AB 2604 adds Section 3019.2 to the California Elections Code and forces a practical decision point: the Secretary of State must either build and operate a text-message-based system that lets voters cure vote-by-mail signature problems via SMS, or provide counties with the resources to do so. The statute ties the new channel to existing ‘‘ballot curing’’ procedures in Section 3019(d) and requires steps to protect data privacy and ballot security.
Beyond creating an SMS channel, the bill requires the Secretary of State to publish program data on its website—how many voters were offered the text option, how many used it, how many cured by other means, how many did not cure, and median cure times for text versus traditional methods. For elections administrators and compliance officers, AB 2604 moves ballot-curing from an ad hoc, county-by-county practice toward a measurable, technology-driven workflow with attendant operational, privacy, and equity implications.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill directs the Secretary of State to either implement an SMS-based ballot-curing system or provide counties with the resources to implement one themselves, and it requires public reporting of usage and timing metrics. It defines ‘‘ballot curing’’ by reference to Section 3019(d) and mandates data privacy and ballot security protections for any system deployed.
Who It Affects
County registrars of voters, the Secretary of State’s elections technology teams, vendors that supply voter-notification platforms, and vote-by-mail voters whose ballots are flagged for signature issues. Civil-rights groups and watchdogs will also be affected because the bill creates new public data about curing outcomes.
Why It Matters
AB 2604 standardizes a digital channel for curing signature problems and builds performance data into state oversight, which can speed cures and improve turnout but will force trade-offs around authentication, equity, and county-level implementation capacity.
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What This Bill Actually Does
Under current California law, counties notify voters when a vote-by-mail ballot’s signature doesn’t match and offer the voter a chance to ‘‘cure’’ that ballot under the rules in Section 3019(d). AB 2604 adds a targeted, technology-first option: the Secretary of State must either create a statewide SMS-based ballot-curing system or provide counties with the funding and resources they need to stand up their own SMS systems.
The bill does not prescribe exactly how a text-message cure must work, but it explicitly ties the new channel to the existing cure process defined in Section 3019(d).
The statute requires any SMS service deployed—whether run by the Secretary of State or by counties using state-provided resources—to include protections for data privacy and ballot security. It also requires transparency: the Secretary of State must publish program statistics on its website, including how many voters were offered the text option, how many used it, how many cured by other methods, how many never cured, and the median time from notification to cure for both text-based and traditional approaches.
Those metrics create a feedback loop for administrators and advocates to evaluate whether SMS improves cure rates and speed.Finally, AB 2604 allows the Secretary of State to combine the SMS system with other state systems referenced in Sections 3019.5 and 3019.7, signaling a preference for interoperability with existing ballot-tracking and notification infrastructure. The bill leaves many technical and operational choices—authentication methods, message content and language access, whether links are included, and who bears upfront costs—open to implementation decisions by the Secretary of State or by counties receiving resources.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The Secretary of State must either implement a statewide text-message-based ballot-curing system or supply counties with the resources necessary to implement their own SMS curing systems.
The bill defines ‘‘ballot curing’’ by reference to Section 3019(d), so SMS curing must follow the existing procedural options for fixing signature defects under that subdivision.
Any SMS service provided under the statute must ensure data privacy and ballot security, though the bill does not specify technical standards or certifications.
The Secretary of State must publish specific program metrics on its website: number offered SMS curing, number who cured by SMS, number who cured by other means, number who did not cure, and median notification-to-cure times for both methods.
The Secretary of State may combine the SMS system with the state systems created under Sections 3019.5 and 3019.7, enabling integration with existing ballot tracking/notification platforms.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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State-operated SMS ballot-curing system
This paragraph gives the Secretary of State the affirmative option to build and operate a statewide text-message-based cure system. Practically, that means the state could centralize the sending of cure notifications by SMS, host the web interfaces or verification workflows, and manage related data. Central operation concentrates responsibility and could produce consistent user experience and statewide metrics, but it also raises questions about funding, procurement, and centralized data stewardship.
