The bill creates the Office of the National Fraud and Scam Prevention inside the Executive Office of the President, led by a Presidentially appointed, Senate‑confirmed Director. The Office is charged with advising the President, coordinating federal implementation of fraud- and scam‑prevention policy, standing up a program to accept shared non‑personally identifiable scam data, and coordinating integrated incident responses with federal agencies and private‑sector partners.
This centralization matters because it elevates fraud and scam prevention to White House policy level and creates a formal channel for public–private coordination and playbooks for incident response. Compliance officers, cybersecurity teams, and federal program managers should expect new coordination requirements and a new mechanism for sharing operational intelligence with the federal government.
At a Glance
What It Does
Establishes an office in the Executive Office of the President to coordinate national fraud and scam prevention strategy, lead integrated incident response planning, advise on public education and emerging technology risks, and offer technical assistance to existing interagency efforts. The Office is authorized to receive shared non‑personally identifiable scam data and to consult with private‑sector entities.
Who It Affects
Relevant federal agencies with fraud‑related responsibilities, White House policy offices, and private entities that generate or receive scam data (platforms, financial institutions, telecom carriers, and cybersecurity vendors) that may participate in data sharing or incident response coordination. Interagency task forces and existing law‑enforcement components will encounter a coordinating actor in the White House.
Why It Matters
By colocating coordination in the Executive Office of the President, the bill aims to reduce fragmentation across agencies and to create a single federal interlocutor for the private sector. For practitioners, the Office will change who you contact during major campaigns and create expectations around playbooks, cross‑agency interoperability, and public education campaigns.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill places responsibility for national fraud and scam prevention at the White House level by creating a new Office whose Director reports to the President. The Office’s remit is primarily coordination: it provides strategic advice to the President and to White House policy councils, works with heads of agencies to align budgets and personnel toward shared prevention priorities, and monitors how well agencies implement the agreed strategy.
It is not written to replace existing law‑enforcement or regulatory authorities; instead, the Office is framed as a central coordinator and integrator of federal activities and plans.
Operationally, the Office leads the development and exercise of integrated incident‑response playbooks for fraud and scam campaigns deemed consequential. That includes drafting operational priorities and plans in coordination with agency heads, ensuring lines of effort and delegated authorities are clear, and pushing for regular exercises and updates to those playbooks.
The Office is also tasked with private‑sector engagement: advising on public‑private information sharing, coordinating consultations with industry leaders, and seeking to improve collaboration between defensive and offensive capabilities where appropriate and lawful.On the staffing and resourcing side, the Director can hire personnel, accept detailees from other agencies, use other agencies’ facilities with consent, and enter contracts or cooperative agreements. The statute authorizes standard administrative flexibilities (consultants, contracts, and details) to carry out its work.
The Office must also produce an annual assessment for the President and Congress describing the fraud‑prevention posture and implementation status across the federal government. Finally, the statute defines key terms and establishes a framework for when campaigns qualify for an integrated federal response, while leaving operational specifics about coordination and authorities to the Director’s implementation and interagency arrangements.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The Director is a Presidentially appointed, Senate‑confirmed position paid at the Executive Schedule Level II rate.
The statute creates a statutory civil‑liability shield for any person who, in good faith, shares non‑personally identifiable information with the Office for the Act’s purposes.
The law defines a fraud or scam campaign as having 'significant consequence' if it causes aggregate losses above $5,000,000, affects more than 1,000 individuals, or poses a substantial threat to national economic or cybersecurity interests.
The Director may employ a limited number of personnel outside ordinary civil‑service constraints and may compensate certain hires up to higher pay rates specified in the bill.
All authority granted by the Act, including the Office itself, automatically terminates five years after the statute’s enactment unless new legislation extends it.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Short title
A single clause provides the statute’s short name, the 'National Scam Prevention Coordination Act.' This is a formal naming provision; it carries no operational effect but signals Congress’s framing of the enactment as a coordination statute focused on scams and fraud prevention.
Establishment and leadership in the Executive Office
The Office is established inside the Executive Office of the President and is led by a Director who serves at the President’s pleasure. Placing the Office in EOP intentionally elevates the role above agency heads for strategic coordination. The Director’s placement in EOP creates proximity to policy principals and gives the office access to White House interagency levers — but it also means the Office’s influence will depend on White House priorities and its relationships with agency principals.
