Codify — Article

California AB25 (2025) standardizes signature verification and cure for vote-by-mail ballots

Sets uniform comparison rules, a written cure process (including electronic options), and procedural safeguards before a mail ballot can be rejected.

The Brief

AB25 imposes a statewide framework for how county elections officials must compare signatures on vote-by-mail identification envelopes and how voters can cure disputed signatures. The bill spells out which signatures may be used for comparison, what characteristics may be considered, and requires elections officials to give voters a written opportunity to verify or provide a signature using multiple delivery methods.

The measure matters because it replaces ad hoc local practices with a single, statute-driven procedure that combines technological allowances (signature-verification software and facsimiles), documentation requirements (a standard signature verification/unsigned-envelope statement), and multilingual notice obligations. That mix changes both the operational work facing county election offices and the practical hurdles voters must meet to preserve their ballots when signatures are questioned.

At a Glance

What It Does

Creates a uniform signature-comparison regime for vote-by-mail ballots that permits signature-verification technology, specifies what signature characteristics may be considered, and establishes a statutory cure process for disputed or missing signatures. It requires counties to translate notices where federal law requires and to accept several electronic and in-person methods for returning cure statements.

Who It Affects

County elections officials and their staff, vendors of signature-verification technology and election-management systems, voters who cast ballots by mail (especially those whose signatures vary), and language-access coordinators in counties covered by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.

Why It Matters

By setting statewide standards the bill aims to reduce inconsistent treatment of mailed ballots across counties, but it also creates new procedural steps, documentation, and potential training and technology needs for counties. The cure pathways and allowed electronic submissions shift how voters preserve ballot validity and how officials document rejections.

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What This Bill Actually Does

The bill directs elections officials to compare the signature on a vote-by-mail identification envelope to the signature on the voter’s registration record—either the original affidavit of registration or another signature-bearing registration form in the file. It establishes a presumption that the envelope signature is the voter’s and says an exact, pixel-for-pixel match is unnecessary: similar characteristics can suffice.

The Secretary of State will publish regulations listing permissible characteristics and acceptable explanations for discrepancies (for example, changes in style over time or haste), and officials are explicitly forbidden from considering party preference, race, or ethnicity while comparing signatures.

AB25 permits counties to use facsimiles of signatures and signature-verification technology, but it builds in procedural safeguards when a signature is flagged as not comparing. Rather than allowing an immediate administrative rejection, the bill requires counties to follow a written cure process: notify the voter with a standardized form, provide a prepaid return envelope, and offer alternative submission methods including in-person delivery at the elections office, delivery to a polling place or ballot drop box, email, fax, or other electronic means the county provides.

Notices and instructions must be translated in any language the county is required to provide under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.The bill also covers ballots where the identification envelope lacks a signature. It creates a parallel unsigned-envelope statement process that mirrors the signature-verification cure, and it authorizes counties to supply a single combined statement online and by mail for use in either situation.

Counties must adopt privacy and security protocols for any electronic submission method so that cure statements are received securely and used only to verify signatures. Finally, the bill includes processing rules: ballots stay sealed in their identification envelopes until official processing, and officials must follow the Secretary of State’s regulations when using software or other technology to compare signatures.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

If a signature is judged to have multiple, significant, and obvious differing characteristics, the ballot can be rejected only after two additional elections officials each find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the signatures differ from the registration record.

2

Notice and the signature-verification/unsigned-envelope statements must give voters the option to return the cure statement by mail, email, fax, other county electronic means, or in person to a polling place or ballot dropbox before polls close.

3

The required notice form includes a perjury warning describing potential felony penalties and the instructions must be translated into all languages the county must provide under federal Section 203.

4

If an elections official accepts a signature verification statement and finds the signatures compare, the official shall use the signature on that statement to update the voter’s registration signature for future elections—even if the statement was returned after the cure deadline.

5

A ballot must remain inside its identification envelope until official processing begins, and the statute bars rejecting a ballot for cause after the identification envelope has been opened.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

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Subdivision (a)

Signature sources and comparison standards

This section requires officials to compare the vote-by-mail envelope signature with the signature on the voter’s affidavit of registration or any signature-bearing registration form in the record. It establishes a presumption that the envelope signature is the voter’s and makes clear that exact matches are unnecessary—similar characteristics suffice. Practically, counties must train staff to evaluate slant, letter formation, cursive vs. printed writing, and other features the Secretary of State will list, and to apply permitted explanations for changes over time without consulting protected characteristics such as party or race.

