This bill directs the Department of Defense to set up a formal United States‑Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program with a dedicated program office, annual unclassified reporting (with classified annexes permitted), and an authorization of $150 million per year for fiscal years 2026–2030. It also creates a separate emerging‑technology cooperation authority with Israel, authorizes $50 million per year for FY2026–2030, and conditions activity on a signed memorandum of agreement that addresses cost‑sharing, intellectual property, and semiannual Israeli expenditure reports.
Beyond those new authorities, the bill amends prior U.S.–Israel cooperative authorities to increase funding levels and extend end dates for anti‑tunnel and counter‑UAS programs, extends war reserve stockpile authority, requires the Secretary of Defense to open a Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) office in Israel, directs engagement on inclusion of Israel in the U.S. national technology and industrial base, and orders an assessment (and report) on integrated air and missile defense in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The measure combines operational cooperation, R&D levers, and procurement authorities while placing reporting and oversight obligations on the Defense Department.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill establishes a bilateral Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program with a DoD program office, creates an emerging‑technology R&D authority that requires a cost‑sharing memorandum of agreement before work begins, and finances both with multi‑year authorizations. It also amends existing statutes to raise funding caps and extend deadlines, tasks DoD with organizational steps (DIU office, NATIB engagement), and requires an IAMD assessment for CENTCOM.
Who It Affects
DoD components (including the Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate), U.S. and Israeli defense industries and research institutions, DIU and innovation ecosystems, and Congress through new reporting flows. Regional partners will be implicated indirectly by the IAMD assessment and potential cooperative expansions.
Why It Matters
The bill shifts U.S.‑Israel defense ties from one‑off programs to institutionalized, funded R&D and procurement pathways, tying cooperation to cost‑sharing and IP frameworks. That approach changes how emerging capabilities may be co‑developed, procured, and governed — with implications for export controls, industrial base competition, and congressional oversight.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill creates a formal, funded bilateral program to counter unmanned systems by directing the Secretary of Defense, with Israeli concurrence, to establish a United States‑Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program. DoD must stand up a program office inside the Department to manage collaborative R&D, testing, joint training, information sharing, and procurement and deployment of counter‑unmanned systems.
The program requires an annual unclassified report to the Armed Services Committees describing activities, progress, coordination with existing U.S. programs, and recommendations; that report can include a classified annex. Congress authorizes $150 million per year for FY2026–2030 to implement this program.
Separately, the bill authorizes a United States‑Israel emerging technology capabilities program covering AI, cybersecurity, robotics, quantum, and automation, but conditions activity on a memorandum of agreement between the parties. That MOA must include cost‑sharing provisions (including in‑kind support), an IP‑rights negotiation framework, and a requirement that Israel provide semiannual reports to DoD on any Israeli government expenditures under the program; DoD may not begin activities under the authority until it submits the MOA and a certification to the Armed Services Committees.
The bill authorizes $50 million per year for FY2026–2030 for that work and designates the Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate as lead for implementation once the required report is filed.The measure also amends two existing authorities: it raises the anti‑tunnel cooperation cap from $50 million to $80 million and extends its sunset to December 31, 2028; and it raises the counter‑unmanned aerial systems cooperation cap from $55 million to $75 million and extends that authority to December 31, 2028. It extends the war reserves stockpile authority through January 1, 2029.
Operationally, DoD must establish a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel within 180 days to engage Israel’s MOD and private sector on dual‑use risks from Iran and to deepen innovation ties. DoD must also engage Israel about ascension into the U.S. national technology and industrial base within 90 days, taking steps to protect sensitive information.
Finally, DoD must deliver a 180‑day assessment and report on integrated air and missile defense for the CENTCOM region that evaluates current capacity, options to strengthen cooperation with Israel and other partners, and the funding and authorities required to reach full operational capability.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill authorizes $150,000,000 per year (FY2026–2030) to stand up and run a U.S.‑Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program and requires establishment of a DoD program office to manage it.
It increases the authorized anti‑tunnel cooperation from $50,000,000 to $80,000,000 and moves the statutory sunset to December 31, 2028.
It authorizes $50,000,000 per year (FY2026–2030) for a joint emerging‑technology program but bars any activity until DoD submits an MOA that mandates cost‑sharing, an IP framework, and semiannual Israeli expenditure reports.
DoD must establish a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel within 180 days and engage Israel on inclusion in the U.S. national technology and industrial base within 90 days, with protective measures for sensitive information.
DoD must produce an assessment and 180‑day report on integrated air and missile defense in the CENTCOM region, including what funding and new legal authorities would be necessary to expand cooperation with Israel and regional partners.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
United States‑Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program
Section 3 directs DoD and the Israeli Ministry of Defense to create a formal bilateral C‑UAS program. Practically, DoD must set up an internal program office to coordinate collaborative R&D, testing, data‑sharing, joint training, and procurement/deployment of counter‑unmanned technologies. The statutory obligation to report annually to the Armed Services Committees (unclassified with classified annex allowed) creates a recurring oversight touchpoint that will shape transparency, metrics, and budget requests.
Increased Funding and Extension for Anti‑Tunnel Cooperation
This amendment to the FY2016 NDAA provision raises the program ceiling from $50M to $80M and extends the program’s authorization through December 31, 2028. For implementers, the change increases available procurement and sustainment dollars for tunnel detection, mapping, and mitigation systems while leaving program structure and reporting in place under the original statute.