Resource support for county implementation
As an alternative to running the service itself, the Secretary of State can make resources available to county registrars so each county can implement its own SMS curing service. This option preserves county control and allows for local customization, but it creates uneven workloads and requires the state to define what ‘‘resources’’ means—grants, technical assistance, templates, or vendor contracts—and to oversee consistent security practices.
Definition: ballot curing by reference to Section 3019(d)
The bill does not reinvent the cure process; it incorporates the procedures already set out in Section 3019(d). That means SMS is a notification and intake channel, not a new substantive type of cure. Implementers must map any SMS workflow directly to the legal steps and deadlines that apply under Section 3019(d), or risk providing a noncompliant cure pathway.
Mandatory privacy and ballot-security protections
Any SMS-based service must ‘‘ensure data privacy and ballot security.’’ The bill sets a clear requirement but leaves the technical details unspecified—no encryption standards, logging rules, or retention schedules are mandated. Implementers will need to translate this obligation into tangible policies and contracts (e.g., vendor security reviews, encryption-in-transit and at-rest, access controls) to satisfy both legal and public expectations.
Public metrics and system integration
The Secretary of State must publish usage and timing metrics for the program, which creates a performance accountability framework. The statute also allows combining the SMS effort with systems under Sections 3019.5 and 3019.7, encouraging integration with existing ballot-tracking and notification platforms. Practically, agencies must plan for data collection, standard definitions for ‘‘offered’’ and ‘‘cured,’’ and interfaces between systems to produce reliable statewide statistics.
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Explore Elections in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Vote-by-mail voters with signature defects who have access to a cell phone: they gain a faster, more direct notification channel and potentially a quicker path to cure before deadlines, which can preserve their ballot.
- County registrars and election administrators that adopt SMS tools: they can reduce unresolved-cure inventories and get near-real-time metrics to manage workloads and outreach strategies.
- Secretary of State and policymakers: the required public metrics provide empirical evidence to evaluate whether SMS improves cure rates and turnaround times, supporting oversight and future policy choices.
- Civil-rights and voter-advocacy organizations: publicly available program data enables targeted monitoring of disparities (who is offered and who cures) and supports evidence-based advocacy.
Who Bears the Cost
- County election offices (if counties implement systems): they may need to use local funds, staff time, or procurement processes to adopt SMS platforms unless the state fully funds implementation and maintenance.
- Secretary of State (if it chooses to operate the system): building, hosting, and securing a statewide SMS service and publishing program data will require upfront development and ongoing operational funding.
- Vendors and IT contractors: they must meet security and privacy expectations without the bill specifying standards, so vendors will shoulder development and compliance risk during procurement.
- Voters who lack reliable mobile service or who are concerned about privacy: these voters may be excluded from the benefit or face increased risk if authentication and message design are not handled carefully, creating a non-financial cost borne by vulnerable populations.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
AB 2604 poses a classic trade-off: expand access and speed by using an immediate, widely used channel (SMS) versus protect ballot integrity and voter privacy by imposing strong authentication and technical safeguards that can slow deployment and raise costs. The statute pushes for both but leaves the hard choices—how secure is secure enough, who pays, and how to avoid excluding people without reliable mobile access—to implementers.
AB 2604 creates a useful, targeted intervention—SMS as a prompt and intake channel for curing signature defects—but leaves major implementation questions unanswered. The statute requires ‘‘data privacy and ballot security’’ without defining technical standards, leaving procurement teams to decide acceptable encryption, authentication, data retention, and logging practices.
That gap increases legal and operational risk: vendors may propose divergent approaches, counties may adopt inconsistent protections, and incidents (phishing, SIM swapping, or improper data disclosure) could undermine trust.
The bill also relies on metrics to justify the program, but the required counts and median times will be meaningful only if the state defines consistent numerator and denominator rules (who counts as ‘‘offered’’), time-stamping conventions, and how cross-channel cures are attributed. Differences in county practices, language access, and mobile penetration could produce skewed comparisons and misleading conclusions about SMS effectiveness.
Finally, the act does not allocate specific funding or set mandatory technical requirements, so the choice between centralized implementation and distributed, county-level rollout will shape equity, security, and speed—but that decision is left to administrative and budgetary processes rather than statute.
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