Subdivision (c)

When a signature is 'questioned' and the rejection standard

If an official finds multiple, significant, and obvious differences, the statute triggers additional procedures rather than an immediate rejection. Most consequentially, it sets a high evidentiary threshold: two additional elections officials must each independently find beyond a reasonable doubt that the signatures do not compare before the ballot can be rejected. That elevates the administrative burden for rejection decisions and requires clear documentation and chain-of-custody procedures to support two independent determinations.

Subdivision (d)

Notice content, delivery, and cure timeline

The bill prescribes a standardized form of notice and instructions counties must send to voters whose signatures are questioned. Notices must include a prepaid return envelope and may be supplemented by phone, text, or email when contact information is available. Importantly, the statute ties the return deadline to the certification schedule (the statement must be received by a set time before certification), and it requires language translations under Section 203. Counties must be operationally ready to produce and mail these packets quickly and to log alternative delivery methods.

2 more sections
Subdivision (e)

Unsigned identification envelopes and parallel cure

If a voter fails to sign the envelope, the bill forbids immediate rejection so long as the voter completes an unsigned identification envelope statement via the same cure channels and within the designated timeframe. Counties may accept in-person signature cures at the elections office, polling places, or drop boxes and may use other methods to obtain signatures. This mirrors the signature-dispute process and reduces the technicality of automatic rejection for missing signatures, but it again imposes notice and documentation responsibilities on local officials.

Subdivisions (f)–(k)

Combined statements, electronic submission, security, and processing rules

Officials must post a combined verification/unsigned-envelope statement online and provide contact info for secure submissions. Counties offering electronic submission must create privacy and security protocols so data are used only for signature verification. The statute also instructs that ballots remain sealed in identification envelopes until processing begins, that ballots cannot be rejected after an envelope is opened, defines 'certification of the election' for the deadline measures, and requires officials to follow Secretary of State regulations when using software or other technologies.

At scale

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Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Voters with legitimate signature variation — The statute’s presumption of validity, allowance for similar characteristics to suffice, and a formal cure pathway reduce the likelihood that natural changes in handwriting will cause disenfranchisement.
  • Remote and mobility-limited voters — By allowing email, fax, drop-box delivery, and in-person cures at multiple locations, the bill gives practical alternatives to voters who cannot easily travel to a county office during business hours.
  • Non-English-speaking voters in covered counties — The requirement to translate notices and instructions under Section 203 improves access for voters in language-minority communities who previously might have missed cure notices.

Who Bears the Cost

  • County elections offices — They must implement standardized notices, maintain logs of alternative submissions, train staff on nuanced signature comparisons, adopt secure electronic-receipt systems, and produce translations, all of which increase operational complexity and cost.
  • Vendors of signature-verification software and EMS providers — Software must interoperate with county workflows, comply with Secretary of State regulations, and support secure receipt and storage of electronic cure submissions, potentially requiring product changes and certification.
  • Election workers and two-official review panels — The high rejection threshold and required independent findings create extra workload and documentation duties for personnel asked to make difficult, subjective determinations under a stringent standard.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The central dilemma is protecting the integrity of mailed ballots without creating new, hard-to-meet technical obstacles that disproportionately disqualify eligible voters: the bill raises the evidentiary bar for rejecting a ballot and expands cure options, but it adds procedural complexity and technological demands that could produce uneven application across counties unless the Secretary of State provides clear regulations and resources.

AB25 threads a narrow path between two objectives: preventing fraudulent mail ballots and avoiding improper disenfranchisement. The bill limits rejection power by creating a presumption in favor of voters and by requiring a multi-official review before a ballot is tossed, but it simultaneously tightens formal steps that counties must follow — quick mailing of standardized notices, multilingual obligations, and secure electronic receipt mechanisms.

Those operational demands are likely to increase costs and require clear guidance and training from the Secretary of State to produce consistent outcomes across counties.

Several implementation questions matter. The statute authorizes signature-verification technology but also insulates the final determination from a software-only decision; counties will need policies explaining when a machine “non-compare” triggers human review and how to document independent findings.

Allowing email and fax submissions helps accessibility but raises privacy and chain-of-custody issues: how will counties authenticate electronic cure statements, prevent tampering, and store those records? The requirement to use any returned, comparable verification signature to update the voter’s registration can help future administrations but also risks incorporating a forged signature if identity checks are weak.

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