This bill creates multiple, targeted vehicles to deepen U.S.–Israel defense cooperation. It directs the Secretary of Defense to stand up a bilateral Counter‑Unmanned Systems program and an Emerging Technology Capabilities program with Israel, establishes a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel, extends and increases funding for existing cooperative programs, and orders assessments and reporting tied to these efforts.
The measure matters because it shifts the relationship from periodic cooperation to sustained, programmatic integration: dedicated program offices, multi‑year funding authorizations, formal memoranda of agreement for R&D cost‑sharing and IP, and explicit requirements for semiannual and annual reporting. For defense planners, industry and compliance teams, the bill raises immediate questions about program governance, information protection, intellectual‑property arrangements, and budget trade‑offs.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill requires the Department of Defense to establish a U.S.–Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems program (including a DoD program office), authorizes a bilateral emerging‑technology RDT&E program subject to an MOA, directs establishment of a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel, and orders several defense assessments and report submissions to congressional armed‑services committees.
Who It Affects
DoD organizations (including acquisition and the Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate), the Israeli Ministry of Defense, U.S. and Israeli defense contractors and academic partners, and regional partners whose air and missile defense posture intersects with U.S. Central Command responsibilities.
Why It Matters
The bill institutionalizes bilateral R&D and procurement pathways rather than ad hoc cooperation, creating recurring funding lines, formal reporting rhythms, and explicit governance expectations—shifts that affect procurement planning, export control compliance, industrial participation, and IP negotiation strategies.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill instructs the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from Israel’s Minister of Defense, to establish a formal United States‑Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program. That program must cover collaborative research, joint training and information sharing, procurement and deployment of counter‑unmanned capabilities, and creation of a dedicated program office inside DoD to manage execution.
The statute also requires an annual, mostly unclassified report to the congressional armed‑services committees documenting activities, assessments of threat mitigation progress, coordination with existing U.S. programs, and program needs.
Separately, the Secretary may enter a joint Emerging Defense Technology Capabilities program with Israel—targeting AI, cybersecurity, robotics, quantum, and automation—but only after providing Congress with a memorandum of agreement that includes cost‑sharing, an IP framework, and assurances about semiannual reporting by Israel on any funds it expends. After that report, the Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate becomes the lead DoD agency for implementing the program and will receive semiannual expenditure updates from Israel.The bill also amends two prior U.S.–Israel cooperation authorities: it increases funding caps and extends expiration dates for anti‑tunnel and counter‑unmanned aerial systems programs.
It pushes back the end date for war reserves stockpile authority, orders a DoD assessment of integrated air and missile defense in the CENTCOM area (with requirements to consider recent Iranian strikes on Israel), requires seeking discussions about Israel’s potential inclusion in the U.S. national technology and industrial base, and directs the establishment of a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel within a set timeframe to coordinate private‑sector engagement and counter dual‑use threats.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill authorizes $150 million per year for the Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program for fiscal years 2026–2030.
It requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an initial report on the Emerging Technology Memorandum of Agreement before any joint RDT&E activities begin, including cost‑sharing and IP terms, and mandates semiannual expenditure reports from Israel.
The emerging‑technology program designates the Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate as DoD’s lead once the required report is submitted.
It increases previously authorized U.S.–Israel anti‑tunnel cooperation funding from $50 million to $80 million and extends that program’s authority to December 31, 2028.
The Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel must be established within 180 days of enactment to coordinate private‑sector cooperation and counter Iranian dual‑use developments.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Creates the U.S.–Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program
This section directs the Secretary of Defense, with the Israeli Minister of Defense’s concurrence, to form a bilateral program for developing, testing, and fielding technologies that defeat unmanned systems. Practically, the statute insists on a DoD program office to manage collaborative R&D, joint exercises, information‑sharing protocols, and procurement. The requirement for an annual unclassified report (with a possible classified annex) institutionalizes congressional oversight and forces program planners to separate operational details that can be public from classified technical specifics that cannot.
Modifies prior anti‑tunnel cooperation authority
Section 4 amends the 2016 authorization to raise the authorized funding level for U.S.–Israel anti‑tunnel cooperation and to extend the program’s sunset. For implementers this means an extended window to obligate funds and greater procurement flexibility; for contracting officers it increases the pool of programs subject to bilateral procurement rules and oversight, and may accelerate bilateral project pipelines already in motion.
Adjusts U.S.–Israel counter‑UAS program funding and duration
This amendment lifts the authorized funding cap and pushes the expiration date for the counter‑UAS cooperation authority. That change preserves a statutory vehicle used for procurement and assistance tied to counter‑UAS capabilities and gives program managers more runway to plan multi‑year procurements or joint fielding activities.
