The STOP MADURO Act raises the cap on payments under the Department of State Rewards Program for information that directly leads to the arrest and conviction of Nicolas Maduro Moros to $100,000,000 and authorizes the Secretary of State to pay that amount to one or more individuals. The bill expressly overrides the existing statutory cap in 22 U.S.C. 2708(e)(1).
Crucially, the bill requires that any payment come exclusively from the liquidation of assets being withheld from Maduro, Maduro regime officials, and their co-conspirators under specified sanctions authorities and Executive Orders. That linkage repurposes sanctioned assets to finance criminal-intelligence incentives, creating operational, legal, and diplomatic trade-offs for sanctions and forfeiture regimes.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill authorizes the Secretary of State to pay up to $100 million under the State Department Rewards Program for information that directly leads to Maduro’s arrest and conviction, notwithstanding the current statutory cap. It confines funding for any such payment to proceeds from liquidating assets withheld from Maduro, his officials, and co-conspirators under listed sanctions statutes and Executive Orders.
Who It Affects
The Department of State’s Rewards Program, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Treasury (which hold and administer blocked assets), U.S. law enforcement and federal prosecutors pursuing Venezuela-related narcotics charges, potential informants, and any third parties with legal claims on frozen or blocked assets.
Why It Matters
This is an uncommon legislative move: a large, targeted reward funded not from appropriations but from sanctions proceeds. It ties criminal-investigative incentives directly to sanctions enforcement and asset-forfeiture processes, with implications for litigation over assets, sanctions administration, and U.S. diplomacy toward Venezuela.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The STOP MADURO Act changes two mechanics of the existing Rewards Program. First, it increases the maximum reward available for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Nicolas Maduro Moros to $100 million and allows the Secretary of State to pay that amount to one or more qualifying informants.
Second, it restricts the source of any payment: the statute requires that payment come only from the liquidation of assets being withheld from Maduro, Maduro regime officials, and their co-conspirators under a set of sanctions authorities and Executive Orders.
Operationally, the bill relies on the existing definitions and procedures in section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act (the Rewards Program) for what constitutes qualifying information and who may receive payments. It does not create a new rewards bureaucracy or change the Rewards Program’s substantive eligibility criteria; rather, it supplements the program with an increased ceiling and a narrowly prescribed funding source.
The bill explicitly overrides the cap set in 22 U.S.C. 2708(e)(1).By tying payment to liquidation of blocked assets, the statute channels forfeiture or sale proceeds held by the President or by OFAC to reward payments. That means a reward cannot be paid from general Treasury balances or new appropriations; payment waits on an asset-collection and liquidation process that is often administratively complex and litigated by third parties.
The bill enumerates specific authorities that can supply the funds—among them the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, and several Venezuela-focused Executive Orders—so only assets withheld under those or any other sanctions provisions identified would be eligible.In practice, the measure adds an aggressive tool for generating human intelligence against a named target while creating dependencies on sanctions enforcement, asset management, and litigation outcomes. The Secretary of State retains discretion over awards under the Rewards Program, but this bill narrows where the money can come from and creates an unusually large single-target reward that could change how OFAC, Treasury, and Justice coordinate on asset disposition and litigation strategy.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill raises the maximum State Department reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Nicolas Maduro Moros to $100,000,000.
It expressly overrides the statutory cap in 22 U.S.C. 2708(e)(1), authorizing the Secretary of State to make the larger payment to one or more individuals.
Any payment must be derived exclusively from liquidation of assets being withheld from Maduro, Maduro regime officials, and co-conspirators by the President or OFAC.
The bill lists specific authorities whose withheld assets may fund the payout, including the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, and multiple Venezuela-related Executive Orders.
The reward is limited to information described by section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act—i.e.
information that directly leads to the target’s arrest and conviction under U.S. law.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short titles (STOP MADURO Act)
Designates the bill’s official short titles: the Securing Timely Opportunities for Payment and Maximizing Awards for Detaining Unlawful Regime Officials Act of 2025 and the STOP MADURO Act. This is a drafting formality but signals the bill’s narrow, target-specific purpose and frames subsequent provisions as emergency-style enforcement measures.
