HB 1839, the Move the ICC Out of NYC Act of 2025, would require the United States to pursue a supplemental agreement to the United Nations Headquarters Agreement that prohibits the International Criminal Court from hosting, leasing, or using United Nations facilities within the United States. The bill frames this as a policy step consistent with the United States’ non-ratification of the Rome Statute and the stated lack of ICC jurisdiction over U.S. persons.
It designates the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations as the lead negotiator and sets a deadline linked to the opening of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly for beginning those negotiations. If enacted, the measure would authorize renegotiation of the UN HQ Agreement to constrain ICC access to U.S.–based UN facilities, notably in New York.
This is a negotiation-driven mechanism rather than an enforcement action within U.S. courts or domestic law.
At a Glance
What It Does
The act instructs the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to seek a supplemental agreement to the UN Headquarters Agreement that would prohibit the United Nations from hosting or allowing ICC use of its facilities in the United States.
Who It Affects
Directly affects the United Nations Headquarters in New York, the International Criminal Court, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, along with U.S. foreign affairs agencies tasked with treaty negotiations.
Why It Matters
It signals a strategic use of treaty leverage to constrain ICC operations on U.S. soil, reflecting sovereignty concerns and a preference for restricting ICC access to U.S. facilities via the UN Headquarters framework.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill lays the groundwork to curb ICC access to U.S.–based UN facilities by pushing for a modification to the UN Headquarters Agreement. It adds that the ICC has no jurisdiction in the United States and notes the status of the Rome Statute in relation to U.S. law.
The core procedural move is Section 4, which requires negotiations to draft a supplemental agreement within a defined timeline after the 80th UNGA opens. The ultimate aim is to prohibit the UN from hosting or allowing the ICC to use its facilities in the United States.
The text emphasizes the l egitimacy of such negotiations under existing agreements and clarifies definitions to anchor the policy approach in current U.S. law and international arrangements. The article does not prescribe domestic sanctions or enforcement mechanisms beyond the negotiation requirement; it relies on treaty renegotiation as the instrument to alter access to UN facilities in the U.S., particularly in New York City.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill requires the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to initiate negotiations for a supplemental UN Headquarters Agreement to bar ICC access to U.S.–based UN facilities.
Negotiations must begin within 30 days after the opening date of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly.
The definitions tie the ICC and Rome Statute to existing U.S. law (22 U.S.C. 7432, the American Service Members’ Protection Act).
The ICC is stated to have no jurisdiction within the United States or over U.S. persons.
The instrument sought is a supplemental agreement to the UN Headquarters Agreement restricting ICC use of U.N. facilities in the United States (notably in New York).
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short Title
This section provides the bill’s official short title, the Move the ICC Out of NYC Act of 2025. It names the act as the mechanism for pursuing the policy described in the subsequent sections.
Findings
Section 2 catalogs factual statements about the UN and the United States’ relationship to the UN and ICC. It notes the UN Charter’s ratification, the UN Headquarters Agreement, the absence of Rome Statute ratification by the United States, and the claim that the ICC lacks U.S. jurisdiction. It also identifies that the ICC maintains an office at the UN Headquarters in New York and that the UN Headquarters Agreement has been amended through supplemental arrangements with the U.S. as the representative of the United States.
Definitions
Section 3 defines the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute, as well as the United Nations Headquarters Agreement. It ties these terms to the statutory framework referenced elsewhere in the bill, anchoring the proposal in preexisting statutory and international-law constructs.
Supplement to United Nations Headquarters Agreement
Section 4 mandates a diplomatic process. Not later than 30 days after the opening date of the 80th UNGA, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN must seek to open negotiations for a supplemental agreement to prohibit the United Nations from hosting, leasing, or otherwise allowing use of its facilities within the United States by the ICC. This creates a procedural mechanism to alter access to U.N. facilities through treaty renegotiation, rather than through domestic law or ICC jurisdiction changes.
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Who Benefits
- The United States Department of State and its Office of International Organizations, which would lead the negotiations and coordinate policy objectives.
- The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, who is empowered to initiate and conduct the negotiations under the bill.
- U.S. lawmakers and foreign affairs committees (e.g., House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee) that supervise treaty and UN-related policy, gaining a new leverage point in international negotiations.
- Advocates of U.S. sovereignty and those supporting selective engagement with international criminal courts may view the instrument as advancing national prerogatives.
Who Bears the Cost
- The United Nations Headquarters and UN facilities in New York could face renegotiation pressures and operational adjustments to comply with a new supplemental agreement.
- The International Criminal Court would see a practical reduction in its access to UN facilities in the U.S., potentially affecting its urban and field operations in the U.S.-based UN complex.
- U.S. diplomatic staff and the broader U.S. diplomatic budget could incur costs associated with negotiating a formal amendment to the UN Headquarters Agreement.
- Potential friction with the UN system that supports the UN Headquarters and related operations, which could complicate broader international cooperation in other areas.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
Should the United States use the UN Headquarters Agreement as a lever to restrict ICC access to U.S.–based UN facilities, potentially limiting international criminal justice cooperation, or should it maintain traditional UN-ICC engagement channels and respect existing UN legal frameworks even if that preserves ICC access?
The bill constructs a negotiation-based lever to constrain ICC access to UN facilities in the United States. The core tension lies in balancing U.S. sovereignty and treaty prerogatives against the practical realities of international cooperation and the UN system’s functioning.
While the act asserts ICC jurisdictional limitations and leverages a renegotiated UN Headquarters Agreement, it does not spell out enforcement mechanisms, dispute-settlement procedures, or potential exemptions. It also hinges on the political viability and legal acceptability of amending the UN Headquarters Agreement, which involves multilateral considerations and potential implications for the UN’s relationship with the United States.
A practical question is whether a supplemental agreement can be crafted without undermining broader UN operations or triggering broader legal challenges under international law. The measure assumes that altering access to UN facilities through a bilateral or multilateral instrument is both desirable and feasible, but it does not address enforcement, exceptions, or how the UN would respond to such an amendment if negotiated or rejected by other parties to the underlying agreements.
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