiaries.
Who It Affects
Directly affected stakeholders include U.S. G‑SIBs and their subsidiary depository institutions, compliance and capital planning teams at those firms, institutional investors in bank long‑term debt, and the federal agencies responsible for prudential supervision. Indirectly affected parties include bond underwriters, rating agencies, and counterparties to large banks.
Why It Matters
A CRA disapproval does more than cancel a rule: it restores the regulatory baseline that existed before the rule and bars reissuance of a substantially similar rule without explicit congressional authorization. That combination can change capital planning, debt issuance strategies, and cross‑border regulatory coordination on TLAC for the largest U.S. banks.
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What This Bill Actually Does
S.J. Res. 110 is a straightforward exercise of the Congressional Review Act: it declares that the Treasury Department’s December 2025 regulatory action concerning enhanced supplementary leverage ratio standards and TLAC/long‑term debt rules for U.S. G‑SIBs has no force or effect.
The text is one operative sentence that identifies the rule by title and Federal Register citation and pronounces disapproval.
Because the resolution is framed as a disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, it triggers the CRA’s downstream legal effects. Practically, that means the specific December 1, 2025 final rule would be nullified, and the implementing agencies would face the CRA’s bar on issuing a “substantially the same” rule in the future unless Congress passes new legislation authorizing it.
For the regulated firms, that combination creates a durable constraint: regulators cannot simply reissue the same approach to eSLR or TLAC without additional congressional action.For compliance officers and capital planners at affected institutions, the resolution’s significance lies less in the text of the joint resolution itself than in the change to the regulatory environment it would bring if enacted. Nullification would halt any transition timelines or compliance steps tied to the December 2025 rule and reopen choices about capital and debt structure that firms had been adjusting toward.
For regulators and market participants, it also inserts legal and policy uncertainty: agencies must consider alternatives or seek congressional authority to pursue the same policy goals, and investors must price the potential for a different prudential framework.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The resolution invokes chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code (the Congressional Review Act) to disapprove the Treasury Department’s final rule published at 90 Fed. Reg. 55248 (Dec. 1, 2025).
It declares the named Treasury rule—addressing eSLR standards and TLAC/LTD requirements for U.S. G‑SIBs—‘shall have no force or effect.’, A CRA disapproval, if enacted, prevents the agency from issuing a new rule that is ‘substantially the same’ unless Congress later authorizes it by statute (per the CRA’s cross‑referenced provisions).
The resolution’s operative text is a single sentence; it does not amend statutory law, change supervisory standards by statute, or prescribe alternative capital ratios or TLAC levels.
Because it targets a specific Federal Register rule, the resolution’s legal reach is limited to the December 1, 2025 action and the agency’s ability to reissue substantially similar regulations without new congressional authorization.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Congressional disapproval of the Treasury rule
This is the resolution’s single operative sentence: Congress disapproves the Treasury Department’s specified final rule and declares it to have no force or effect. Practically, passage would mean the December 1, 2025 rule is treated as if disapproved under the CRA—invalidated as an agency action. The clause names the rule precisely (by title and Federal Register citation) to tie the disapproval legally to that specific regulatory document.
Use of chapter 8 of title 5 (the CRA) as the disapproval mechanism
The resolution expressly invokes chapter 8 of title 5, the statutory mechanism that allows Congress to overturn agency rules via expedited joint resolutions. Although the joint resolution text does not restate other CRA provisions, invoking the CRA imports downstream statutory effects: for example, the prohibition on issuing a ‘substantially the same’ rule without subsequent statutory authorization and the expedited procedures for considering the resolution in Congress.
What this resolution changes—and what it does not
The resolution cancels a specific final rule but does not itself set new capital or TLAC standards, reassign supervisory authority, or amend the statutes that underpin bank prudential regulation. Its practical impact depends on the interaction with existing supervisory rules and guidance and on whether agencies choose to pursue alternate rulemakings or seek legislative authority to replace the nullified approach.
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Who Benefits
- U.S. G‑SIBs and their treasury/capital‑markets teams — They avoid complying with whatever new eSLR calibrations and TLAC/LTD issuance requirements the December 2025 rule imposed, which can reduce near‑term capital and funding costs and postpone structural changes to balance sheets.
- Bond issuers and underwriters for bank long‑term debt — Nullifying TLAC/LTD requirements preserves existing debt issuance practices and may prevent immediate shifts in demand for new long‑term instruments tied to regulatory loss‑absorbing capacity.
- Bank legal, compliance, and risk teams — They avoid implementing new procedures, revising capital plans, and incurring programmatic compliance costs tied specifically to the December 2025 rule’s requirements.
Who Bears the Cost
- Federal prudential regulators (Treasury, the Fed and federal banking agencies) — Disapproval limits regulators’ ability to implement their chosen framework for enhancing system‑wide resilience and may force them to pursue alternative policy routes or request legislative authority.
- Investors and counterparties concerned about systemic risk — If the nullified rule would have strengthened loss‑absorbing capacity, disapproval could leave markets and taxpayers exposed to greater tail risk from large bank failures.
- Market participants relying on regulatory clarity — Corporate treasurers, rating agencies, and lenders face renewed uncertainty about future capital and debt requirements, which can raise pricing and operational risk while agencies recalibrate.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between congressional control over major policy choices and regulators’ need for technical, adaptable tools to manage systemic risk: disapproving a prudential rule restores legislative oversight and immediate relief for regulated firms, but it also removes a regulatory tool designed to protect financial stability and forces either slow legislative fixes or workarounds that can leave gaps or create uncertainty.
The practical implications of this one‑sentence resolution extend beyond its text because of how the Congressional Review Act operates. The CRA’s ban on reissuing a ‘substantially the same’ rule without new statutory authorization creates a durable constraint on agencies; that effect often matters more than the immediate nullification.
But defining ‘substantially the same’ is legally fraught and likely to generate agency caution, litigation, or a revised rulemaking that tries to achieve similar ends via different statutory or factual predicates.
Another tension is between democratic oversight and technical prudential rulemaking. Congress can use the CRA to check agency action, but banking standards are technical and often coordinated internationally (for example, TLAC stems from Financial Stability Board work).
Removing a rule by resolution may disrupt international coordination or create regulatory arbitrage unless regulators or Congress provide an explicit alternative. Finally, the resolution does not change the statutes that authorize prudential supervision; agencies may respond with narrower rulemakings, supervisory guidance, or a request for statutory changes—each path presents trade‑offs in speed, transparency, and legal durability.
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