The Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act would establish reporting requirements related to telecommunications equipment and services produced or provided by certain entities. It directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to deliver a baseline report within 180 days of enactment and annual updates for two years detailing the prevalence of untrusted equipment in networks of U.S. allies and partners with collective defense agreements.
The bill also requires a companion assessment focused on U.S. embassies, including the status of implementing NDAA 2019 Section 889 prohibitions and any associated waivers, along with a plan for phasing out such equipment where present. Finally, the Act authorizes the selection of trusted telecom infrastructure projects for support, pairing diplomatic efforts with early-stage project assistance to bolster trusted supply chains abroad.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill mandates (1) an initial 180-day report and two subsequent annual reports on untrusted equipment in allies’ 5G networks, plus (2) a separate embassy-focused report assessing procurement, compliance with 889 prohibitions, waivers, and remediation plans.
Who It Affects
The Secretary of State, the Commerce Department, U.S. embassies and staff, allied governments and their telecom carriers, and network operators deploying 5G/Open RAN technologies.
Why It Matters
It creates a data-driven basis for U.S. policy and diplomacy around trusted networks, enabling targeted risk mitigation and procurement decisions to safeguard national security.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The Act introduces a structured reporting regime aimed at identifying and tracking untrusted telecommunications equipment and services in networks of U.S. allies and partners. It requires, within 180 days of enactment, a baseline report plus annual updates for two years, covering whether untrusted equipment appears in a country’s 5G network, which carriers are involved, and whether the equipment sits in the core or periphery of the network.
It also asks for the country-by-country status of plans to remove such equipment (rip-and-replace) and to note any deployment plans for Open Radio Access Network or successor technologies. A second, separate report addresses the use of covered equipment within U.S. embassies and by embassy personnel, including how the 889 prohibitions have been implemented, any waivers granted, remediation challenges, and the status of phase-out efforts.
The Act also authorizes the selection of trusted telecom infrastructure projects for U.S.-backed support, combining diplomatic backing with early-stage project assistance from the United States Trade and Development Agency. Together, these provisions create a framework to bolster national security through more transparent, data-driven governance of telecom supply chains.
The bill defines trusted versus untrusted equipment by reference to existing standards in the Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act and related NDAA provisions, ensuring alignment with current U.S. policy on telecommunications security.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The Secretary of State must deliver an initial report within 180 days of enactment and annual updates for two years on untrusted equipment in allied networks.
For each ally with a collective defense agreement, the report lists the presence of untrusted equipment in 5G networks, the carriers using it, and whether it is core or periphery.
The embassy report assesses compliance with NDAA 2019 Section 889 and documents waivers, remediation plans, and the status of equipment phase-outs at U.S. embassies.
Definitions tie untrusted equipment to the Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act framework, designating all non-covered gear as trusted only if it is not within the covered category.
The Act authorizes selecting trusted telecom infrastructure projects for U.S.-backed support, including diplomatic and early-stage project assistance from the UTDA.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short Title
This Act may be cited as the Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act.
Sense of Congress
The Congress asserts that national security depends on the security of telecommunications abroad and that trusted equipment and services reduce malign influence and economic coercion. It identifies Huawei and ZTE as entities of concern due to ties to the People’s Republic of China and states the United States has an interest in promoting trusted telecommunications globally.
Report on Untrusted Telecommunications Equipment or Services in Countries with Collective Defense Agreements
Not later than 180 days after enactment and annually for two years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the specified committees a report on untrusted equipment in the networks of U.S. allies and partners. The report must enumerate each ally’s presence of untrusted equipment, identify carriers using or not using it, distinguish core versus peripheral deployment, and describe rip-and-replace plans. It also requires information on Open RAN or successor technologies’ deployment and any related national security considerations.
Report on Covered Telecommunications Equipment or Services in United States Embassies
This section provides findings on supplier origins for embassy devices and the status of implementing the 889 prohibitions with respect to equipment, systems, and services used at U.S. embassies. It requires identification of embassies with and without prohibition implementation, challenges to remediation (e.g., supply-chain visibility, replacement costs), waiver details and justifications, and phase-out progress for entities granted waivers.
Supporting Trusted Telecommunications
The Secretary of State, with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall select international telecom infrastructure projects with national security value to receive support. The Department shall provide diplomatic and political support to help countries overcome barriers and build capacity, and the Director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency should offer early-stage project assistance where appropriate.
Definitions
The terms ‘covered telecommunications equipment or service’ and ‘untrusted telecommunications equipment or service’ align with the definitions in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act of 2019. ‘Trusted’ equipment or service refers to items not treated as covered.
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Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- U.S. State Department and allied policy staff (better data informs diplomacy and security posture)
- Embassy IT teams and personnel (clearer guidance and risk assessments)
- Allied governments and telecom operators (data-driven risk management and upgrade planning)
- U.S. Trade and Development Agency (early-stage project engagement in trusted infrastructure)
- U.S. national security community (improved visibility into global telecom supply chains)
Who Bears the Cost
- Embassies and personnel (equipment replacement costs and deployment disruptions)
- Allied telecom carriers (rip-and-replace costs and network upgrades)
- U.S. government administrative burden and reporting costs
Key Issues
The Core Tension
Balancing the security imperative to avoid untrusted equipment against the practical and political costs of auditing, replacing, and coordinating across diverse allied networks and procurement regimes.
The bill relies on country-by-country reporting and a reliance on existing definitions of ‘covered’ and ‘untrusted’ equipment. While it creates a centralized data stream, the accuracy and timeliness of data from diverse allies and carriers could vary, creating gaps or delays in response.
The integration with NDAA 2019 prohibitions for embassy equipment means some waivers and remediation plans will require cross-agency coordination and could affect alliance procurement timelines. Data handling, classification, and potential sensitive details may yield a need for classified annexes in practice, raising questions about how much information can be shared publicly.
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