Core duties and policy coordination
This subsection lists the Office’s central duties: advising the President, coordinating information‑sharing and secure handling of scam data, guiding public‑education efforts, and harmonizing policy across agencies. Practically, this requires the Office to monitor agency implementation of strategy, recommend organizational and budgeting changes to align resources, and produce an annual assessment for the President and Congress. The emphasis is on alignment rather than direct enforcement of agency authorities.
Integrated incident response and private‑sector engagement
The Office must lead the creation and exercise of integrated incident‑response plans and playbooks for significant fraud campaigns, ensure clear lines of authority and delegation, and promote interoperability across defensive and offensive capabilities where appropriate. It is also explicitly instructed to coordinate with private‑sector entities and to incorporate industry into incident response planning, meaning companies can expect structured consultation during major campaigns.
Administrative authorities and staffing flexibilities
The Director receives broad administrative powers: hiring staff subject to civil‑service rules with specific exceptions, engaging consultants, accepting detailees and voluntary services, entering contracts and cooperative agreements, and using other agencies’ resources with consent. These authorities are typical for an EOP office designed to stand up quickly, but the statute limits certain hiring flexibilities to a capped number of positions paid at higher rates, which is intended to attract technical talent.
Liability protection, definitions, and sunset
The text provides a statutory immunity for entities that share non‑personally identifiable information in good faith with the Office, sets out statutory definitions for 'fraud,' 'scam,' 'incident response,' and 'significant consequence,' and places a five‑year sunset on the Office and its authorities. Those elements define the legal scope of the Office’s engagement, set thresholds for triggering integrated federal responses, and intentionally make the Office a time‑limited experiment unless renewed by Congress.
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Explore Government in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Consumers and victims of mass scams — will likely benefit from centralized public education campaigns, coordinated federal responses, and improved post‑incident recovery planning that aim to reduce aggregate harms and speed remediation.
- Federal agencies with overlapping fraud responsibilities — benefit from a single coordinating authority that can align budgets, exercises, and playbooks, reducing duplication and clarifying lines of effort during complex campaigns.
- Private‑sector platforms, financial institutions, and telecom carriers — gain a formal mechanism to share non‑personally identifiable scam data with the federal government and to receive coordinated guidance and playbooks during incidents, which can streamline incident handling.
- Law‑enforcement and national security components — may gain improved situational awareness and coordinated operational support when the Office successfully integrates defensive plans with offensive authorities consistent with applicable law.
Who Bears the Cost
- Private companies that participate in data sharing or incident coordination — face new compliance demands, potential costs for anonymizing and transferring data, and operational obligations to engage in exercises and consultations.
- Federal agencies — must adapt to a new coordinating office that can recommend organizational and budget changes, potentially requiring reallocation of staff and resources and creating additional planning and reporting obligations.
- Small vendors and nonprofit groups — may be pressured to conform to federal playbooks or to dedicate limited staff time to federal exercises and consultations, imposing capacity and cost burdens disproportionate to their size.
- Privacy advocates and civil‑liberties stakeholders — bear the burden of scrutinizing how non‑PII is defined and handled; they may need to litigate or lobby to clarify boundaries if data‑sharing practices blur into personally identifiable information.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is between centralized, high‑level coordination (which promises faster, coherent federal responses and streamlined public‑private collaboration) and the risks that centralization imposes on agency autonomy, privacy protections, and legal clarity: the Office can streamline action, but unless implementation rules around data handling, thresholds, and authorities are tightly defined, it may concentrate decisions without sufficient guardrails, creating both operational efficiency and legal/policy risk.
The bill deliberately prioritizes coordination and information sharing but leaves many operational contours to the Director and interagency processes. That design trades immediate statutory specificity for implementation flexibility, which can be useful for rapidly evolving fraud techniques but also creates uncertainty for stakeholders about exactly when and how the Office will act.
The authority to accept detailees, contractors, and voluntary services makes rapid stand‑up feasible but shifts the practical burden of staffing and expertise onto agencies and private organizations that provide resources.
The statutory immunity for sharing non‑personally identifiable information reduces legal risk for contributors but raises close questions about the definition of 'non‑personally identifiable' and how re‑identification risks will be managed. The threshold that triggers an integrated federal response is numeric and administratively determined; that clarity helps prioritize scarce government resources but risks excluding high‑harm, targeted campaigns that fall below the threshold or drawing in campaigns that meet the numbers but are not strategic priorities.
Finally, the five‑year sunset creates an implicit sunset for stakeholder commitments: private partners and agencies may be reluctant to make long‑term investments in processes or systems tied to an office that automatically expires unless Congress acts to extend it.
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