Codify — Article

STOP MADURO Act authorizes State Dept. reward paid from seized Venezuelan assets

Creates a new $100 million cap for State Department rewards tied exclusively to liquidation of assets withheld from Nicolás Maduro and associates, reshaping how such bounties are funded and administered.

The Brief

This bill authorizes the Secretary of State to offer a greatly expanded reward under the Department of State Rewards Program for information that directly leads to the arrest and conviction of Nicolás Maduro. It changes the funding model by directing that any payment come exclusively from the liquidation of assets being withheld from Maduro, Maduro-regime officials, and their co-conspirators under U.S. sanctions authorities.

The measure matters because it both raises the stakes on one high-profile international criminal target and links reward payouts to sanctioned-asset recoveries rather than appropriated funds. That shift creates new operational, legal, and policy questions for State, Treasury/OFAC, Justice, and parties with competing claims on seized assets.

At a Glance

What It Does

The bill amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act to allow the Secretary of State to pay up to $100,000,000 for information leading to Nicolás Maduro’s arrest and conviction, notwithstanding the current statutory cap. It specifies that the payment must come exclusively from the liquidation of assets withheld from Maduro and associated persons under U.S. sanctions authorities.

Who It Affects

Directly affects the State Department’s Rewards Program, Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the executive branch officials who seize and manage sanctioned assets; it also affects potential informants, prosecutors handling Venezuela-related cases, and third parties with legal claims to those assets.

Why It Matters

Tying a very large reward to seized-sanctioned assets creates an operational pathway to finance powerful criminal incentives without new appropriations, but also forces a choice over the disposition of blocked assets (rewards, restitution, or other uses) and raises the risk of contested distributions and diplomatic fallout.

More articles like this one.

A weekly email with all the latest developments on this topic.

Unsubscribe anytime.

What This Bill Actually Does

The bill creates a one-time, statutory authorization that temporarily lifts a current cap in the State Department’s Rewards Program and allows the Secretary of State to set a reward of up to $100 million for information that directly leads to the arrest and conviction of Nicolás Maduro. It does not create a new criminal cause of action or change charging decisions; rather, it enlarges the incentive available to potential informants and intermediaries who can provide actionable intelligence to law enforcement.

Critically, the payment must be funded only from the proceeds of liquidating assets that the President or OFAC is withholding from Maduro, regime officials, and their co-conspirators under existing sanctions laws and executive orders (for example, the Kingpin Act and multiple Venezuela-related executive orders). That means the executive branch must identify, liquidate, and reserve funds from such assets before making any payment, and it ties the reward’s availability to the existence and collectibility of such assets.Practically, the measure puts State, Treasury/OFAC, and the Department of Justice into a coordinated posture: OFAC or the President must designate and withhold assets, Treasury must handle liquidation mechanics and custody, State must evaluate claims for reward eligibility under section 36(b) of the Basic Authorities Act, and DOJ must pursue the criminal cases whose convictions trigger payment.

The bill gives the Secretary discretion over payments and allows distribution to one or more claimants — creating the need for an internal process to adjudicate competing claims and to decide allocation shares.Implementation will require new interagency procedures, written criteria for qualifying information, a chain-of-custody for sensitive intelligence, and legal review of any competing claims (civil-asset-claimants, victims’ restitution rights, or foreign-state assertions). The bill does not itself authorize seizure or liquidation beyond existing sanctions authorities; it simply earmarks proceeds from those mechanisms for reward payments.

The Five Things You Need to Know

1

The bill suspends the statutory cap in 22 U.S.C. 2708(e)(1) to permit rewards up to $100,000,000 for information leading to Maduro’s arrest and conviction.

2

It conditions payment exclusively on funds derived from liquidation of assets being withheld from Maduro, Maduro-regime officials, and co-conspirators under sanctions authorities (e.g.

3

the Kingpin Act and specified Venezuela-related executive orders).

4

The Secretary of State — using the Department’s Rewards Program authority in section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 — may pay the $100 million to one or more individuals whose information "directly leads" to an arrest and conviction.

5

The bill names specific legal bases for withheld assets that can fund the reward, including the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and multiple Venezuela-related executive orders, but does not appropriate new funds from the Treasury general fund.