Findings underpinning the measure
Recites factual background: the 2020 U.S. criminal charges against Maduro alleging narco-terrorism and related offenses, DOJ press releases describing the alleged conduct, and cited asset seizures (approximately $450 million in the findings). These findings are not operative law but provide legislative justification for the reward increase and for using sanctions-related assets to fund it.
Authorization to increase rewards
Substantively amends the State Department’s Rewards Program by authorizing payments of up to $100 million for information that directly leads to Maduro’s arrest and conviction. It specifically carves out an exception to the existing limit in section 36(e)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act, vesting the Secretary of State with authority to make such payments to one or more persons under the existing standards of section 36(b). This keeps the Rewards Program’s decisionmaking framework intact while lifting the cap for this single target.
Source and limits on funding
Requires that any authorized payment be funded exclusively from the liquidation of assets withheld from Maduro or his co-conspirators under enumerated sanctions statutes and Executive Orders, and allows other sanctions provisions to qualify as well. Practically, this channels proceeds from sanctions enforcement and forfeiture into the Rewards Program rather than using appropriated funds, but it makes payment contingent on successful asset restraint, potential forfeiture proceedings, and liquidation—each of which involves separate legal and administrative processes.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Potential informants and cooperating witnesses — they gain access to an unusually large monetary incentive (up to $100M) tied explicitly to Maduro’s arrest and conviction, increasing the potential payoff for high-risk disclosures.
- U.S. law enforcement and federal prosecutors (e.g., DOJ, FBI) — larger rewards can accelerate intelligence development and encourage insiders to come forward, improving prospects for building cases tied to narcotics and terrorism-related charges.
- State Department Rewards Program — gains a targeted, high-value tool that can be deployed for a single high-profile foreign target without changing the Program’s eligibility criteria.
- Sanctions enforcement community (OFAC/Treasury) — the bill creates a clear pathway for repurposing blocked assets to further criminal accountability, potentially increasing the operational utility of sanctions holdings.
Who Bears the Cost
- Owners and alleged beneficiaries of frozen or blocked assets (Maduro, regime officials, co-conspirators) — their assets become the explicit funding source for rewards and may be prioritized for liquidation rather than other claims or uses.
- U.S. Treasury/OFAC (administrative cost and litigation exposure) — OFAC will face additional administrative steps and possibly litigation to liquidate assets for reward payments, diverting resources from other enforcement priorities.
- Third-party claimants and victims — litigants asserting ownership or competing claims on frozen assets may face accelerated or altered forfeiture timelines; victims who might otherwise receive restitution could see asset allocations change.
- U.S. diplomacy and negotiation leverage — the executive branch may have reduced flexibility in negotiations with Venezuela if major assets are earmarked to fund a high-profile reward rather than negotiated settlements or repatriation arrangements.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill pushes aggressively for accountability by offering an unprecedented, targeted monetary incentive, but it makes that incentive contingent on seized assets that are limited, contested, and administratively difficult to convert into cash; thus it trades a stronger tool for apprehension against practical, legal, and diplomatic hurdles that could frustrate or delay the very outcome it seeks.
The measure creates several implementation and legal challenges. First, it ties reward payments to asset liquidation, but blocked assets are frequently subject to complex ownership claims and international litigation; funds may be tied up in court for years, making payment uncertain or delayed.
Second, the bill narrows the funding source to assets withheld under specified sanctions authorities; that exclusivity prevents the use of appropriated funds and raises questions about priority among competing claims (criminal forfeiture, civil judgments, victim restitution, or diplomatic settlement). Third, repurposing sanctioned assets for reward payments could invite legal challenges from third parties who claim ownership or who argue statutory limits on how forfeiture or blocked-asset proceeds may be used.
Operationally, a $100 million award focused on a single individual is unusual and could create perverse incentives, including risks to informants and to the chain-of-custody or verification of information that ‘‘directly leads’’ to arrest and conviction. It also imposes coordination costs: State Department reward determinations, OFAC asset management, Treasury legal teams, and DOJ litigators would need clear protocols and likely interagency memoranda of understanding to allocate funds, handle competing claims, and manage timing.
Finally, the choice to fund enforcement incentives from sanctions proceeds has diplomatic consequences; it could constrain the executive branch in negotiations that involve asset repatriation or settlement and may be perceived internationally as blending criminal accountability with financial appropriation of foreign assets.
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