Authorizes an Emerging Defense Technology Capabilities program with safeguards
The Secretary may jointly conduct RDT&E in AI, cyber, robotics, quantum and automation with Israel, but only after submitting to Congress a memorandum of agreement that addresses cost‑sharing, an IP rights framework, and supporting documents. The provision conditions the start of joint activities on that MOA and requires semiannual Israeli expenditure reports. It balances authority to cooperate with affirmative controls designed to give Congress visibility into funding flows and IP arrangements before work begins.
Extends war reserve stockpile authority
A single‑line statutory change delays the sunset date for war reserve stockpile authority. Operationally this preserves the legal basis to maintain and use a U.S. war reserve stockpile for the region and avoids a sudden lapse that could complicate readiness or logistics planning.
Requires a Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) office in Israel
Within 180 days the Secretary must establish a DIU office on the ground in Israel. That office is explicitly tasked with engaging Israel’s MOD and private sector on dual‑use threats and harnessing joint innovation for national security. For US industry engagement this creates a local DoD presence to broker partnerships, accelerate pilots, and shepherd promising technologies through DoD touchpoints.
Starts NTIB discussions over Israel’s industrial base inclusion
The Secretary must seek to engage Israel on the process for ascension into the U.S. national technology and industrial base. While not mandating admission, the provision opens formal dialogue and frames any exchange with explicit instructions to protect sensitive information—signalling an intent to explore deeper industrial cooperation subject to security constraints.
Orders CENTCOM integrated air and missile defense assessment
DoD must assess the current integrated air and missile defense posture in the CENTCOM area, identify gaps and resource or legal authorities required to expand cooperation with partners, and submit an unclassified report (with possible classified annex) within a statutory timeframe. The assessment must consider specific strategy language from the FY2023 NDAA and lessons from recent Iranian strikes against Israel, tying the assessment to policy directives and operational lessons learned.
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Explore Defense in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Israeli defense firms and research institutions — they gain structured access to U.S. R&D partnerships, potential procurement pathways, and direct DIU engagement that can accelerate commercialization and export opportunities.
- U.S. Defense acquisition and operational units — program offices and warfighters receive prioritized funding streams and bilateral tools to test and field counter‑unmanned and emerging technologies with an allied operator in realistic settings.
- U.S. and Israeli academic and private sector partners in AI, quantum, robotics, and cybersecurity — the bill explicitly channels joint RDT&E and private‑sector engagement, creating new grant, contract, and pilot opportunities for innovation and testing.
Who Bears the Cost
- U.S. Department of Defense budgets/taxpayers — the bill authorizes multi‑year appropriations that will consume discretionary budget space and require allocation decisions across competing readiness and modernization priorities.
- Small and mid‑sized contractors — increased bilateral programs and MOA requirements may impose compliance, IP negotiation, and export‑control burdens that raise transaction costs and deter participation by firms without in‑house legal or compliance resources.
- DoD program offices and oversight committees — annual and semiannual reporting, plus a classified annex structure and NAtional Technology and Industrial Base discussions, increase administrative and oversight workloads without explicit offsets or staffing authorizations.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is speed versus safeguards: Congress and DoD want rapid, integrated capability development with an allied operator to counter urgent threats, but doing so risks sensitive technology exposure, contested IP ownership, and strained U.S. budgetary priorities—so the bill must balance operational urgency against durable protections for national security and the domestic industrial base.
The bill threads a narrow path between rapid bilateral capability development and numerous governance risks. It requires memoranda of agreement and semiannual Israeli expenditure reports for emerging‑tech efforts, but it leaves substantial discretion to DoD on how to structure IP rights, classify project elements, and balance cost‑sharing versus strategic advantage.
That discretion creates implementation uncertainty: DoD must negotiate terms that protect U.S. access and competitive advantage while offering Israel sufficiently attractive IP and commercialization arrangements to secure meaningful cooperation.
A second set of trade‑offs sits at the intersection of information sharing, export controls, and the industrial base. Deepening operational integration—shared testing, procurement and DIU pilots—can accelerate fielding but raises the risk that sensitive U.S. technologies or techniques will be exposed to third parties, or that U.S. firms will lose competitive rights in jointly developed IP.
The bill’s reporting requirements provide visibility but not prescriptive guardrails for export control harmonization, deconfliction of procurement priorities, or mitigation of subsidy and market‑distortion risks within the allied industrial base.
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