The Sovereign Enforcement Integrity Act of 2025 prohibits state, territorial, District of Columbia, and local officers, employees, and agents from arresting or detaining foreign nationals in the United States solely because of a warrant, indictment, summons, or other process issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC). It also bars local cooperation with ICC arrest or detention efforts and forbids the use of state or local funds, facilities, personnel, or equipment to carry out those actions.
The bill centralizes authority over any U.S. cooperation with the ICC: the only exceptions are (1) a specific act of Congress authorizing cooperation in a given case or (2) a written presidential certification to Congress that such cooperation is essential to a declared national security interest with a specific authorization. The statute expressly preempts any state or local law that conflicts with this rule.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill makes it unlawful for state and local actors to arrest, detain, or assist in detention of a foreign national solely on the basis of an ICC-issued process and forbids using state or local resources for such actions. It creates two narrow exceptions — specific congressional authorization or a presidential national-security certification with written authorization to Congress.
Who It Affects
State, territorial, D.C., and local law enforcement agencies and elected officials responsible for arrest and detention policies; foreign nationals present in the U.S. who are the subject of ICC actions; and the federal executive and legislative branches, which hold the discretionary power to authorize cooperation in particular cases.
Why It Matters
The bill shifts responsibility for responding to ICC requests from subnational authorities to the federal government and creates a uniform national rule. It closes a potential pathway for local enforcement of international arrest requests while concentrating decisionmaking in Congress and the President, which has implications for foreign policy, criminal accountability, and intergovernmental relations.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The Act starts by stating Congress’s view that the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and that matters touching international law enforcement and foreign nationals are questions for the federal government. Building on that premise, it prohibits any state or local officer, employee, or agent from arresting, detaining, or otherwise depriving a foreign national of liberty when the only basis is an ICC-issued warrant, indictment, summons, or similar process.
It also forbids cooperation with the ICC’s efforts to effectuate such arrests and bars the use of state or local funds, facilities, personnel, or equipment for those purposes.
Rather than an absolute ban, the bill sets out two discrete paths to authorized cooperation. First, Congress may pass a law that explicitly authorizes cooperation with the ICC in a specific case.
Second, the President may certify to Congress that cooperation is essential to a declared national security interest and provide a specific written authorization tied to that certification. Those are the only statutory exceptions; absent them, state and local actors must stand down when an ICC process is the sole legal basis for arrest or detention.The statute contains an express preemption clause: it supersedes any state or local law, policy, or regulation that would permit, require, or authorize actions inconsistent with this Act.
It also includes a severability clause so that if part of the Act is invalidated, the remainder remains in force. Practically, the bill creates a uniform floor preventing local engagement with ICC enforcement unless the federal government — through Congress or the President — takes affirmative, case-specific steps to permit it.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill makes it unlawful for any state, territorial, D.C.
or local officer or agent to arrest or detain a foreign national solely on the basis of an ICC-issued warrant, indictment, summons, or similar process.
State and local authorities are barred from cooperating with the ICC to effectuate arrests or from using their funds, facilities, personnel, or equipment to assist in such actions.
Congressional authorization in the form of a statute specific to a case can lift the prohibition for that case only.
The President can lift the prohibition for a specific case only by certifying to Congress that cooperation is essential to a declared national security interest and issuing a written authorization.
The Act expressly preempts any state or local law, policy, or regulation inconsistent with its prohibitions and includes a severability clause.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title
Declares the Act’s name as the 'Sovereign Enforcement Integrity Act of 2025.' This is purely nominative but signals the bill’s thrust: to prioritize sovereign control over enforcement decisions related to the ICC.
Findings and purpose
Sets out factual and constitutional findings: that the U.S. is not party to the Rome Statute, that foreign-relations authority is federal, and that state or local action on ICC processes could conflict with federal foreign policy. The stated purpose is to preempt state and local enforcement unless federal law or presidential action authorizes cooperation. Those findings do not themselves create rights but frame congressional intent, which matters for statutory interpretation and potential judicial review.