6

No change to criminal charging standards or prosecutorial discretion is made; the bill only alters reward authority and the funding source for such payments.

Section-by-Section Breakdown

Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections. Expand all ↓

Section 1

Short titles

Provides the Act’s short titles (the full long title and the acronym STOP MADURO Act). This is a standard organizational element with no substantive effect on powers or funding; it matters only for citation and cross-referencing in implementing documents and regulations.

Section 2

Findings

Lists factual findings about previously filed criminal charges and prior asset seizures and statements by U.S. attorneys concerning alleged Maduro-led narcotics conspiracies. While nonbinding, these findings signal congressional intent and the factual predicate for elevating the reward — useful context for agencies reviewing congressional purpose in case of legal challenges to execution or allocation of funds.

Section 3(a)

Amend State Department reward authority

Amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act by overriding the statutory cap referenced in 22 U.S.C. 2708(e)(1), permitting the Secretary of State to pay up to $100,000,000 for qualifying information that "directly leads" to Maduro’s arrest and conviction. Administratively this expands the Secretary’s discretionary authority under section 36(b) and requires a rewards adjudication process that can handle very large claims and possibly multiple claimants.

1 more section
Section 3(b)

Specify source of funds — liquidation of sanctioned assets

Mandates that any payment come exclusively from funds realized through liquidation of assets being withheld from Maduro and associated persons under enumerated statutes and executive orders (including the Kingpin Act and certain Venezuela-related EOs). Operationally, this ties reward availability and timing to asset-identification, legal clearance, and liquidation processes controlled by OFAC and the President’s sanctions authorities, rather than to annual appropriations.

At scale

This bill is one of many.

Codify tracks hundreds of bills on Foreign Affairs across all five countries.

Explore Foreign Affairs in Codify Search →

Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost

Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.

Who Benefits

  • Potential informants and intermediaries — a much larger financial reward increases the incentive for insiders, defectors, or third-party brokers to provide high-value information leading to arrest and conviction.
  • U.S. law enforcement and prosecutors — bigger monetary incentives can produce actionable leads and witness cooperation that aid criminal prosecutions and extradition efforts.
  • State Department (Rewards Program) — gains an expanded tool to pursue high-priority foreign targets without seeking new appropriations, increasing executive flexibility in foreign-weapons-of-influence and sanctions enforcement.

Who Bears the Cost

  • Treasury/OFAC and federal asset managers — must identify, preserve, litigate, and liquidate assets, a resource-intensive process that shifts management burdens and potential legal exposure to their offices.
  • Victims and civil claimants — proceeds from sanctioned-asset liquidations are earmarked for reward payments, potentially reducing funds available for victim restitution or competing civil judgments unless otherwise preserved by separate legal priorities.
  • Foreign-policy partners and diplomatic channels — using seized assets to fund rewards tied to a foreign regime may complicate coordination with allies, affect negotiations over asset returns, and provoke diplomatic disputes or litigation from third-party claimants.

Key Issues

The Core Tension

The bill pits two legitimate policy goals against each other: maximizing incentives to obtain evidence that could secure the arrest and conviction of an alleged international criminal leader, versus preserving the legal and policy priorities for seized assets (victim restitution, civil judgments, diplomatic settlements) and ensuring accountable, transparent disposition of those funds; empowering the executive with large, earmarked payouts solves one problem while creating another.

The bill inserts a high-dollar reward mechanism into an already-complex sanctions and asset-forfeiture landscape. The exclusive-funding requirement creates immediate sequencing questions: payments cannot occur until assets are identified, legally withheld, and liquidated, yet criminal prosecutions and convictions can be lengthy and contested.

That sequencing raises practical issues about reserving proceeds, interim distributions, and statutory priority if victims or other creditors obtain judgments against the same assets.

There are legal and operational risks. Large rewards create potential perverse incentives for fabricated or coerced testimony, heighten personal security needs for claimants and witnesses, and invite litigation from parties asserting prior claims to the same assets (including foreign entities).

The bill also increases concentrated executive discretion over very large sums without prescribing allocation criteria, oversight mechanisms, or notice procedures for competing claimants — leaving open how the executive will balance reward payments against restitution, civil judgments, or diplomatic settlements.

Try it yourself.

Ask a question in plain English, or pick a topic below. Results in seconds.