Modification of Existing U.S.‑Israel Counter‑UAS Authority
Section 5 amends the FY2020 counter‑UAS statute by increasing its funding cap from $55M to $75M and extending the authority to the end of 2028. That lifts a prior funding constraint and synchronizes expiration dates across related bilateral authorities, which simplifies portfolio planning for DoD and OSD staff who manage cooperative security assistance and technology transfers.
Emerging‑Technology Cooperation with Cost‑Sharing and IP Safeguards
Section 6 authorizes joint RDT&E in AI, cyber, robotics, quantum, and automation, but it conditions operations on a submitted MOA. The MOA must require cost sharing (including in‑kind contributions), establish a process to negotiate IP rights, and require semiannual Israeli reporting on Israeli government expenditures. Until DoD transmits this MOA and certifies compliance with those elements to the Armed Services Committees, no activities may begin — a gating mechanism that gives Congress visibility before obligations are incurred.
Extension of War Reserves Stockpile Authority
This single‑line amendment extends the statutory authority for war reserve stockpiles through January 1, 2029. That keeps a tool for prepositioning materiel and contingency stocks in effect for an additional two years and affects planning for logistics, depot space, and sustainment funding.
Defense Innovation Unit Office in Israel
Section 8 requires DoD to open a DIU office in Israel within 180 days to coordinate with Israel’s MOD and private sector on countering Iranian dual‑use threats and to leverage bilateral innovation. Managers will need to reconcile DIU’s commercial engagement model with host‑nation security constraints and U.S. classification/export rules when scouting procureable technologies.
NATIB Engagement and IAMD Assessment for CENTCOM
Section 9 orders DoD to initiate discussions about Israel’s path into the U.S. national technology and industrial base within 90 days, with an explicit instruction to protect sensitive information. Section 10 requires a CENTCOM‑region integrated air and missile defense assessment and a 180‑day report covering current capability, options to deepen cooperation with Israel and other partners, and identification of funding and legal authorities needed to reach full operational capability — effectively a blueprint tasking for future budget and policy decisions.
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Explore Defense in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. combatant commanders and warfighters — gain coordinated access to new counter‑UAS tools, joint training, and interoperable systems that can improve operational readiness and force protection in contested environments.
- Israeli defense industry, startups, and research institutions — receive expanded access to U.S. partnership, joint R&D funding streams, and procurement pathways that can accelerate commercialization and exports under bilateral agreements.
- U.S. defense innovation community including DIU and Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate — obtain institutional authorities and dedicated funding to field prototypes more rapidly and to pursue co‑development with Israeli firms and labs.
- Regional partner militaries — stand to benefit indirectly if the CENTCOM IAMD assessment leads to deeper trilateral or multilateral integration, shared sensors, or coordinated command arrangements.
- Congress and oversight bodies — receive recurring, structured reporting (annual and semiannual) that improves visibility into joint spending, IP arrangements, and program outcomes.
Who Bears the Cost
- Department of Defense — must allocate appropriated dollars, staff the new program office, stand up the DIU mission in Israel, and absorb the administrative burden of expanded reporting and interagency coordination.
- U.S. taxpayers — appropriations authorized ($150M and $50M annually for FY2026–2030, plus increased caps elsewhere) increase budgetary commitments and may displace other priorities absent offsetting savings.
- U.S. defense contractors not affiliated with Israeli partners — face increased competition for R&D and procurement dollars and may need to adjust bids to account for bilateral cost‑sharing and IP provisions.
- DoD acquisition and security offices — will manage complex export control, classification, and IP negotiations, raising compliance costs and potentially slowing transitions from prototype to production.
- Smaller partner nations — could be sidelined if expanded bilateral integration creates capability sets and procurement lines closed to others for national security reasons.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is whether to accelerate bilateral co‑development to field capabilities fast enough to meet evolving threats — risking leakage of sensitive technology, complicated IP claims, and pressure on the U.S. industrial base — or to preserve tight U.S. control over advanced technologies and procurement, which slows fielding and reduces Israel’s incentive to invest. The bill chooses deeper partnership but defers the hardest trade‑offs (IP allocation, export controls, and cost‑share levels) to implementation, leaving operational urgency and industrial security in tension.
The bill formalizes and finances deep bilateral cooperation, but it leaves key implementation choices to DoD and the Defense Department’s negotiations with Israel. Requiring an MOA before emerging‑tech activities begin gives Congress leverage, but the statute does not prescribe the substance of IP‑sharing rules, the valuation of in‑kind contributions, or dispute resolution mechanisms — all of which will shape who controls downstream commercialization and acquisition rights.
Similarly, the cost‑sharing requirement broadens Israeli fiscal involvement, but it does not establish minimum or maximum shares, so budget negotiations could become bargaining chips that slow projects.
Information protection and export controls are recurring fault lines. The bill repeatedly instructs parties to ‘‘protect sensitive information’’ yet couples that with open collaboration and a DIU presence that specializes in commercial engagement.
Reconciling commercial engagement, host‑nation law, and U.S. classification and ITAR/Export Administration Regulations will require detailed policy work; mistakes could either leak sensitive capabilities or block promising co‑development. Finally, the appropriations authorizations and expanded program offices increase DoD’s administrative and oversight load; unless Congress appropriates the authorized sums and funds supporting personnel and compliance functions, the programs may be under‑resourced despite nominal authorizations.
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