Prohibition on state or local enforcement
Imposes the core prohibitions in three buckets: (1) forbids arrest, detention, or deprivation of liberty of a foreign national when the sole basis is an ICC process; (2) forbids cooperation or assistance to the ICC to effectuate such arrests; and (3) forbids use of state or local resources for those activities. The 'solely on the basis' formulation narrows the ban to situations where an ICC process is the exclusive legal error or cause, leaving open scenarios where domestic warrants or other legal bases exist concurrently.
Exceptions: congressional and presidential authorization
Provides two narrowly tailored exceptions. Congress can enact a statute explicitly authorizing cooperation with the ICC in a particular case. Separately, the President may certify to Congress that cooperation is essential to a declared national security interest and give a written, case-specific authorization. Both exceptions are deliberately case-specific rather than blanket permissions, concentrating decisionmaking at the federal level.
Preemption
Declares the Act to supersede any state or local law, policy, or regulation inconsistent with its prohibitions. Practically, that displaces state statutes or local ordinances that would permit or require local cooperation with ICC requests; it does not itself create federal positive obligations to act on ICC requests — rather, it removes state-level authority to act.
Severability
Includes a standard severability clause so that if one provision is held unconstitutional or invalid in a particular application, the remainder of the Act stands. That design anticipates potential litigation over particular phrases (for example, 'solely on the basis') or the scope of federal preemption.
This bill is one of many.
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Explore Foreign Affairs in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Foreign nationals in the United States who are the subject of ICC processes — they gain protection against arrest or detention by state or local authorities when the ICC process is the only asserted legal basis for detention.
- State, territorial, D.C., and local law enforcement agencies — they receive a clear statutory rule limiting obligations and eliminating the risk of being drawn into international arrest operations absent federal direction.
- Municipalities and state governments — they avoid potential political and diplomatic entanglements and the budgetary costs of cooperating with or litigating over ICC arrests, because the Act forbids use of local resources for those purposes.
Who Bears the Cost
- International Criminal Court and its investigators — the Act blocks an enforcement pathway within U.S. jurisdiction when local actors might otherwise assist, reducing practical reach against subjects present in the United States.
- Victims and advocates seeking accountability through the ICC — limiting local cooperation could make domestic apprehension and transfer more difficult in cases where federal authorization is not granted.
- Federal government (Congress and the Executive) — the Act concentrates decisionmaking at the federal level, creating a potential operational and political burden on Congress to authorize cooperation in individual cases or on the President to decide and justify exceptions, with attendant diplomatic and national-security trade-offs.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill resolves a constitutional and foreign-policy tension by removing state-level engagement with ICC enforcement, but in doing so it forces a trade-off between U.S. control over foreign relations and the international community’s ability to hold individuals accountable; concentrating discretion in Congress and the President reduces fragmentation but increases the risk that political considerations, rather than legal merits, will determine whether a case proceeds.
The bill’s 'solely on the basis' language is consequential and creates ambiguity. It appears to allow states to act when there is an independent domestic charge or lawful basis for arrest that is not merely the ICC process; that carving-out may be litigated and will require guidance on how domestic and international processes intersect.
Courts will likely be asked to parse whether an ICC warrant is truly the sole basis for an arrest in practice, and that interpretation will shape how broadly the ban operates.
Concentrating discretion in Congress and the President resolves the federalism problem by centralizing foreign-relations authority, but it also politicizes responses to ICC requests. The presidential national-security certification is a low-frequency, high-salience tool; using it will invite scrutiny and could be challenged as an improper delegation of judicial or prosecutorial functions.
The preemption clause prevents state-level cooperation but does not compel the federal government to assist the ICC; that gap may frustrate international partners and victims seeking accountability while also insulating the United States from treaty obligations it has not assumed. Implementation will require administrative guidance about identifying 'foreign national' status, notifying federal authorities when ICC processes are presented to local agencies, and handling conflicts where domestic and ICC processes overlap.
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